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A bstract
In this thesis we demonstrate how important the existence of a pool of qual­
ified workers within the local labour market is for the process of job creation 
and the location of economic activity.
In chapter 1 the basic theoretical model is developed. Using a matching model 
it is shown that Job Creation will be higher if firms have a larger pool of qual­
ified workers from which to fill their vacancies, since their expected profits per 
vacancy opened will be greater. At the same time, individuals have a higher 
incentive to invest in education if job creation is higher. The interaction be­
tween these two forces generates a pecuniary externality in the labour market.
In chapter 2, we extend the theoretical model by considering two regions and 
the possibility of migration. In equilibrium, areas where the pool of qualified 
workers is larger attract more jobs and skilled workers. Job Creation will be 
higher in such areas since firms located there are able to find a more qualified 
worker with greater ease. At the same time, given the sunk cost of moving, 
only the most skilled workers will find migration to these areas worthwhile. 
The interaction between these two forces generates a pecuniary externality 
that encourages concentration of economic activity in areas with a larger pool 
of qualified workers.
In chapter 3 we estimate the effect of the pecuniary education externality on 
the process of matching in the UK regional labour market in the 1990s. We 
find a significant effect of the average level of education in a region on the 
conditional probability of finding a job in that region using a duration model. 
This effect is positive for skilled occupations and negative for unskilled ones.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we estimate the effect of the education externality on 
the individual decision to stay-on in education. We find that the share of 
the region’s working age population with degree has a positive and significant 
effect on the education decisions of sixteen and eighteen year-olds, while the 
share with high vocational has a similar effect for seventeen year-olds.
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Chapter 1
Job creation and increasing  
returns to  human capital
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter we show that the interaction between ex-ante investment de­
cisions of heterogeneous individuals and firms in a labor market with search 
frictions generates a positive externality on the accumulation of human capital 
and the possibility of multiple equilibria. When individuals have to invest in 
education prior to entering the labor market and firms have to decide to open 
a vacancy before meeting a worker, in a labor market characterized by search 
frictions, there will exist a positive spill-over from each individual’s investment 
in human capital to the rest of the society.
In general, individuals make their education decisions when young, well before 
entering the labor market. This decisions will thus be based on the expected 
probability to find a job and earn a wage. On the other hand, firms nor­
mally have to decide whether to incur in the cost of opening a vacancy or not, 
before knowing which worker they will be matched with. This means that 
they will base their decision on the expected profits from opening a vacancy, 
which will depend on the expected average of human capital among individu­
als. Therefore any exogenous change in the level of education of some workers 
will increase the expected profits per vacancy, augmenting job creation and 
the employment rate. This will improve every individual’s expectations about 
the labor market and in turn will give incentives to everyone to increase his 
investment in human capital. At an aggregate level, the existence of increasing
11
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returns might generate different equilibria dependent on the underlying param­
eters. Some economies might get stuck at a low employment, low aggregate 
level of human capital equilibrium, while others will enjoy full employment and 
high skill level, depending on the underlying characteristics of each economy.
The interesting feature of this externality is that it does not depend on the 
existence of increasing returns to scale neither in the production function, nor 
in the matching function. It is only due to the combination of heterogeneity 
of workers and search frictions in the labor market.
This externality is generated by a similar mechanism to the one in Acemoglu 
(1996), which he called, pecuniary externality. Acemoglu shows that the in­
teraction between ex-ante investment in human capital by individuals and in 
physical capital by firms in a labor market with frictions, generates increasing 
returns to human capital. The main difference with this work is that he as­
sumes full employment, equal to the population size. We study equilibria with 
unemployment deriving richer results about the features of labour markets 
characterised with this externality. In addition, this model provides a simple 
reduced form expression which will be used in chapters 3 and 4 to test the 
existence of the externality in the individual education decisions and unem­
ployment durations. This also allows for a fairly simple analysis of the social 
planner’s solution.
When we introduce physical capital in the model, the positive externality on 
human capital accumulation is generated through two different sources: job 
creation and physical capital accumulation by the firms matched with the more 
skilled workers. When some individuals raise their investment in human capi­
tal, firms expect to be matched with a more skilled worker, so expected profits 
increase and they open more vacancies, raising the level of employment. At 
the same time, the firms which are matched with more skilled workers will in­
crease their physical capital, increasing even further the expected profits and 
the number of vacancies. This will raise employment and education even fur­
ther.
The derivation of an equilibrium with unemployment allows us to obtain a 
theoretical relation between aggregate employment, or unemployment, and
CHAPTER 1. JOB CREATION AND INCREASING RETURNS 13
the distribution of education in the labor force. This is particularly appealing, 
since it permits the analysis of processes related to changes in the size of the 
labor force1. The reason being that demographic or sociological changes may 
alter the distribution of human capital among workers, affecting job creation 
and unemployment.
The model developed in this chapter can also shed some light on the con­
nection between individual education decisions and individual unemployment 
rates. Empirical evidence by Mincer (1991) suggests that people with higher 
educational levels suffer a lower risk of unemployment and a lower duration 
of unemployment. This can be explained within the model by endogeniz- 
ing the intensity of search that each individual delivers. That is, individuals 
with higher education have higher ability and therefore search more efficiently, 
which increases their probability of employment.
However, this is not the only possible mechanism explaining education exter­
nalities. The endogenous growth literature, originated with the seminal pa­
pers by Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986), has shown that in an economy with a 
higher average level of education processes like the exchange of ideas, imitation 
or learning by doing are more likely to occur fostering technological progress. 
Since these externalities work through the improvement of technology in the 
process of production, are called technological externalities. Instead, the ex­
ternality studied in the present work is generated in the labour market, due 
to the interaction between ex-ante heterogenous workers and search frictions. 
That is why it is called pecuniary externality. In addition, these literature 
does not study unemployment equilibria. Finally, Saint-Paul (1992) also de­
rives pecuniary externalities from the accumulation of human capital but as a 
consequence of wage rigidities.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2 we start by de­
scribing the economy. In Section 1.3, we solve for the labor market equilibrium 
taking the average level of human capital as given. While in Section 1.4 the 
general equilibrium of the economy is obtained by endogeneizing the decision
1 Demographic changes normally do not have any effect on the equilibrium of a labor 
market characterized by a matching process, because the matching function is assumed to 
have constant returns to scale.
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to invest in human capital. The Social Planner’s Solution is derived in section 
1.5. Some extensions to the basic model are considered in sections 1.6 and 1.7. 
Finally, section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 D escription  o f th e  Econom y
1.2.1 Firms and Workers
This is an non-overlapping generations model, where individuals live one pe­
riod only. That is, all individuals are born at the beginning of the period. 
First, they go to school and then they enter the job market simultaneously to 
search for a job. At the end of the period, end of workers’ lives, all jobs are 
destroyed and firms and newborn workers start the search process again.
In the economy there are L individuals, each one born with a different ability 
(aj). When young they attend full-time education and then enter the labor 
market with the human capital obtained (hi). In the labor market individuals 
and firms engage in a search process, which produces a number of matches. 
Those individuals who find a job, produce and earn a wage, while the rest 
remain unemployed and earn a subsidy.
The number of firms active in the economy is variable. When a firm decides 
to enter the labor market opens a vacancy and starts looking for a worker. 
The cost of opening the vacancy is sunk, so the firm will only open one when 
expected profits are non-negative. Once a firm and a worker meet, the firm 
buys the appropriate technology for the worker’s human capital level and the 
worker brings one unit of labor and his human capital. The result of the match 
is the production of yi units of product using the following technology:
Vi = A h f (1.1)
where A > 0 is a constant representing the technological level and 1 > a > 0.2
2 Physical capital is not introduced in this version of the model to simplify and emphasize 
the main mechanism studied.
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1.2.2 Wage determ ination
When a match is realized, the occupied job will yield a return that is at least 
as high as the sum of the expected returns of a searching firm and a searching 
worker. The realized job match yields some pure economic rent which is equal 
to the sum of the expected search costs of the firm and the worker. Wages are 
set to share this economic rent according to the Nash Solution to a bargaining 
problem, as in Pissarides (2000). The wage rate will be the one that maximizes 
the weighted product of the worker’s and the firm’s net return from the job 
match. The worker will gain from the match a wage (w^ and will give up the 
unemployment benefit (z ). The firm will obtain from the match the product 
(yi) minus the wage paid to the worker and will give up the expected profits 
of the vacancy, which are equal to zero in equilibrium. Therefore the wage for 
this job will satisfy
Wi = arg max(wj -  z)0 (yi -  Wi)l~0
where 0 < (3 < 1. The parameter (3 might be interpreted as the worker’s 
relative bargaining power. The solution of this maximization problem gives us 
the following wage rule:
^  = j3yi +  (1 -  P)z 
The firm’s net returns (7q) are equal to the product minus the wage, namely
7Ti =  (1 -  P)yi -  (1 -  P)z
Throughout the rest of the chapter, the unemployment benefit is assumed equal 
to zero. This is only done for simplification purposes, since having a positive 
subsidy will not change the results, as long as the subsidy is independent of
the productivity of the worker. Therefore the expression for the profits and
wages we will use is the following:
Wi = p A h f (1.2)
7n = ( l - p ) A h f  (1.3)
It is clear from these equations that the firm’s and worker’s returns from the 
match will be larger the higher the education level that the individual acquired
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when young.
1.2.3 Education Decisions
The acquisition of education level hi requires effort e*, which is increasing in 
the amount of education acquired and decreasing on each individual’s ability.3 
A simple expression that satisfies these assumptions is:
In order to decide how much to invest in human capital, each individual max­
imizes his utility subject to his resource constraint, taking the probability of 
employment as given (q). The constraint only says that every person will con­
sume according to her expected income, which is equal to the wage times the 
probability of finding a job (q).
h?
max Ui= a  l— (1.4)
hi OjW
s.t : Ci = w(hi)q
Where the wage is given by equation (1.2). The solution to this maximization 
problem gives the individual’s optimal human capital investment, which de­
pends positively on the level of ability of the individual and on the probability
of finding a job.
hi = (aAficiiq)*^ (1.5)
where 'P > 1 >  a  > 0.
Lem m a 1.1. The individual’s optimal investment in human capital increases 
with the probability of employment and with his own ability.
Proof: Prom equation (1.5), the derivative of the optimal human capital with 
respect to q and with respect to a* is positive as long as ^  > a. That is, as 
long as the elasticity of the expected wage with respect to human capital 
(a) is smaller than the elasticity of the utility cost of human capital (4/).
3In a different context it might be useful to define a* differently - for example as the 
distance to the nearest education centre or as a higher opportunity cost of education for 
women. However, for the externality to exist it has to be an exogenous characteristic given 
before the entrance to the labour market.
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This assumption is a necessary condition for the second order condition 
to hold and it includes the case of a quadratic cost function, generally 
used in the literature.
1.3 Labor M arket Equilibrium
Trade in the labor market is considered a decentralized economic activity, 
mainly due to the existence of heterogeneities among workers, but also to fric­
tions and information imperfections. Because of this, it becomes difficult for 
firms to find the appropriate worker and for workers to find a job, thus they 
have to spend resources searching before production takes place. This gives 
rise to unemployment in equilibrium (see Pissarides (2000), Pissarides (1992)).
The timing of events in the labor market is as follows. First, firms decide to 
open vacancies and then firms and workers engage in search. After a costly 
search process, a match is realized. Then production takes place using the 
firm’s technology and the worker’s human capital. At the end of the period all 
matches are destroyed. The labor market is therefore composed of L  workers 
and V  vacancies who engage in a search process by which N  matches are 
created.
N  = min{m(y, L), L }
where m (.,.) represents a matching function with standard properties, ie. in­
creasing in both arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree one. The level
of employment (N) should also be equal to the number of individuals looking 
for work times the probability that a worker meets a firm (q)
N  = qL . (1.6)
This implies that on average,
N  V
q = T  = ^ L ’1) • (L?)
It is assumed that q is also the transition probability for each worker. The 
average probability of filling a vacancy (p) has to be equal to the level of
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employment (AT, equation (1.6)) over the number of vacancies opened.
N  qL
p = v  = v  (L8)
If we define market tightness as the ratio of vacancies opened to the number of 
searchers, , 0 — j ,  we can express the transition probabilities of workers and 
firms as a function of market tightness.
V =  rn( l , i )  
q = m (0,1)
The dependence of these functions on the relative number of traders (tight­
ness) shows the trading externality typical of matching models. This exter­
nality arises because price is no longer the only allocative mechanism, there is 
also stochastic rationing. There is a positive probability that a vacancy is not 
filled or that a worker does not find a job, which cannot be eliminated through 
price adjustments, but it can be improved or worsened by the relative number 
of traders in the market.
The expected profit of a firm from a vacancy {E(tt)) will be equal to the 
probability of filling a vacancy (p) with a worker, times the profit obtained 
from employing that worker. Since the firm does not know which worker will 
arrive we have to integrate over all possible individuals.
EW = p rP J[y ( f t ) -^ f t ) ] /W rff t j  (1 9)
Substituting the equations determining p (equation (1.8)), yt (equation (1.1)) 
and the wage (equation (1.2)) into this equation, we obtain the expected profit 
from a vacancy, as a function of the distribution of human capital.
E(«) = l ( i - m fh(arLf(a)da (mo)
There is a fixed cost of opening a job equal to c, which is independent of the 
type of worker recruited. This implies that firms will open vacancies as long 
as the expected profit per vacancy is bigger than the cost of opening it.
E (tt) > c
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In equilibrium no firm can open a job and make a positive profit since there 
are no barriers to entry, therefore E(7r) = c. Substituting the expected profits 
(equation (1.10)) in the free-entry condition and solving for the number of 
vacancies opened (over the population size), we obtain the first equilibrium 
condition of the labor market, which will be called ” Job Creation Condition”:
[ (1 -0 M 1 J  h(a)a f  (a)da
C L
This means that in equilibrium market tightness depends positively on the 
employment rate, as well as on the distribution of human capital among the 
population. Therefore, if one of these factors increases, market tightness will 
be below its equilibrium level - there are too few vacancies - firms will expect 
positive net profits and will open more vacancies. As the number of vacancies 
increases, so does market tightness and the expected profits per vacancy de­
crease until they are equal again to the cost of opening a vacancy. The ” Job 
Creation Condition” also shows that the probability of filling a vacancy (p) is 
independent of q or 6 in equilibrium, since otherwise more vacancies would be 
opened.
* = H
Therefore the equilibrium value of p depends positively on the profit per worker 
and negatively on the cost of opening a vacancy. This is explained through 
a similar argument as before. When one of this factors increases, p will be 
above its equilibrium level, making the expected profits from opening a va­
cancy larger than the costs and firms will start opening more vacancies. As 
the number of vacancies increases, so does market tightness and the com­
petition among firms in the search for workers. This will start reducing the 
expected profits until they become zero, where the equilibrium will be restored.
In order to solve for the equilibrium in the labor market we also have to deter­
mine the probability of finding a job (q). Using equation (1.7), we can obtain 
this probability as the number of matchings per person searching. Obviously, 
there has to be an upper-bound on q equal to 1.
a - m J h(a)af(a)dal j
q = min {m  (8,1 ), 1}
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Assuming a specific functional form for the matching function m  (V, L) = 
(b V (L)1_<?!> we obtain the second equilibrium condition, which will be called 
” Employment Rate Condition”.
' (W)* i f  ( W f  < 1
9 =  S
1 otherwise
where 6 > 0 is a scaling constant and 0 < 0 < 1 represents the relative effi­
ciency of firms and workers in the search process. 4 Both, the ” Job Creation 
Condition1'' and the ” Employment Rate Condition’’ represent relations between 
market tightness and the probability of finding a job, for a given distribution 
of human capital. Therefore, the equilibrium values of this variables will be 
determined at the point in which the two curves cross, which is shown in fig­
ures 1.1 and 1.2.
Notice that we can define a-^ a as E[ha], which from now on will be called
’’average” education. However, this term depends on the whole distribution 
and can be shown to be approximately equal to the following:
where ph and cr^  are the average and variance of the education distribution in 
the economy.
This market has a unique non-trivial equilibrium given h and the exogenous 
parameters of the economy. But this unique equilibrium may have different 
characteristics depending on the distribution of h and the exogenous param­
eters. When the ’’average” level of human capital is very high, or the cost of 
opening a vacancy is very low, an equilibrium with full employment and high 
tightness is more likely to prevail, otherwise unemployment and low tightness 
will be found in equilibrium. Which of this two unique equilibriums will ex­
ist depends on whether the two equations cross before they reach the upper 
bound of full employment or not, i.e. if the maximum value of 9 from the ” Job 
Creation condition” (0max =  ^r-E[h?]) is bigger than the maximum value of
4This is assumed to be equal for both, i.e.: <j) =
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Figure 1.1: Labour Market Equilibrium case Figure 1.2: Labour Market Equilibrium case
1- @max ^  5 2 . 0max >  ^
9 from the ”Employment rate condition” (0 = £). The reason is that, when 
the ”average” human capital in the economy is very large, the firms’ expected 
profits are so big that they will keep on creating new jobs beyond the point 
in which market tightness is large enough to achieve full employment. This 
will happen until expected profits disappear and labour market equilibrium is 
achieved. This is defined in the following condition:
Condition 1.1. An upper-bound to the education externality exists when ’’av­
erage” education is large enough. For the externality to affect the equilibrium 
employment rate the following condition must hold:
(L12)
Otherwise ’’average” human capital is too large and job creation will be so 
strong that full employment will always be achieved.
Axiom 1.1. The unique non-trivial equilibrium can have different character­
istics depending on the distribution of human capital and the exogenous pa­
rameters of the economy:
Case 1: if condition 1.1 holds an equilibrium exists with unemployment and 
low market tightness.
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Case 2: if condition 1.1 does not hold there is full employment and market 
tightness is high in equilibrium.
9 = 1 ; 0 = ^ =i^ E[h?] (1.14)
Both, the probability of finding a job and market tightness (number of vacan­
cies opened) in case 1 depend positively on the distribution of human capital 
existent in the population, and the same happens with market tightness in 
case 2. These equilibrium values also depend positively on other parameters 
of the model like the bargaining power of firms or the technological progress 
and negatively on the cost of opening a vacancy.
Lem m a 1.2. In equilibrium, both the probability of employment (if there is 
unemployment) and market tightness will increase if some or all the individuals 
in the labor market increase their investments in human capital, keeping the 
investment of the rest constant.
Proof: Prom equation (1.13), we know that the equilibrium values of q and 6 
depend positively on E[hf\, since 1 > (f> < 0. Thus, if hi is increased for 
some individuals from h® to h\ (where h\ > h®) 5 and remains constant 
for the rest, then E  [(h*)a] > E  [(h°)Q], since 1 > a > 0 and there­
fore E[hf\ is a convex function of hi (see Aghion &; Williamson for the 
mathematical theorem).
The reason is that the higher the E (h f ), the bigger the probability of employ­
ing a worker with more skills, obtaining a higher expected profit per vacancy 
opened. Therefore, the job creation condition will shift to the right and more 
vacancies will be opened increasing market tightness. The greater availability 
of vacant jobs makes it easier for unemployed workers to find a job and the 
probability of employment rises until it reaches the new equilibrium. Graph­
ically this would correspond to the Job Creation Condition pivoting to the 
right, and cutting the Employment Rate Condition for a higher q and 6, as 
shown in figure 1.3.
5 This increase may vary across individuals
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Figure 1.3: Rise in E[ha]. Case 2: 0max > |
e
1.4 E q u ilib r iu m  o f  th e  E con om y
The equilibrium of this economy is fully described by the two variables deter­
mining the equilibrium in the labor market, i.e.: probability of employment and 
market tightness (equation (1.13) and ( 1.14)), plus the individual’s optimal 
investment in human capital (equation (1.5)). In order to be able to analyze 
this equilibrium, we should express the human capital in the same functional 
form as it appears in the labor market conditions, i.e.: E[hf]. Therefore the 
three equations determining the equilibrium in the economy are the following:
This is a recursive system. First of all, we obtain the equilibrium values of 
the employment rate and aggregate human capital from the first two equa­
tions and then we substitute the human capital in the third equation to obtain 
the equilibrium value of the market tightness. The best way of understanding
E[ha] =  (Aa/3q)*-a E[a*~a (1.15)
otherwise
q < 1
(1.16)
otherwise
(1.17)
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Figure 1.4: Equilibrium of the economy. Figure 1.5: Equilibrium of the economy.
Case 1: unemployment equilibrium Case 2: full employment
this equilibrium is graphically. In figure 1.4 we can see the equilibrium in the 
{q, E[ha ]} space.
A unique non-trivial stable equilibrium always exists, but it can have differ­
ent characteristics depending on the concavity of the function determining 
the cost of education. We can have three different cases: one with unemploy­
ment, another with full employment and finally, the trivial case of a no-activity 
equilibrium. In the second case there is also another equilibrium with unem­
ployment, but it is unstable. Which case prevails will depend on a condition 
determined by the underlying parameters of the economy, in particular by the 
distribution of abilities. Which case prevails will depend on the following two 
conditions determined by the underlying parameters of the economy:
Condition 1.2. An upper-bound to the education externality exists when the 
”average ” ability amongst the population is large enough. For the externality 
to affect the equilibrium employment rate the following condition must hold:
a C
' '    31  (!-18)
6(1 —  /3)A^-a(a/3)^-a
Otherwise ”average” ability is too large and therefore ” average” human capital 
is also too large making job creation so strong that full employment is always 
achieved. This condition is equivalent to condition 1.1 but expressed in terms 
of ability instead of human capital.
Condition 1.3. 4/ > 2a
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Figure 1.6: Equilibrium of the economy. Case 3: no economic activity
This makes the second derivative of the ”average ” human capital equation with 
respect to the employment rate negative. That is, average human capital in­
creases less than proportionally when the probability of employment raises. The 
intuition being that a higher 'ip raises the rate at which the marginal cost of ed­
ucation increases while the rate at which the marginal benefits of education 
rises remains constant. Therefore individuals have a lower incentive to invest 
in education as the employment rate raises.
Axiom 1.2. The unique non-trivial stable equilibrium can have unemploy­
ment or not depending on the concavity of the cost of education function, the 
distribution of abilities and the exogenous parameters of the economy:
Case 1: if conditions 1.2 and 1.3 hold we have an equilibrium which is stable 
(point A in figure 1.4). This equilibrium will have unemployment with 
low ” average” human capital and low market tightness.
q' = Ai ( £ [ a ^ | )  
h] = [/ta/JAjaJ1=5 (^ [a 1^"])* 2°
where A, =
Case 2: if neither condition 1.2 nor condition 1.3 hold there is a stable
equilibrium with full employment and high investment in human capital
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(point B in figures 1.5 and A.l).
q2 = 1
h2 = (AapCLi)*^
0} =
In addition, if condition 1.2 is also fulfilled, we have a second equilibrium 
with some unemployment and low investment in human capital, but 
unstable (figure 1.5, point A).
Case 3: Otherwise, an equilibrium different from zero does not exist (figure 
1 .6 ).
The more interesting is case 1, in which an stable equilibrium with unemploy­
ment is obtained. This case results from the existence of a coordination failure 
problem, or externality in the accumulation of human capital. This externality 
results from the interaction between the search frictions in the labor market 
(trading externality) and the heterogeneity of individuals. When an individual 
(or rather a group of individuals) increases his human capital he knows he will 
obtain a higher wage if he finds a job. However, he cannot realize that the sub­
sequent rise in the ’’average” level of education will increase expected profits 
and job creation, rising the employment rate. It is the failure to recognize this 
second effect that gives rise to the coordination failure. Therefore, if there are 
not enough incentives for the individual to invest enough in human capital, the 
firm will expect a less qualified worker and its expected profits will decrease, 
reducing job creation and the investment in human capital of all individuals. 
Then the economy may find itself at a situation with high unemployment, and 
a low level of human capital.
The intuition for case 3 is the following. When the ’’average” level of ability is 
too low or the parameters determining the cost (benefit) of opening a vacancy 
are too high (low), firms will have no incentive to open any vacancy and there 
will be no activity in the labor market. This corresponds to the case in the 
labor market equilibrium, in which the job creation curve has a bigger slope 
than the employment rate curve for all 6. This is an interesting result which 
may help to explain the lack of skill intensive sectors in developing economies
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or in deprived areas within a country.
P roposition  1.1. An increase in the education level of some individuals in­
creases market tightness and therefore the probability to find a job. This in­
creases the expected wage of every individual and thus his investment in human 
capital.
Proof: From lemma 1 . 1  we know that the individual’s investment in human 
capital increases with the probability to find a job. And from lemma
1 . 2  we know that the value of the market tightness that equilibrates 
the labor market depends positively on the ’’average” human capital 
existent in the economy. Therefore, the individual’s optimal investment 
in education depends positively on the ’’average” level of education. This 
becomes clear by substituting the employment rate that equilibrates the 
labour market (equation 1.13) into the optimal investment in human 
capital (equation 1.15).
h i  =  <
- i f  q < 1
 ^ (A a fia i)*^  i f  q=  1
The equilibrium with unemployment described in case 1 and corresponding 
to point A in figure 1.4) is stable. To see why we can think of what would 
happen if the economy was below point A, with an employment rate and ’’av­
erage” human capital lower than in equilibrium. At that employment rate, 
the ’’average” level of education optimal for individuals is higher than the one 
which equilibrates the labor market. That is, it is higher than what firms 
expected. This implies that too few vacancies are opened and thus the compe­
tition between firms for the existing workers is not very intense, which makes 
the expected net profits per vacancy positive. Thus the number of vacancies 
starts augmenting and so does market tightness, increasing the probability to 
find a job. This augments the individuals’ incentives to invest in education and 
eventually improves the ’’average” level of education, which in turn increases 
even further the net expected profits of firms. This process goes on until q and 
E[ha] rise back to the equilibrium. A similar argument applies for the stability 
of the equilibrium with full employment described in case 2 (point B in figures
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Figure 1.7: Case 3: Equilibrium of the economy with compulsory education
E(g(h)]
1.5 and 1.5).
The possibility of the market shutting down when the ” average” level of ed­
ucation is too low is very worrying. However, this possibility can be reduced 
by introducing some compulsory education, so that all individuals acquire a 
minimum level of education even if there are no job opportunities at all. This 
is equivalent to assuming that the individually optimum level of investment in 
human capital has a lower bound equal to that compulsory education (/imm), 
which does not affect utility. That is:
hi = { A a p a iq )^  + hmin
If we take expectations we get
E[ha ] = (AaPq)*^ E [a*^ ] + hm
This implies that now even in case 3 we can obtain a stable non-trivial equilib­
rium with unemployment (point A in figure 1.7). This shows that an education 
policy guaranteing a minimum level of compulsory education for all individ­
uals, is not only important because of the individual gains in terms of future 
expected earnings but also because it helps to ensure the existence of labour 
markets.
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1.5 Social P lanner’s Solution
The existence of a positive externality from education raises an important 
question about the social optimality of the individual decision. Individuals 
cannot internalize the externality in their optimal decisions, since they con­
sider the employment rate as given, therefore their investment in education 
in equilibrium might be different from the socially optimal, and in fact it can 
be proven to be too low. The social planner knows that the investment de­
cisions affect the equilibrium in the labor market, thus he will take this into 
account when deciding the optimal investment. He will maximize the following 
objective function:
ax |m ( 0 , 1 )L J  Ah(a)a f(a)da — cV — L J  — / ( a )d a |m
Q i
Solving this problem we obtain the socially optimal market tightness and hu­
man capital investment
gSP= (  ^ E [ha\" ^
/ifp =  (A a a n fp ) (1.19)
where ^  > 1 > a > 0 .
Proposition 1.2. The socially optimal investment in human capital is higher 
than the individually optimal investment.
Proof: Comparing the socially optimal level of investment (hfp ), with the 
privately optimal level (/if), (equation (1.5)), we have that:
h fP > h> i f f  qsp > 0qp
which is always true since qsp > qp in equilibrium (proof in the ap­
pendix).
This shows that there is scope for policy intervention. That is the government 
should subsidise individuals’ investment in education to reach the socially op­
timal level. This could be done either by increasing the supply or the demand
CHAPTER 1. JOB CREATION AND INCREASING RETURNS 30
for human capital. An example of the importance of policy intervention was 
shown in the equilibrium of case 3 where a policy guaranteing a minimum level 
of education for every individual made sure that a labour market would always 
exist.
1.6 Physical C apital
In this section we consider the investment in physical capital by firms. We 
assume that a perfect market for capital exists where capital can be rented 
once the match is realized. That is, the capital investment by firms is not 
sunk, it can be recovered. The technology of production now will be:
yij - Ak)~ahf 
where i represents the individual and j  the firm.
The introduction of physical capital in the model generates the following 
changes with respect to the basic model. First, the total match surplus now 
has to take into account the cost of renting the capital. Solving the Nash 
Bargaining problem in the same way as in section 1.2, we get the new wage 
and profit rules:
Wij = /3(Akj~ah f -  rkj) +  (1 -  (3)z
7n j = (1 -  (3)(Ak)-ati* -  rkj) -  ( 1  -  (J)z
Secondly, the firm’s maximization problem has also changed. The firm now has 
to undertake two different investment decisions. It has to decide whether to 
open a vacancy or not, incurring in the sunk costs of advertising and recruiting, 
depending on the expected profits from opening it. Then, once the worker has 
been recruited, it has to decide what is the appropriate level of physical capital 
it needs to rent for the worker’s level of human capital. That is, when the firm 
acquires the physical capital it already knows the level of human capital of the 
worker. This implies that we can determine the capital decision first, taking 
the worker’s human capital as given, and then the job creation decision. The
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optimal level of physical capital will be equal to:
kj = argmaxTTjj =  argmax(l — (3) (Akj ah\f — rkj — z ) given h
and solving we get,
kj — hi A ( 1  — a)
This implies that the firm will acquire capital until the physical to human 
capital ratio is constant and equal for all firms, so we can drop the subscripts.
A{\ — a)
The wage and profit rules can also be expressed in terms of this ratio:
1—a
wk - aPAh{ + (1  -  (3)z
n k  =  a { l  -  P ) A h i  -  (1( l - P ) z
Now, we can solve the rest of model in the same manner as before. The main 
difference with the basic model is that all equations will be multiplied by a 
factor which is a function of the physical to human capital ratio. The optimal 
investment in education by the individual will be:
h? = aA(3diq ( ^
1—a
(1.20)
where ^  > 1 . And the equilibrium of the economy with physical capital will 
be obtained by solving the following system of equations:
E[hk] =  [aA0q]*=i £[a*=r] ( -
1 —a
k \  * - »
[a © I " 0 ] 1
1 otherwise
The implications of including capital in the model are clear from the previous
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equations. Now the externality of education is potentiated by firms’ invest­
ments in physical capital. As in the basic model, when some individuals invest 
more on education, they raise the economy’s average level of education and 
the expected profits of firms from opening a vacancy. Increasing job creation 
and the probability of employment for all individuals. However, now we have 
a second mechanism. The firms matched with these more skilled individuals 
will invest more on capital, increasing even further the gains from the match. 
This provides an additional incentive for all individuals to invest in education. 
Now it is the exact average level of education what affects the employment 
rate, which is larger than the ’’average” human capital of the basic model 
(E[hi\ > E[hf since a < 1). The effect will be potentiated even further if the 
physical to human capital ratio is larger than one. This will happen when the 
cost of renting capital is low, and/or the technological level and the share of 
physical capital in production are high. The reason being that in this case for 
every unit of human capital the individuals contribute to the match, the firm 
contributes with more than one unit of physical capital.
With capital, the conditions for an equilibrium with unemployment to exist 
are slightly different:
E h * -1] <
c
(1.21)
b( 1 — (3)A^~a (aP)^~a 
V > 2 (1.22)
A xiom  1.3. A stable equilibrium with unemployment exists if both conditions 
hold equal to the following:
[ A a / J A t a J j
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1.7 D ifferent U nem ploym ent R ates
It is a known stylized fact that individuals with higher levels of education 
face lower unemployment rate and this empirical fact seems to hold for most 
developed countries and education levels 6. Mincer (1991) suggests that the 
differences in individual unemployment rates are mainly due to the fact that 
more educated workers are relatively more efficient in acquiring and processing 
job search information and that workers and firms search more intensively to 
fill more skilled vacancies. In this section I try to reconcile the basic model 
with this empirical fact by endogeneizing the individual’s search efficiency.7
The basic model in this chapter assumes that all individuals face the same 
unemployment rate, this is because they all search with the same intensity. 
Instead, we may think that different individuals search with different inten­
sity depending on their characteristics. The more intensively an individual 
searches, the higher the probability of finding a job. Then, the individual 
probability of employment will be equal to the number of search units that 
particular individual supplies (s*) times the general employment rate prevail­
ing in the economy. And the same will be true for the probability of filling a 
vacancy with individual i. Namely,
Qi = s{q 
Pi =  Sip
The aggregate supply of search units (S ) will be the sum of the efficient search 
units supplied by each individual:
S = J  sf(s)ds
In this case, each person has to make two decisions: the investment in edu­
cation and the number of units of search to supply. It is assumed that the 
acquisition of s* units of search and hi units of education, requires an effort e*, 
which is increasing in the amount of education or search units acquired and 
decreasing in the ability of each individual. A simple expression that satisfies
6In some developing countries, like India, this is not true
7This will be done using a similar method as in Pissarides (1992) and Pissarides (2000) 
chapter 5.
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these assumptions is:
Therefore, the individual will solve the following maximization problem:
ti? sT maxm = PAhfSiq-----
hi , s i  C ljl
Solving, we obtain the optimal search intensity as a positive function of educa­
tion and the investment in education as a positive function of search intensity, 
while both are a function of ability and the employment rate.
hi =  (aAftdiSiq)*-* (1-23)
Si = (Afiaihfq)*^  (1-24)
where > 1 > a > 0  and T > 1 .
The main difference with the basic model in the labor market is that now we
have L workers, supplying S units of search, and V firms who engage in a
search process. That is, we have to redefine the market tightness as the ratio 
of vacancies to the total supply of units of search: 0 — Solving in the same 
manner as in the basic model we get the ” Job Creation Condition” and the 
” Employment Rate Condition”:
o _  ( f  s(a)h(a)af ( g) da
[  c J f s ( a ) f ( a ) d a
f  s ( a ) h ( a ) a f ( a ) d a  j  i -<t> ^  ^ 0 ) ^  <  1
q = I (1.25)
1 otherw ise
Then, the individual’s probability of employment will be (if (b d < 1):
9i =  Si<? =  ( j H a m ^ )  " *  {  W
(1.26)
From these equations it becomes clear that now in addition to the external
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effect there is another effect due to the search efficiency. When some individuals 
invest more in education, they increase the average level of education, but 
they also become more efficient in searching, rising aggregate search efficiency. 
This will increase expected profits per opened vacancy since firms now have 
a higher probability of finding those more skilled individuals and job creation 
goes up. However, at the same time, this has a negative effect on the rest 
of individuals searching for jobs, since they are now relatively less efficient in 
searching and therefore face higher unemployment rates. That is, a rise in 
average education generates two effects. On the one hand, it increases job 
creation, but at the same time it increases aggregate search efficiency reducing 
everyone else’s chances of finding a job.
1.8 C onclusions
The main contribution of this chapter is to develop a theoretical model showing 
how an education externality might be generated exclusively from the process 
of matching in the labour market without the need of increasing returns to 
scale neither in the production function nor in the matching function. It is 
the interaction between the ex-ante decision to invest in education by workers 
and to open a vacancy by firms that gives rise to the externality. The model 
shows that when the economy is in an equilibrium with unemployment due to 
the education externality there is a connection between aggregate employment 
(or unemployment) and the distribution of education in the labour force.
The existence of the externality means that there is scope for intervention. 
Individuals cannot internalize the effect the externality has in their optimal 
decisions, since they take the employment rate as given, and therefore their 
equilibrium investment in education is lower than the socially optimal. This 
is particularly interesting in the case in which an economy finds itself in an 
equilibrium with no activity due to the low level of skills of its population. A 
clear example of this are the labour markets in many developing countries or 
the lack of specialized labour markets in certain areas of developed countries. 
The model developed in this chapter indicates that a solution to this problem 
might be to implement an education policy which guarantees a minimum level 
of compulsory education for all individuals. This will develop the skills of the
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population enough to provide incentives for firms to start creating vacancies 
in that area (or particular sector) and for workers to invest in education above 
the compulsory level. Eventually, both these forces will take the economy into 
an equilibrium with economic activity, reducing aggregate unemployment.
Finally, the theoretical model is extended to consider the effect of having phys­
ical as well as human capital. The introduction of both types of capital is 
shown to potentiate the education externality. Now in addition to the standard 
mechanism, by which a rise in the education investment of some individuals 
increases expected profits per vacancy and job creation, we have a second one. 
The firms matched with these more skilled workers will also invest more in 
capital increasing even further the gains from the match and providing with 
an additional incentive for workers to invest more in education.
The model is also extended to consider the possibility that different individ­
uals face different unemployment rates, depending on their search efficiency, 
which is a function of ability. This will potentiate the effect of the externality 
for these individuals who have increased their education, but it will dampen 
it for the rest of individuals. The reason being that when some individuals 
increase their education, they improve the average level of education in the 
labour market, which has two opposite effects: it increases job creation, but at 
the same time it increases aggregate search efficiency reducing everyone else’s 
chances to find a job.
Some of the interesting further work to be done in this area would consist in 
extending this model to consider other related mechanisms, like the possibility 
of migration between regions, which is studied in chapter 2. In addition, an 
empirical test of the empirical relevance of this mechanism is necessary. Two 
empirical tests of the theory are explained in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.
Chapter 2
Education m atching  
externalities and the location of  
econom ic activity
2.1 Introduction
The analysis of the concentration of economic activity in specific geographic 
areas has been a very dynamic area of research since the seminal papers by 
Krugman (Krugman (1991a), Krugman (1991b)). But, as Krugman himself 
states, the basis of this analysis was developed much earlier. Alfred Marshall 
(Marshall (1920)) already identified three reasons to explain the concentra­
tion of economic activity in a certain geographical location: pooling of skilled 
workers, input-output linkages and technological spill-over effects. So far, this 
literature has centered its attention on the existence of pecuniary externalities 
in the production process, coming mainly from Marshall’s second and third 
reason for concentration, but little attention has been paid to the first one. In 
general, these models have given a secondary importance to the labor market 
and the accumulation of skills. An exception being Rotemberg and Saloner 
(2000). They develop a model that explains concentration based on the ex­
istence of an externality coming from the supply of workers with the specific 
skills required by the industry. In their model, workers will only be willing to 
acquire these specific skills if there axe enough firms wanting to employ them 
and vice-versa. But they concentrate on specific skills and do not consider 
the existence of unemployment, while most empirical studies show that this is 
one of the most important determinants of regional migration (see Greenwood
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(1997)).
In addition, the analysis of the relationship between labor markets, skill ac­
cumulation and geographic concentration of economic activity seems specially 
relevant since differences across geographical areas in unemployment rates and 
average human capital are large and persistent for most developed countries.
In this chapter we propose a mechanism by which geographical concentration 
of economic activity may arise from a pecuniary externality originated exclu­
sively in the labor market. This externality is due to the interaction between 
the firm’s expected returns from opening a vacancy and the workers’ decisions 
to invest in general skills and to search for work in a certain area. The idea 
is the following. Better off areas offer higher wages, more job opportunities 
and lower unemployment rates, thus attracting workers from other areas where 
labor markets are performing worse. But since moving to a different region im­
plies an important sunk cost (housing, etc.) only the more skilled individuals 
will find migration worthwhile.1 Therefore, migration favours the concentra­
tion of human capital in areas where labor markets are performing better. This 
will improve the profits firms expect to obtain when creating a job in these 
regions, fostering job creation and improving even further the performance of 
these regions’ labor markets and the immigration of skilled individuals. Thus, 
there exists a positive feedback effect between the migration of highly qualified 
individuals into better off regions and job creation.
The existence of this pecuniary externality will result in the possible of mul­
tiplicity of equilibria in the economy, which can explain the concentration of 
economic activity in certain areas as well as the persistence of regional dif­
ferences. That is, if a region is affected by a negative shock, strong enough 
to trigger migration of the more skilled individuals towards other regions, the 
human capital levels of the recipient regions will improve. Once the shock 
disappears, the economy may not return to the original situation, but instead 
it may converge to a new equilibrium, where regional divergences become per­
manent. Thus, migration produces concentration of human capital in those 
regions where labor markets are performing better, which improves economic
1This is a well known stylized fact of regional migration. See Greenwood (1997) for a 
survey of the empirical literature.
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Figure 2 .1 : Average regional education du-Figure 2 .2 : Average regional education du­
ration vs labour market tightness ration vs unemployment duration
conditions in these areas, increasing migration even further. The process even­
tually stops because as more people search for work in these areas, the labor 
market becomes congested and work opportunities are reduced.
The real relevance of this mechanism is difficult to determine without serious 
empirical work which will be reported in chapters 3 and 4. However, as it is 
clear from figures 2 . 1  and 2 .2 2, the skilled labour markets of the regions with 
highest average level of education have shorter unemployment durations and 
greater market tightness. This evidence seems to support the implications of 
this theory.
In the literature on returns to education there exist several empirical studies 
for US cities and UK travel to work areas showing the importance of human 
capital externalities. Rauch (1993) and Moretti (1998) find that a one-year 
increase in average years of schooling in a city generates an important social 
return, on top of the private return. While, Burgess and Profit (2001) show 
that there exist significant spatial externalities in British travel to work areas. 
The problem with this paper is that they do not take workers’ education into 
account. They find that conditional on local labor market conditions, high 
unemployment levels in neighbouring areas raise the number of local filled va­
cancies but lower the local outflow from unemployment. The former suggests 
that local vacancies become more profitable since are filled quicker with people
2The line with crosses represents the trend when excluding the three top & bottom 
regions.
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from this nearby areas. While the latter could be interpreted that the people 
from nearby areas applying to local vacancies are exhibiting a higher search 
intensity or they are offering better qualifications than the local unemployment 
pool. Both of these interpretations would justify the mechanism analyzed here.
There are other relevant articles related to this chapter in the literature. Burda 
and Wyplosz (1991) analyze the interaction between migration and human 
capital accumulation, but they consider only technological externalities and 
assume full-employment. Ortega (2000) uses a matching model related to the 
one used here to show that migration can be pareto improving, but he consid­
ers homogeneous individuals who do not invest in human capital. In addition, 
his mechanism comes from the distribution of rents between firms and work­
ers, while the one here comes from the total size of the rents to be distributed. 
Finally, the externality analyzed in this chapter is based on Acemoglu (1996) 
and on the model of chapter 1 .
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The economy is described 
in section 2 .2 . Section 2.3 describes the labor market equilibrium. Section 
2.4 solves for the regional equilibrium taking the migration flows as given. 
Finally, in Section 2.5, we endogenize migration flows and solve for the general 
equilibrium of the economy. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 D escription  o f th e  Econom y
2.2.1 Firms and Workers
This is a non-overlapping generations model, where individuals and jobs live 
one period only. The economy is composed of two areas with the same initial 
population, L. These areas are identical in every aspect. Each individual is 
born with a different ability (a*), but there is a similar distribution of abilities 
in each area, given by the cumulative distribution function F(a). When young 
they attend full-time education. Then, they decide where to live and they en­
ter the labor market of the area where they have settled down with the human 
capital acquired (hi). In the labor market, individuals and firms engage in a 
search process, which produces a number of matches. Those individuals who 
find a job, produce and earn a wage, which depends on their education level.
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The rest remain unemployed and earn a subsidy, which is independent of their 
qualifications. There is a sunk cost of migration, m, which represents the costs 
the migrant has to incur when settling down in a new area (eg. housing costs).
The number of firms active in each area of the economy is endogenous. When a 
firm decides to enter a region’s labor market it opens a vacancy in one area, and 
starts looking for a worker. All firms are identical and the cost of opening the 
vacancy is sunk and equal across areas. Therefore, firms will open vacancies 
until the expected profits are equal to zero in each area. Once a firm and a 
worker meet, the firm buys the appropriate technology for the worker’s human 
capital level and the worker brings one unit of labor and his human capital. 
The result of the match is the production of yi units of product using the 
following technology, similar across areas:
where the index i denotes the individual and index r the area. A > 0 is a 
constant representing the technological level, 1 > a > 0 .
2.2.2 Wage determ ination
A realized job match yields some pure economic rent which is equal to the 
sum of the expected search costs of the firm and the worker. Wages are set 
to share this economic rent according to the Nash solution to a bargaining 
problem (as in chapter 1 and Pissarides (2000)). That is, the wage will satisfy 
the following:
where (3 E [0 , 1], which can be interpreted as the worker’s relative bargaining 
power. The solution of this maximization problem gives us the following wage 
and profits rules:
(2 .1)
witr ~  arg max(iuiir -  zrY  (Vi,r -  ^ v ) 1 ^
W i,r  =  P V i , r  +  ( 1  -  P ) Z r  
7Ti ,r  =  ( 1  ( 1
(2 .2)
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The wage determination process is similar across all areas and independent of 
the worker’s origin. This is true for native workers searching for a job in their 
own areas, since the returns from a match will be similar. But it is also true 
for migrants and natives working in the same area. The reason is that the cost 
of migration is independent of whether the worker finds employment or not 
and therefore it is not be considered when determining the wage. This does 
not mean that the actual wage will be of the same value. For a given ability, 
the actual wage might be different across regions, because the investment in 
education might also be different. However, migrants and natives living in the 
same region with similar ability earn the same wage.
2.2.3 Education Decisions
The acquisition of education level hi requires effort e*, which is increasing in the 
amount of education acquired and decreasing in the ability of each individual. 
A simple expression that satisfies these assumptions is:
In order to decide how much to invest in human capital, an individual born in 
region j maximizes his utility subject to his resource constraint (which depends 
on whether he migrates or not), taking the probability of employment in the 
area where he will work as given (qr). The constraint only says that every 
person will consume according to her expected income, which is equal to the 
wage times the probability of finding a job (q), minus the cost of migration.
h fr
c*,r ^  where r = j,g
=  w(hi>g)qg +  z( 1 -  qg) i f  stays in g
ci,j — w (hi,j)Qj +  z (f ~ Qj) — m i f  migrates to j
Where the wage is given by equation (2.2). The solution to this maximiza­
tion problem gives the individual’s optimal human capital investment, which 
depends positively on the ability of the individual and on the probability of 
finding a job in the area where he lives.
max Uir =
hi,r
s.t :
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hifr = (<otA(3diqr) (2.3)
where 'F > 1 > a  > 0 .
Lem m a 2.1. The individual’s optimal investment in human capital increases 
with the probability of employment and with his own ability. Therefore, it is 
higher when he decides to settle down in an area with a higher employment 
rate. But it is the same for a migrant and a native living in the same area, 
provided they have the same ability.
Proof: From equation (2.3), the derivative of the optimal human capital with 
respect to qr and with respect to a, is positive as long as 4/ > a, which is a 
necessary condition for the second order condition to hold. Therefore, if 
you decide to migrate to an area with a higher employment rate, you will 
acquire a higher level of education, since your expected lifetime income 
will be higher. The education decision is the same for migrants and 
natives due to the existence of perfect capital markets.
2.2.4 Location Decisions
Individuals decide where to live and work before (or at the same time as) 
making their education investments. An individual will settle down in the 
area where his expected lifetime income, net of migration costs, is higher. 
That is, an individual born in region g will migrate to region j if the following 
inequality holds:
wi,jQj + *(1 “  Qj) ~ m >  Wii9qg +  z( 1 -  qg) (2.4)
It is clear from this expression that some people will migrate from region g 
to j only if labor market conditions are better in the latter region. That is, 
if the employment rate or the wage is higher in j than in g (qg > qg and/or 
W{j > Wii9). Substituting the wage and the investment in education, we obtain 
this inequality in terms of the individual’s innate ability:
|A  (aA paiq j)*^ -  z j  (Hqj —m >  | a  (aA(daiqg)w^  -  z j  (3qg
And solving for the ability of the individual, we obtain the marginal ability to 
migrate (a*). This is the ability of the individual who is indifferent between
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migrating to j or staying in g:
m  +  z(3{qj -  qg)a, > a* =
a *?* (PAY (q] -  q])
where 7  =  Therefore, all individuals born in region j with ability higher 
than a* will migrate to region g, while the rest stay in region j. Since the 
people with higher ability are also the ones with higher education, only the 
most skilled individuals migrate. If we assume the unemployment benefit is 
equal to zero3, the marginal ability simplifies to:
i f - a
a* = ---------^ ------- —  (2-5)
a ( ( 3 A ) ° ( q ] - q ] ) ^
Proposition 2.1. Migration only happens from regions where labor markets 
are performing badly to regions where they are performing better. That is, in 
this model, there exists only one-way migration.
Proof: The marginal ability to migrate from region j to region g (a'*) can be 
obtained in the same manner as equation 2.5, to get:
'if—a
/*   ____________ ^  a _______________ (r\ C \
( a  A \ —  (  7 7 \  * ~ a  (  ’ 'a  ((3A) “ (q] -  q]) *
An individual will migrate from region j to g only if the expected utility 
obtained from moving to g is higher than the one obtained from staying 
in j, which is only possible if qg < qg. Obviously, we cannot fulfill both 
this condition and the one to have migration from g to j (qg > qg) at the 
same time and therefore only one-way migration is possible.
With the ability of the marginal individual we can determine the size of the 
labor force in each region, that is, the number of people engaged in search in 
each labor market. The labor force in region j (Lf) will be equal to the native 
population (L) plus the migrants from g, i.e.: all individuals with ability higher 
than a*. While the labor force in region g (Lg) will be equal to the native
3Throughout the rest of the chapter, the unemployment benefit is assumed equal to zero. 
This is only done for simplification purposes, since having a positive subsidy will not change 
the results, as long as the subsidy is independent of the productivity of the worker.
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population minus the migrants.4
Lj = L ^1 + J  f(a)da
Lg = L [  f(a)da  
Jo
Once we know who will live in each region, we can also determine the average 
level of education of the workers in that area.
E[hr] =  (a t A Q q r E [ a ^ \
Where the ”average” ability in each region (E[a*-°]) is equal to:
/ 0‘ a * ^ f(a )d a  + J*. a * ^ f(a )d a
E[aj
1
' I ' - a  '
L  ( X + fa*  f (a)da)
i_ a*-<* f(a)da
£ K " 1  =  C2-'’)L /0° f(a)da
These two equations determine what happens to ” average” ability and subse­
quently average human capital as migration increases (or as a* decreases).
Lem m a 2.2. The ’’average” ability and average human capital of a region 
increases for low levels of immigration, while it decreases for high levels of 
immigration. When everyone from region g migrates to region j  the average 
level of human capital converges to the initial average level with no migration.
i
Proof: The derivative of E[aJ~a] with respect to a* is:
da,
where
dE[aJ-°) f(g -)[2 (B l ) - ( B 2)\
1 + fa*  f ( a ) d a ]
Bi = \ (  a*-<* f(a)da — j  f(a)da
U  a* J  a*
dBi>  0 ; — -  <  0a*
4It is not necessary to indicate over which of the region’s ability distributions we are 
integrating since they are identical. Therefore, we always integrate over da.
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Bo =
ra*  pa*
/ f(a )d a — /  a^zr^ f(a)da  
Jo Jo
dB2
> 0  ; — - > 0
Bi is positive or zero because the average over the interval [a*, 1] 
(LHS of the difference in brackets) is greater than or equal to this expres­
sion calculated at the lower bound of the interval times the population in 
the interval (RHS of the difference in brackets). A similar argument but 
using the upper bound of the interval explains why B2 is also positive or 
zero. In addition, when there is no migration (a* =  1) the derivative is 
negative (Bi — 0 and B2 > 0), while when everyone in region g migrates 
to j, the derivative is positive {B\ > 0 and B2 = 0). Then, as migration 
increases (a* decreases), B\ starts increasing and B2 decreasing, until 
the derivative becomes positive (see figures 2.3 and 2.5).
Lem m a 2.3. The ’’average” ability and average human capital of a region 
decreases as emigration increases.
i
Proof: The derivative of E[ag ~a] with respect to a* is:
d E [a f^ \ f ( a*) Jo* f ( a)da) ~  Jo a*~af{ a)da
da* [JT  f(.a)da
> 0
The numerator is equal to B2 in lemma 2.2 and is therefore positive. In 
addition, when there is no emigration (a* = 1) the derivative is positive. 
Then it decreases until it becomes zero when everyone has emigrated to 
the other region (a* = 1) (see figures 2.3 and 2.5).
Prom these two previous lemmas it is clear that as the individuals with highest 
ability start migrating from region g to j, the regional difference in ’’average” 
abilities and average human capital will increase. However, as migration be­
comes more important and a larger part of the population of region g migrates 
to j (a* is low), the average ability in j will increase less and eventually start 
decreasing. This means that regional differences will eventually start decreas­
ing when the average ability in region j decreases at a faster rate than the 
average ability in region g. However, they never disappear.
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of regional average ability as migration increases
E[aj]
Proposition 2 .2 . Regional differences in average human capital and ability 
increase with migration. Eventually, for very high levels of migration, these 
differences start decreasing, but they always remain positive.
i
Proof: Lemma 2.2 shows that E[ aJ~a ] increases with high levels of migration, 
while it decreases with low levels of migration until it converges back^to 
its initial level. Lemma 2.3 shows that as migration increases E[ ag~a ] 
decreases until it becomes zero. Therefore, the difference increases whilei i
E[aJ~a] increases. If for high levels of migration E[a*~a} decreases at
i
a faster rate than E[ag ~a], then the difference will decrease. However, 
when everyone in region g migrates to j, the difference is positive. This 
can also be shown by calculating this difference:
E[a*-«}-E[ar*\ = 2 fa * f(a)da
1 + fa* f ( a)da
fg .a* -af(a )da _  fp a*-af(a)da 
f a\  f(a)da  / 0“* f(a)da
Where the difference inside the brackets is positive because the ” average” 
ability over the interval [a*, 1] (LHS of the difference in brackets) will 
always be greater than or equal to the ” average” ability over the interval 
[0, a*] (RHS of the difference in brackets) . When everyone migrates 
( a *  =  0) the difference remains positive.
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E[aj]
Figure 2.4: Distribution of ability before mi- Figure 2.5: Distribution of ability after mi­
gration takes place gration has taken place
2.3  L abor M arket
The economy is divided into two separated regional labor markets. That is, 
individuals can only search for work in the region where they live (or where 
they plan to live).5 Each regional labor market works similarly and in the same 
manner as the one described in chapter 1, section 1.3, therefore we will reduce 
its description here to the minimum. Trade in the labor market is considered 
a decentralized economic activity, which makes it difficult for firms to find 
the appropriate worker and for workers to find a job, forcing them to spend 
resources searching before production takes place. This gives rise to regional 
unemployment in equilibrium (see Pissarides (2000) & Pissarides (1992)).
The timing of events in the labor market is as follows. First, firms decide to 
open vacancies and then firms and workers engage in search. After a costly 
search process, a match is realized. Then production takes place using the 
firm’s technology and the worker’s human capital. At the end of the period 
all matches are destroyed. Each regional labor market is therefore composed 
of Lr workers and Vr vacancies who engage in a search process by which Nr 
matches are created.
Nr = min{m(Pr , Lr), Lr}
5The mechanism explained here would prevail even if individuals searched for work from 
their region of origin, as long as they targeted only one market in their search. In that case 
we would have migration to jobs.
CHAPTER 2. LOCATION AND MATCHING EXTERNALITIES 49
where m(.,.) represents a matching function with standard properties and 
equal across regions. Then, on average, the probability of finding a job in 
region r (qr) is equal to the employment level (Nr) over the number of people 
searching (Lr), while the probability of filling a vacancy in region r (pr ) has to 
be equal to the level of employment over the number of vacancies opened in 
that area (W)-
Qr = = m(6r, 1) (2 .8)
Pr = Vr =m{l'¥?
Where market tightness (6r) is defined as the ratio of vacancies opened to the
y
Lnumber of searchers, 9 = y.
The expected profit of a firm from a vacancy opened in region r (E(irr )) will be 
equal to the probability of filling a vacancy (pr) with a worker, times the profit 
obtained from employing that worker. Since the firm does not know which 
worker will arrive we have to integrate over all possible individuals searching 
in that area.
E M  =  ^_ U [ y( h) r - W(h)r}f(h)dhr | (2 9)
Substituting the equations determining pr, y^r and the wage into this equation, 
we obtain the expected profit from a vacancy in region r, as a function of the 
distribution of human capital in that region.
E M = ^ {1- p )A f hs am aJ ^ . ( 2 . 1 0 )
There is a fixed cost of opening a job equal to k, which is independent of the 
type of worker recruited and equal across regions. Therefore, firms will open 
vacancies as long as the expected profit per vacancy in the region is bigger 
than the cost of opening it. In equilibrium no firm can open a job and make 
a positive profit since there are no barriers to entry, therefore E(nr) = k. 
Substituting the expected profits, equation (2.10), in the free-entry condition 
and solving for the number of vacancies opened in the region, we obtain the 
” Job Creation Condition
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[(1 -/5M 1 f  h(a)af{a)dar'
k Ijj*
This condition says that in equilibrium, market tightness in the region depends 
positively on the employment rate, as well as on the distribution of human cap­
ital among the labor force.
In order to solve the equilibrium in each regional labor market we also have 
to determine the probability of finding a job (qr). Using equation 2.8 and 
assuming a specific functional form for the matching function m(V, L)  — 
(bV)^ (L)l~^ we obtain the ”Employment Rate Condition” .
qr= \
(ibdr)+ i f  (b6ry  < 1
1 otherwise
(2 .12)
where b > 0 is a scaling constant and 0 < <f) < 1 represents the relative effi­
ciency of firms and workers in the search process. 6
Both, the ” Job Creation Condition’'' and the ”Employment Rate Condition” 
represent relations between market tightness and the probability of finding a 
job in a region, taking the labor force and the distribution of human capital 
in that region as given.
2.4 R egional Equilibrium
The equilibrium of each region in this economy is described by the two variables 
determining the equilibrium in the labor market, the probability of employ­
ment and the market tightness in the region, plus the individual’s optimal 
investment in human capital, taking the labor force of each region and the 
marginal ability to migrate as given. In order to be able to analyze this equi­
librium, we express the human capital in the same functional form as it appears 
in the Job Creation Condition (equation (2 .11)), i.e.: Ra^ dar or ^  E[h°\,
which I will call ’’average” human capital. Therefore the three equations de­
6For simplicity, in some calculations 0 is assumed to be equal for both, i.e.: (j>=
CHAPTER 2. LOCATION AND MATCHING EXTERNALITIES 51
termining the equilibrium in region r, taking a* as given, are the following:
Where E[a* a] is the ’’average” ability of region’s r labor force7, which de­
pends only on a*.
There always exists a unique non-trivial stable equilibrium, but it can have 
different characteristics depending on the concavity of the function determining 
the cost of education and on the underlying parameters of the economy.
C ondition 2.1. A stable equilibrium with unemployment exists when the fol­
lowing conditions hold:
The first part of the condition is necessary for the stability of the equilibrium, 
while the second part guarantees that there is some unemployment in the 
region. 8
P roposition  2.3. A unique stable equilibrium with unemployment exists if
ity, respectively
8If < 2a, the human capital equation (E[h^\ curve in figure 2.6, will cut the employ­
ment rate equation (qr curve) from above, making that equilibrium unstable. Then, the 
only stable equilibrium is the one with full-employment. For a more detailed discussion on 
this issue read section 1.4 in chapter 1.
E[h?\ = (aA(3qr E[af~a]
(2.13)
otherwise
V otherwise
a
E[at~a } <
a k
6 ( 1  — (3)A^~a (ot(3)
7This expression can be approximated using a Taylor expansion by E(a*~a ) =  
f  a * -Q f(a)da (fj,a) where pa and aa are the average and variance of abil-
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Figure 2.6: Regional equilibrium with unemployment (given a*)
q r '
K|h r |
Axiom 1 is fulfilled, taking a* as given. The equilibrium will be the following:
qr =  Ai (,E [a^“])
hi,r =  [ ^ Q / J A i O i ] ^
=  M  ( * * ] ) * *
 ^—ct a
where Ai = * 2° (a/S)*-2a A *~2a, and E[af~a] is given by equation
(2.7).
The best way of understanding this equilibrium is graphically. In figure 2.6 
we can see the equilibrium for a region, in the {qr, E[h“ ]} space. This sta­
ble equilibrium exists due to the existence of a coordination failure problem, 
or externality in the accumulation of human capital. This externality results 
from the interaction between the search frictions in the labor market (trading 
externality) and the heterogeneity of individuals. An individual (or rather a 
group of individuals) will not invest much in human capital if he expects a 
low probability of employment. At the same time, since the ” average” level of 
human capital in the region is low, the expected profit from opening a vacancy 
will also be low and thus few vacancies will be opened. This will reduce mar­
ket tightness diminishing the probability of employment for everyone in that 
region’s labor market. Thus reducing everyone’s investment in human capital. 
Then, the region may find itself at a situation with high unemployment, and 
a low level of human capital, for a given a*.
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Figure 2.7: Effect of an increase in migration Figure 2.8: Effect of an increase in migration 
(reduction in a*) in region j (reduction in a*) in region g
Where exactly lies the regional equilibrium depends on the ” average” ability 
of the labor force in the region, which depends on the marginal ability to mi­
grate (a*), as was shown in equation 2.7. From these equations it is clear that 
when a* diminishes, the average ability of the labor force in the region receiv­
ing emigrants (j) increases (figure 2.7), while the one of the other region (g) 
goes down (figure 2.8). However, when migration becomes relatively large (a* 
tends to zero), the ”average” ability and human capital in the region receiv­
ing emigrants will start decreasing making the difference in regional average 
abilities decrease. Although this final effect never dominates and the regional 
differences in ” average” abilities always remain positive.
Proposition 2.4. An increase in the marginal ability to migrate (a*) increases 
the average level of education and the probability to find a job in the region re­
ceiving emigrants. This augments the expected benefits from migration, reduc­
ing a* even further and increasing more the number of migrants. The process 
will go on until a new equilibrium in the labor market is reached. The opposite 
happens in the migrants’ region of origin. As migration increases, the average 
education in the region receiving emigrants starts to decrease and so does the 
probability to find a job, although, they always remain above the initial value 
with no-migration.
Proof: It is clear from Proposition 2.3 that the equilibrium values of hr and 
qr depend positively on the average ability of that region’s workforce
a
(E[ar~a]). This in turn, for the region receiving emigrants depends 
positively on a* for high values of a*, but negative for low values of
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a*, while it depends negatively for the other region, as shown in Lemma
2.2 and 2.3. This can also be seen in figures 2.8 and 2.7.
The equilibrium of the economy is fully described by three equations: one 
for the employment rate of each region (qj,qg) plus another for the marginal 
ability to migrate (a*). The problem is, that this system of equations can only 
be solved numerically. But since a* is a function only of the difference between 
the regional employment rates (q- —q  ^ ) (or market tightness (dp —d p  )), we 
can reduce this system to two equations and then solve it graphically. Namely,
2.5 Equilibrium  of th e Econom y
(«? - 9p7) = Ax { (£[<»;“-]) *-a* - (£K-"l) *-to } (2.14)
(2.15)
where 7
a((3A) a
m- a j,-. and the
regional ” average” abilities are equal to:
nr rsi fo a*-°f(a)da + J1. a»-«/(o)do 
H a) I = ------------7-------j---------- \---------
L ( 1 +  l a -  f ( a ) d a )
(2.16)
In order to graph these two equations we need to know their first and second 
derivatives:
Lem m a 2.4.
da*(eq(2.14)) < 0 fo r  a* high d2a*(eq(2.14)) < 0
d(o] ~Qg) > 0  fa r  a* low ’ d(q] -  q] ) 2 > 0
Proof: The derivatives for each case are derived in Appendix B. It is difficult 
to find the sign of the derivatives of equation 2.14 with respect to a* 
without specifying a particular distribution function for f(a). However,
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Figure 2.9: Equilibrium of the economy
from lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 and proposition 2.2 it is clear that the regional 
difference in average ability will increase for high levels of cT and decrease 
for low levels of a*. Therefore, the first derivative of equation 2.14 has 
to be negative for low levels of migration, but as migration increases it 
goes down until it eventually becomes negative. In terms of the second 
derivative of equation 2.14, even though we cannot unambiguously find 
its sign, this does not affect the properties of the possible equilibria. 
Equilibrium B will be stable if, equation 2.14 cuts equation 2.15) from 
above, which is true independently of the second derivative of equation 
2.14. For ease in the exposition below, I assume it to be positive.
The equilibrium can be seen in figures 2.9 and 2.10. It is clear from these figures 
that there may exist one, two or three equilibria in the economy, depending 
on whether the two curves cross, are tangent or do not cross. The most inter­
esting case is the first one, depicted in the figures, where three equilibria exist: 
equilibrium 1, with no migration (a* = 1) and equal economic characteristics 
in both regions (qg =  qg)\ and equilibria A and B, where migration takes place 
and regional divergence prevails.
Lemma 2.5. Equilibrium 1 and A are stable, while B is unstable.
Proof: This can be shown using figure 2.9. If we have a marginal ability to 
migrate (a*) larger than the one that equilibrates both regions’ labor 
markets (a point to the right of B), that is, if entrepreneurs expect more 
people to migrate than what really occurs. Then the average human 
capital in the recipient region is lower than expected and there is less
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Figure 2.10: Equilibrium of the economy comparing regional labour markets
job creation in that region, so the regional differences are lower as well 
(1 Qj ~ %)■ This reduces even more the incentive to migrate, triggering 
an even higher a* and reducing even further the incentives to create more 
jobs. The result is that a* and (g - — qg) increase until point B is reached. 
The opposite is true for a point to the left of B.
The most important implication from this case is the possible multiplicity 
of equilibria. If, for any reason, one region is affected by a negative shock 
strong enough to move this economy to a point to the right of A in figure 2.9, 
then, once the shock disappears the economy will not return to the original 
situation, but instead converge to a new equilibrium (B). That is, temporary 
regional divergences may become permanent if the initial regional shock is 
strong enough.
P roposition 2.5. Possible multiplicity of equilibria. I f a region is affected by 
a negative shock, strong enough to move this economy to a point to the right of 
A, when the shock disappears the economy may converge to a new equilibrium 
(B). At B regional divergences in employment rates, wages and human capital 
stocks become permanent.
In the stable equilibrium with migration (B), the recipient economy (region j) 
has a labor market that is performing better, with a higher employment rate, 
market tightness and human capital stock, as is clear from figure 2.10 and 
Proposition 2.2. But, it is also true that this economy has a higher average 
expected wage and a higher real wage for all levels of qualification:
E[wj \  -  E[wg] =  0 A  >  0
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Table 2 .1 : Comparative statics
Parameters
variables m b L c P A ip a
a* + - + + - - + 5 _ +, —
q]-qj - + - - - + + , — +, —
N O TE S: T h e d erivative o f each o f th e  equilibriu m  eq u ation s w ith  resp ect to  th e  
param eters are ca lcu la ted  in th e  ap pen d ix .
WJ ~ w9 = {PA V ^ f  “ (V  “ -  Qg Q) > 0 i f  qj > qg
P roposition  2.6. An economy which in equilibrium receives immigrants, has a 
labor market that is performing better, with a higher employment rate, market 
tightness and human capital stock. In addition, this economy has a higher 
average expected wage and a higher real wage for all levels of qualification.
2.5.1 Comparative statics
Table 2.1 summarizes the effect that changes in some of the parameters of the 
economy have on the equilibrium values of the marginal ability to migrate and 
the difference in regional employment rates.
A rise in the cost of migration (m) will reduce migration and the regional 
differences in employment. This is because a higher cost of migration reduces 
the incentive to migrate and the number of migrants for a given level of re­
gional differences in employment, that is, it shifts upwards the migration curve 
(equation 2.15), as can be seen from figure 2.11. However, it does not affect the 
regional labour markets curve (equation 2.14). As a consequence, the economy 
moves along the regional labour markets curve towards the new equilibrium, 
where migration and regional differences in employment are lower (a* is higher 
and ql- — cpg is lower) . 9
An increase in the matching efficiency (6), a reduction in the costs of opening 
a vacancy (c) or a reduction in the population born in each area (L), all have a 
similar effect, increasing migration and regional differences. This change in the 
parameters increases the (ex-ante) expected profits10 from opening a vacancy
9Regional differences could actually increase due to the shape in the regional labour 
markets curve, which has a negative slope for low levels of migration but a positive one for 
high levels of migration.
10Ex-post profits are always zero in equilibrium due to the free-entry condition.
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a*
a*^
Figure 2.11: Increase in the cost of migration Figure 2.12: Increase in 5, or decrease in L 
(m) or c
and therefore rises job creation in each region, given the average ability of the 
population in the region. However, since the average ability was already higher 
in the region receiving migrants, (ex-ante) expected profits increase proportion­
ally more in that region and so does job creation rising regional differences even 
further. This means that the regional labour markets curve (equation 2.14) 
shifts to the right, while the migration curve remains unchanged (see figure 
2.12). Therefore, the new equilibrium lies to the right and below the original 
one, with a lower a* and a higher ql — q^.
A rise in productivity (A) also increases migration and regional differences in 
employment, but in this case is as consequence of both curves shifting. On the 
one hand, a rise in these parameters increases the real wage in both regions and 
consequently the individual investment in education. This allows more people 
to migrate from the region with the lower employment rate to other one for a 
given difference in regional employment rates since they are earning more now 
while the migration costs have not changed. That is, we have a lower a* for a 
given ql —qJ, and therefore the migration curve has shifted down. In addition, 
the rise in education increases ex-ante expected profits in both regions, but 
proportionally more in the region with higher employment rate, rising even 
more regional differences in employment. This means that the regional labour 
markets curve has also shifted to the right, as shown in figure 2.13.
A rise in the bargaining power of workers (/?) (rise in the share of rents from 
the match allocated to workers) increases migration but decreases regional dif-
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Figure 2.13: Increase in Productivity (A) Figure 2.14: Increase in (3
ferences in employment, as consequence of both curves shifting. On the one 
hand, a rise in these parameters increases the real wage in both regions and 
consequently the individual investment in education. This allows more people 
to migrate from the region with the lower employment rate to other one for 
a given difference in regional employment rates since they are earning more 
now while the migration costs have not changed. That is, we have a lower a* 
for a given q- — and therefore the migration curve has shifted down. On 
the other hand, the rise in education increases ex-ante expected profits in both 
regions, but proportionally more in the region with higher employment rate, 
rising even more regional differences in employment. However, a rise in the 
bargaining power of workers also implies a reduction in the bargaining power 
of firms (1 — (3) which reduces the firm’s profits per vacancy opened and job 
creation. This last effect is stronger than the effect due to the increase in 
education, therefore the labour markets curve also shifts to the left, as shown 
in figure 2.14.
Finally, a change in the share of human capital in production (a) and of 
the parameter determining the concavity of the cost of education (^), has an 
ambiguous effect on the equilibrium of the model. The problem is that these 
parameters shift both curves and change their shape, making it very difficult 
to predict where the final equilibrium will be.
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2.6 W elfare analysis
One would be very interested in the ranking according to a Pareto criterium of 
the different possible equilibria in this economy. However, the welfare analysis 
is not easy in this model since we cannot solve analytically for the equilibrium 
and most of the results depend on how much migration there is in equilibrium. 
In general, one can say that the stable equilibrium with migration can only 
increase overall welfare when migration is not very high (a* away from zero).
The overall welfare of a region is equal to the total production in the region 
minus the costs to generate this product, which include the cost of opening 
vacancies, the cost of education and the cost of migration.
Wr =  NrE(yr) — cVr — LrE(er) — mL  / f(a)da
J  a*
Or if we express it in terms of welfare per individual:
Wr x f \ f ( a )d a
wr = - j —  — qrE(yr) — c6r — E(er) — ru­
f f  f{a)da +  f a\  f(a)da
Substituting into this expression the equations for the employment rate, labour 
market tightness, production and effort, and expressing the resulting equation 
in terms of the ’’average” ability in the region, we get the following equation 
determining regional welfare:
wr =  A „,E
ff .f(a )d a
— m
fo f ( a)da + I f  f ( a)da
where Aw = (AiA )'^(a (3 )'irr°‘ — ^  ~Q , r = j ,g  and s = M ,N M .
The index r represents the region, while the index s — represents the equilib­
rium for which we are evaluating the welfare (M with migration, N M  with no
  <x
migration). That is, E  refers to the ’’average” ability of region r in
equilibrium s. In an economy without migration or in a region with emigration 
the last element measuring the cost of migration will be equal to zero.
In order to see if migration increases the region’s welfare, we compare the 
welfare obtained in the equilibria with and without migration (i.e.: wj^—wj^M).
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For the case of the region receiving migrants (region j), this welfare difference 
will be:
w f - w ™ =  A J E  \ a f - 1 1^  -  £  [ a ™ ^ l  2(^ } U  , ^ /(0 ) fI  L J L J J f o f(a)da  +  f a. f(a)d
Note that we have dropped the regional index for the ’’average” ability in the 
equilibrium with no migration since it is equal for both regions. It is clear from 
this expression that migration will not increase the welfare in a region receiving 
migrants for all levels of migration. The change in the region’s welfare due to 
migration is composed of two opposing forces: the higher the average ability 
the greater the increase in welfare, while the higher the cost of migration the 
lower the increase. From lemma 2.3 we know that the average ability in the re­
gion receiving migrants increases for low levels of migration, while it decreases 
for high levels of migration. In addition, the cost of migration is always in­
creasing with migration. Therefore, the welfare difference will be positive (and 
possibly increasing) for low levels of migration, but as migration becomes more 
important the difference will go down and eventually become negative. In the 
extreme, if every individual emigrated to this region, the ’’average” ability will 
be back to the level with no migration, and the difference in welfare will be 
negative and equal to the migration costs.
In the migrants’ region of origin welfare will always decrease when migration 
occurs. From lemma 2.2, we know that the ’’average” ability in this region 
decreases with migration since the most able individuals will migrate first. 
If all individuals leave this region the average ability becomes zero and the 
difference in welfare is at its maximum.
P roposition  2.7. Overall welfare in the economy will be greater in an equi­
librium with migration if the optimal level of migration is not too high and the 
cost of education is not too concave, otherwise it will lower. For very high levels 
of migration, both the cost of migration becomes quite large and the ”average ” 
ability in the region receiving migrants becomes small, making overall welfare 
negative. In addition, when the function determining the cost of education is 
very concave (ifj > 2), the rate at which average ability decreases in region g 
is greater than the one at which it increase in region j  making welfare always 
negative.
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2.7 C onclusions
The main contribution of this chapter is to highlight the importance of Mar­
shall’s first reason to explain geographical concentration of economic activity, 
that is, the existence of a large pool of skilled workers in the region. A simple 
model is developed to show that the labor market itself plus migration can gen­
erate an externality which potentiates the concentration of economic activity. 
Where exactly the activity is located will depend on history and expectations. 
This model can explain the persistent regional differences in human capital 
stocks, unemployment rates and wages across regions of developed countries.
In addition, we undertake some comparative statics analysis. We find that a 
higher bargaining power for workers in the wage setting process and a higher 
level of technology increase regional differences in the equilibrium with mi­
gration, while a lower migration cost, larger population (in both regions) and 
higher cost of opening vacancies reduces regional differences in equilibrium.
Finally, we also show that the equilibrium with migration and persistent re­
gional differences can be Pareto improving but only for low levels of migration 
and low marginal cost of education in terms of effort.
Further work should consist in attempting an empirical test of the mecha­
nism described above. This is undertaken in chapters 3 and 4 in this thesis. 
There we will show that a higher regional level of education reduces average 
unemployment duration and increases the individual probability to continue 
studying at sixteen, seventeen and eighteen years of age. In addition, we will 
also show that this mechanism seems to work through higher job creation, as 
implied by the theoretical model developed here, since we find that a higher 
regional average of education increases regional market tightness.
Chapter 3
An econom etric analysis of  
education externalities in the  
m atching process o f UK regions
nalities in the unemployment durations suffered by workers in the UK. First, 
we develop a simple model, based on chapters 1 and 2 , to address this issue 
theoretically. Then, we test it empirically using data from the UK Labour 
Force Survey for the 17 UK regions over the period 1992Q1-99Q4.
Education externalities have been at the heart of the economic and policy 
debate for the last two decades. Different theoretical explanations have been 
developed, and these can be grouped into two main categories: technological 
externalities (or non-pecuniary) and pecuniary externalities. Both these types 
of externalities were already mentioned by Alfred Marshall (1920) as reasons 
explaining the concentration of economic activity. However, they were not 
further developed until more recently.
The first type of externality was re-discovered by the works of Romer (1986) 
and Lucas (1988). They showed theoretically that, in an area with a higher
3.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the existence and the scale of regional education exter-
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average level of education processes like the exchange of ideas, imitation or 
learning by doing are more likely to occur, in turn fostering technological 
progress. These type of spill-overs have been explored in great detail by the 
endogenous growth literature. The second type of externality was re-discovered 
by the works of Krugman (1991a) and further developed by the new economic 
geography literature. However, these ideas have also been used in other ar­
eas of economic research. Acemoglu (1996) showed that, in a labour market 
were it is costly for firms and workers to find each other, if the average level 
of education of workers is high then firms will invest more in physical capital. 
This generates a pecuniary education externality which does not work through 
technology, but through improving the search process. Based on this idea, a 
similar type of externality is developed in chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis. There, 
it is shown that the average level of education of workers in a labour market 
affects job creation and the duration of unemployment.
However, despite these theoretical developments, there had not been any rel­
evant empirical work on this area until fairly recently. Moreover, most of the 
existing work has concentrated on the estimation of the effect of average edu­
cation in an area on individual wages, that is, on estimating the social returns 
to education. Rauch (1993) was the first attempt to estimate human capital 
externalities. He used data from the United States’ 1980 Census to test the 
effect of average education in the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas on 
individual wages. He found that a one-year increase in average schooling in 
an area raises individual wages by between 3-5%. Moretti (1998) re-estimates 
this effect for US cities using instruments for the average level of education to 
avoid an omitted variable bias problem. He finds that a 1 percentage point 
increase in college share in a city raises average wages by 1.2%-1.4% above the 
private returns to education.
Other studies have found little evidence of significant external returns. Ace­
moglu and Angrist (2000) estimated the effect of average schooling in US states 
on individual wages, using the change in State compulsory attendance laws and 
child labour laws as instruments. They found modest external returns of 1- 
3%. Moretti (1998) indicated that the fact that average education affects wages 
does not necessarily imply the existence of education externalities. This result 
could be due to complementarities between high and low educated workers.
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However, he argued that if different skills are perfect substitutes, the effect of 
an increase in the supply of educated workers on their own wage had to be an 
external effect. By doing this he found that a 1 percentage point increase in 
the labour force share of college graduates increases wages of college graduates 
by 1 .2 %, and therefore concluded that education externalities are important in 
US cities. Ciccone and Peri (2000) argued instead that if skills are imperfect 
substitutes, one cannot separately identify the external effect from the effect of 
the complementarity of skills using a regression of individual wages on average 
wages. They used a standard neoclassical growth model to identify external 
effects and found that these were negligible and insignificant. However, their 
methodology is completely dependent on the theoretical model used. In partic­
ular, they implicitly assume competitive labour markets and full employment.
Another line of empirical research has looked at the effect of education exter­
nalities on employment growth in cities. Simon (1998) found that a rise in the 
supply of high school and degree graduates in a US Standard Metropolitan 
Area in 1940 increases employment growth in the area and that this effect is 
persistent, lasting up to 40 years. Simon and Nardelli (1996) looking at En­
glish cities found that this effect could last up to a century. Glaeser, Hallal, 
Scheinkman and Schleifer (1992) studied the effect of knowledge spill-overs on 
employment growth in industries within cities. They found that these effects 
are more likely to occur between industries within a city and when competition 
between firms in an industry is strong.
In this paper we take a different approach - we test the existence of educa­
tion externalities in the matching process. Firstly, a simple model showing 
the existence of a pecuniary education externality in the matching process is 
developed. In this model, human capital externalities arise when there are 
matching frictions in the labour market because firms have to decide whether 
to create a job or not before knowing who they will finally employ. Thus, 
a more educated labour force will increase the expected profits per vacancy 
opened and increase job creation in that area, at the same time increasing 
the worker’s probability of finding a job. That is, if externalities exist in the 
matching process, one should find that unemployed individuals belonging to 
a local labour market where the labour force is better educated have a higher 
probability of moving from unemployment into employment than otherwise
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similar unemployed individuals in labour markets where the labour force is 
less educated. In addition, for a given average, the more equal the distribution 
of education the higher the probability of transition.
We test this theory by a maximum-likelihood estimation of a model of the dura­
tion of unemployment which assumes a discrete-time semi-parametric hazard 
function and allows the covariates to vary within each unemployment spell. 
The estimation shows that the higher the average and the more equal the 
distribution of education in a labour market, the higher the individual proba­
bility of transition from unemployment to employment. Both of these effects 
are statistically significant at the 10% level. The magnitude of the effect is in 
line with the findings in the literature. A 1 % increase in the average education 
of the average labour market rises the probability of employment by 1 .2 %. 
This effect increases to 2.8% when we consider only intermediate and skilled 
occupations, while it is negative for the unskilled occupations.
Finally, an important issue in this literature, raised by Ciccone and Peri (2000), 
is whether these effects are due to education externalities or to complemen­
tarities in skills. It is difficult to apply their work to this model since they 
implicitly assume a competitive labour market with no unemployment. How­
ever, what their work shows is that there is a significant effect of an area’s skill 
composition on wages paid, but this is not due to an externality that works 
through improvements in productivity. Then, using their model they conclude 
that their result has to be due to complementarity of skills. Alternatively, 
one could interpret this result as suggesting that it might be other types of 
externalities not working through productivity which are important. One such 
type could be the one studied in this research, which may affect wages through 
improving the matching process.
This chapter will be organised as follows. In section 3.2 the theoretical model 
is developed. The dataset used as well as some descriptive analysis of the 
distribution of education and its relation with labour market performance is 
described in section 3.3. The econometric methodology is explained in section 
3.4. Section 3.5 outlines the estimation results and some robustness analysis. 
In section 3.6 we try to confirm the relevance of the results by estimating 
directly the effect of education externalities on job creation. Finally, section
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3.7 concludes.
3.2 T heoretical m odel
The relationship to be estimated in this chapter is based on the theoretical 
models developed in chapters 1 & 2. In particular, I will use a simplified ver­
sion of the model of chapter 1 .
Consider an economy lasting one period composed of a continuum of workers 
and firms, both normalized to 1. Individual human capital hi is a function of 
innate ability and assumed to be given (endogenized in chapter 1 ). Opening 
a vacancy is costly (assume it costs c) and firms have to decide whether to 
open it or not before searching for a suitable worker. Firms and workers are 
matched randomly in the labour market, but not every worker (firm) meets a 
firm (worker). Therefore, there is unemployment in equilibrium. This implies 
that total employment is equal to the number of people looking for a job times 
the probability of finding one. The probability that a worker (firm) meets a 
firm, q (worker, p), is equal to the number of matches N  over the number of 
people searching L (vacancies V):
N  N
p =  y ’ 9  =  L (3'1}
Once a firm and a worker are matched they have to decide whether to produce 
together or not to produce at all (since they live only one period). If they 
produce together, their output is p* =  A hf, where a  < 1 , and A > 0 represents 
aggregate productivity. Wages are set to share the rent generated by the match 
according to a Nash-bargaining rule. This means that the worker receives a
share (3 of the output, while the firm receives the rest of the output, (1  — (3)yi.
Firms’ expected profits are equal to the probability of meeting a worker p times 
the expected product from the match, minus the cost of opening and filling 
the vacancy.
p ( l - 0 ) A E [ h ? ] - c  (3 .2 )
Since the firm does not know which worker it will be matched with, expected 
profits depend on the average level of education in the market. There is free 
entry into the market, thus in equilibrium firms will open vacancies until the
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expected profits are equal to zero.
Substituting equation 3.1 into 3.2 and solving we get the equilibrium expression 
for the probability of finding a job given that you are unemployed (hazard rate 
into employment):
(1  - f l A E l W
c
Human capital externalities arise in this model because firms have to decide 
whether to create a job or not before knowing who they will finally employ. 
A more educated labour force will increase the expected profits per vacancy 
opened and increase job creation. If the labour market was perfectly com­
petitive and there were no matching frictions, firms would be matched with 
workers until the worker’s human capital made the firm’s profits equal to zero. 
In this case, every firm knows who it will be matched with and therefore the 
job creation decision depends only on the individual’s human capital. That is, 
in the competitive case aggregate employment is determined by the position 
of the marginal worker in the education distribution. With matching frictions 
it is determined by the whole distribution of education. This external effect 
has been named a pecuniary externality since it is generated in the matching 
process and is independent of the existence of increasing returns in the pro­
duction function.
As was mentioned in the introduction, education externalities may also arise 
through the exchange of ideas, imitation or learning by doing (Romer (1986) 
and Lucas (1988)). These external effects have been called technological or 
non-pecuniary externalities because they are generated in the process of pro­
duction. They can be captured in this model by allowing the aggregate pro­
ductivity term A  to depend on aggregate human capital in the following way:
A  =  E[hf] (3.4)
If we substitute this into equation 3.3 we have:
(1 - m m w  (3.5)
c
From this equation it is clear that pecuniary and non-pecuniary externalities
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cannot be separately identified empirically using this model. Instead, in the 
empirical estimation we will control for the level of technology in the region 
by including the industrial structure of employment.
Up until now we have assumed that all individuals face the same probability 
of finding a job. However, this probability may vary across individuals if 
the individual search effort is endogenous, as was shown in chapter 1 , section 
1.7. In this case, the individual probability of finding a job (<&) is equal to 
the aggregate probability (q) times the individual’s search effort (s*). If we 
solve the individual maximization problem we get the optimal level of search 
intensity as a function of the individual human capital, but also of his innate 
ability (0 *) and of the labour market conditions.
where T > 1 . Therefore, the individual probability of finding a job will be:
Finally, taking logs in this equation we obtain the relationship we are trying 
to estimate in this chapter.
We will test whether the probability of finding a job given that you are unem-
average level of education in the labour market after controlling for individ­
ual education and other individual and local characteristics - that is, whether
Si = (Af ioihfq)?-1 (3.6)
0(1 -/3)raiftf£[/!f]rB[siftf] (3.7)
ployed for t periods (or unemployment duration) is positively related with the
3.3 T he data
The data used in this chapter comes from the longitudinal Labour Force Sur­
vey (LFS). The LFS is designed to be representative of the total population in
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GB1, containing very detailed information on the labour force status of indi­
viduals as well as on family and individual characteristics. In addition, we use 
the non-longitudinal LFS to obtain aggregate variables reflecting the evolution 
of the British regional labour market over time.
The longitudinal LFS is conducted every quarter on all members of around 
60.000 households. One fifth of the sample is renewed quarterly and hence we 
can observe any individual for a maximum of five quarters. It started in the 
first quarter of 1992 (march-may) and we use all waves up to the fourth quarter 
of 1999 (November-January)2. This period of nine years covers more than a 
whole cycle of the British Economy. The sample is constructed using only the 
unemployment spells taking place during the five quarters each individual is in 
the sample, to avoid a stock sampling bias problem. That is, spells which start 
not earlier than the quarter of the first interview. This means that the longest 
spell will be 14 months. This will avoid stock sampling biases. Spells will be 
measured in months3. The resulting sample consists of 15,974 unemployment 
spells with an average duration of 3.4 months. Out of these durations 40.8% 
finished with a transition into employment, 15.7% finished with a transition 
into inactivity and the remaining 43.5% did not conclude before the individual 
left the sample (see table 3.2).
Since the aim of this study is the estimation of the effect of education match­
ing externalities on the transitions from unemployment to employment, the 
most important variables are the ones measuring the distribution of education 
in the local labour market. We assume that the distribution of education is 
perfectly described by its mean and standard deviation. The theoretical model 
predicts that what is important is the specific segment of the labour market 
the individual is participating in. The problem is how to define the relevant
1 Northern Ireland is excluded from the study since the quarterly LFS was not introduced 
in this area until the winter of 1994-95.
2After 1999 regions are only reported using the new classification of regions (GOR). In 
addition, the county indicator is also dropped from the LFS at this moment which makes it 
impossible to construct comparable regions.
3In some estimations a sample including all unemployment spells reported by individuals 
is used. These can be obtained since individuals are asked in each interview how long have 
they been unemployed for, how long have they been actively looking for work if unemployed 
and when did they start to work. Due to the structure of these question spells may have 
the following length: 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 1 to 5 years. When using this sample 
the Log-likelihood function is corrected for the stock sample bias
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segment of the labour market in the data. In this paper we use occupation 
groups in each region. Using this definition, we calculate the average level of 
education as the mean education across all the individuals belonging to the 
same occupation group in a region at a moment in time. Every individual is 
attributed the average level of education of his own labour market segment - 
e.g. a manager is attributed the average level of education of the managers in 
his area in that quarter. We are only looking at direct spill-over effects, that 
is, within occupation spill-over. We do similarly for the standard deviation of 
education.
The education and occupation variables used are explained in table 3.1 4. The 
individual education variable has 9 levels going from low to high education. 
This classification distinguishes between academic and vocational qualifica­
tions. In addition, we have aggregated this variable into 4 education groups, 
where academic and equivalent vocational qualifications belong to the same 
category.
The regions considered are based on the Standard Statistical Regions classi­
fication, split into metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas whenever possi­
ble. This divides GB into 19 regions: Tyne h  Wear, rest of Northern region, 
South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside, East Mid­
lands, East Anglia, Inner London, Outer London, Rest of the South East, 
South West, West Midlands metropolitan, Rest of West Midlands, Greater 
Manchester, Merseyside, Rest of North West, Wales, Strathclyde and Rest of 
Scotland. 5
The Occupation variable follows the 9 Major Occupation Groups defined by 
the new Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) introduced in 1991. This 
classification was designed so that the occupational groupings brought together 
jobs with similar requirements in terms of qualifications, training and expe­
rience. The ranking of these nine major categories from 1-9 was meant to 
reflect the progression of the occupations from those requiring a higher level 
of qualifications, training and/or experience down to those requiring a much
4A more detailed definition of the education variable can be found in appendix C.l, 
tablet-education-detail
5A detailed list of the counties included in each region can be found in Appendix B, table 
C.2.
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Table 3.1: Categories of Education and Occupation variables
Education O ccupation
9 groups 4 groups 9 groups 4 groups
Degree Degree or Managers Managerial/
High Voc. equivalent Professionals Professional
A Level A Level or Technicians
Mid. Voc. equivalent Craft Technical
0  Level O Level or Clerical
Low Voc. equivalent Personnel Service
Other Acad. Other Voc. Sales
Other qual k Operators Manual
No qual no qual Others
lower level of skill or experience. This is particularly relevant for this study 
since we are using occupation groups to identify segments of the labour mar­
ket which are fairly homogeneous in terms of the education level (ability) of 
its workers. We have also constructed a more aggregated occupation variable 
with 4 groups, keeping the hierarchical structure of the SOC.
The other explanatory variables used in this study can be divided into three 
groups: personal, household and regional characteristics. The personal char­
acteristics include: age, sex, education, last job’s occupational group, being 
white, being married, having migrated in the last year, and whether receiving 
unemployment benefit or financial help from relatives. The household vari­
ables are: region of residence, whether receiving housing benefit, number of 
dependent children under 6  and between 6  and 16, number of people working 
in the household and whether it is a one-person-household or a two-person- 
household. The variables reflecting regional characteristics are obtained from 
the non-longitudinal LFS and include: average level and standard deviation 
of education within each occupation group in the region, unemployment rate 
by region, inactivity rate by region, vacancy rate by occupation and region, 
ratio of the flow of immigrants to the flow of emigrants and industry’s share of 
employment in the region (10 industries). The migration data is derived from 
the National Health Service Central Register, provided by NOMIS. Finally, we 
also include time and region dummies. All the regional variables are included 
in the estimation in logarithms.
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The household and regional variables are allowed to vary within each unem­
ployment spell, except for the region of residence6, while the personal charac­
teristics remain unchanged7.
Finally, since the theoretical model does not provide a way of distinguishing 
between technological and pecuniary externalities, the only possibility is to 
try to control for each region’s technological level. We attempt this by includ­
ing the industrial structure of employment in each region (using a 1 0 -industry 
classification). The idea being that, for example, a region with a high share 
of employment in agriculture will have a low technological level, while another 
with a high share of employment in financial services will be quite advanced 
technologically.
Table 3.2: Sample means of individual characteristics by oc­
cupation group
Variables all occup high occup low occup
D u r a t io n  C h a r a c te r is t ic s
% exit into employment 40.8 45.0 37.1
% exit into inactivity 15.7 12.5 18.6
% stay unemployed 43.5 42.5 44.3
average duration 3.36 3.31 3.41
I n d iv id u a l  C h a r a c te r is t ic s  (% )
Male 56.1 62.7 50.4
16-24 years of age 35.0 26.2 42.6
25-34 years of age 24.5 25.6 23.5
35-49 years of age 27.7 31.9 24.0
50-59/64 years of age 12.8 16.3 9.9
Non-white 7.4 6.4 8.3
Married 45.0 51.7 39.0
Migrant 2.2 2.3 2.2
Head of Household 39.3 46.0 33.4
continued on next page
6The LFS is a survey of non-movers.
7Changes in some of the personal characteristics, like age (in years) or education, may 
occur during an unemployment spell. However, since the maximum spell is 14 months, the 
effects of these changes are likely to be small.
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Table 3.2: continued
I n d iv id u a l ’s  E d u c a t io n  (% )
Other Voc 9.1 8.0 10.1
Other Acad 7.8 5.8 9.6
Low Voc 16.9 22.1 12.4
0  Level 18.9 17.1 20.4
Mid Voc 2.9 3.8 2.0
A Level 6.3 7.2 5.5
High Voc 4.1 6.2 2.3
Degree 6.7 11.9 2.2
L a s t  J o b ’s O c c u p a tio n a l G ro u p  (% )
Operator 14.2 0.0 26.6
Sales 11.5 0.0 21.6
Personal 11.4 0.0 21.5
Clerical 15.7 0.0 0.0
Craft 14.6 31.3 0.0
Technical 5.4 11.7 0.0
Professional 3.8 8.2 0.0
Manager 7.1 15.3 0.0
H o u s e h o ld  S tr u c tu r e
no dep child <  6 0.29 0.27 0.31
no dep child < 1 6 0.81 0.70 0.91
no working 1.2 1.2 1.2
% one person house 12.9 15.2 10.9
% two person house 23.7 26.0 21.6
B e n e f i t s  ( q u a r te r  b e fo re  e x i t  (% ))
Housing benefit 7.3 5.7 8.7
Unemp benefit 52.8 59.9 46.6
Family credit 1.3 0.9 1.7
No of cases 15,974 7,459 8,515
NOTES: ’’high occup” denotes occupations 5-9 of the SOC classification, 
while ’’low occup” denotes occupations 1-4 (see table 3.1.
3.3.1 The distribution of education across regions
Looking first at GB as a whole (figure 3.1 & table 3.3). The level of education 
of the working age population has grown steadily during the 1990s at an aver-
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Table 3.3: Average Education by 4 Occupation Groups
Occup
Average Level Growth
92-99 92 99 92-99
M/P. 6.4 6 .2 6.7 1 .2
Tech 4.9 4.6 5.2 1.7
Serv 4.2 4.0 4.5 1 .8
Man 3.0 2 . 8 3.1 1.5
All 4.4 4.2 4.7 1.7
age annual rate of about 1.7%, from a situation where the average person had 
at least some low vocational qualifications in 1992 to near having O Levels in 
1999. Although this great increase in qualifications has affected all occupation 
groups, it has been most important in the intermediate occupations (technical 
& services), with average annual growth rates of 1.7-2%. The highest and 
lowest occupations grew at an average annual rate of only 1.2%. Despite the 
differences in growth rates, the top occupations have the highest qualifications 
over the whole period.
At a regional level, the general trends pointed out above are still present. The 
highest average corresponds to the skilled occupations and the lowest to the 
unskilled (table 3.4). However, there are important differences across regions. 
The biggest differences occur in the unskilled occupations, where the level of 
education of the worst region is 25% lower than that of the top one, while the 
skilled occupation group is the most uniform across regions (the education of 
the worst region is 10% lower than the top one). This is also reflected in their 
respective standard deviations (0.073 vs. 0.03) and gini coefficients (0.039 vs. 
0.015). The 19 regions considered might be classified into three groups ac­
cording to their average level of education (table 3.4). First of all, there is 
a group of regions which have the highest level of education across all occu­
pations: Scotland, the South East (including Great London) and the South 
West. Secondly, Metropolitan West Midlands and Rest of Northern Region 
have the lowest level of education across all occupations. Thirdly, there is a 
lot of variation across occupations for the rest of the regions. Some regions, 
like Tyne h  Wear, have low qualified Manual, Service and Technical occupa­
tions but medium-high qualified Manager/Professional occupations. While for 
other regions, like East Anglia, Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside and the Rest
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Figure 3.1: Average education by occupation (GB)
Figure 3.2: Average education vs average growth of education by occupation 
(line with crosses excludes 3 top & bottom regions)
average annual growth rate of education (%)
Manual Occupations
  -
average  annual growth rate of education (%)
Service Occupations
average  annual growth rate of education (%)
technical occupations
average  annual growth rate of education (%)
man/professional occupations
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Table 3.4: Average Education by Region and Occupation Group, top 5 & 
bottom 5 regions
Manual Services Technicians Man/Prof All
Reg Ave Reg Ave Reg Ave Reg Ave Reg Ave
WM 2.67 WM 3.56 WM 4.25 RYH 6.23 WM 3.95
Mers 2.73 RN 3.74 EM 4.46 WM 6.26 SY 4.11
RN 2.78 SY 3.76 SY 4.53 EAng 6.26 T&W 4.14
T&W 2.78 T&W 3.79 RWM 4.58 Wal 6.28 Mers 4.15
SY 2.80 Mers 3.81 Man 4.78 RWM 6.30 RN 4.19
RNW 3.08 SW 4.13 RSE 5.09 OLon 6.47 SW 4.68
OLon 3.15 RSE 4.14 Strath 5.20 RSE 6.56 OLon 4.74
RSE 3.35 ILon 4.20 OLon 5.25 Strath 6.70 RSE 4.82
SW 3.36 Strath 4.22 Scot 5.38 Scot 6.83 ILon 4.85
Scot 3.48 Scot 4.43 ILon 5.82 ILon 6.93 Scot 4.90
of West Midlands, the opposite is true.
In terms of growth rates, the intermediate occupations have grown most across 
all regions, while the manual occupations have grown least (except for Tyne 
&; Wear) (table 3.5). By occupation, in general the biggest growth has taken 
place in the areas with the lowest average education. In table 3.5 we can see 
that the most educated regions (Scotland and SE) are always amongst the 
worst regions in terms of growth (Inner london is the exception in Technical 
occupations). In addition, the regions with a very qualified workforce in cer­
tain occupations, have grown most in the other ones (Tyne & Wear in unskilled 
occupations, while East Anglia in skilled ones). However, this is not a feature 
of the extreme regions only, it is true for the middle ones as well. In figure 
3.2, we can see that there is a clear negative relationship between the level of 
education and its growth rate across all occupations. This is still present when 
we exclude the best and worst regions (line with crosses in figure 3.2)8.
8Scotland, South East, metropolitan West Midlands and rest of the Northern region
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Table 3.5: Average Annual Growth Rate of Average Education by Occupation, 
top 5 fe bottom 5 regions_____________________________________________
Manual Services Technicians Man/Prof All
Reg Ave Reg Ave Reg Ave Reg Ave Reg Ave
WM 0.16 Scot 0.74 Strath 1.15 RN 0.54 Scot 0.96
OLon 0.35 OLon 1.57 Scot 1.24 Strath 0.75 OLon 1.34
Scot 0.43 Strath 1.70 Mers 1.27 Scot 0.77 Strath 1.36
ILon 0.44 ILon 1.78 SW 1.36 RSE 0 . 8 8 RSE 1.56
EAng 0.71 RSE 1.82 Man 1.39 ILon 0.89 RN 1.58
WY 1.85 EM 2 .2 1 EAng 2 . 1 1 SW 1.48 Wal 1.87
Man 1.90 RWM 2.44 Wal 2.16 RWM 1.53 RWM 1.96
RN 2.03 WM 2.53 ILon 2.17 EM 1.54 EM 2.15
Mers 2.73 T&W 2.58 WY 2.53 EAng 1.56 T&W 2.17
T&W 3.26 WY 2 . 6 8 EM 2.56 RYH 1.57 WY 2 . 2 0
SD 0.80 SD 0.43 SD 0.42 SD 0.31 SD 0.30
GINI 0.33 GINI 0 .1 1 GINI 0.13 GINI 0.15 GINI 0.09
3.3.2 Education, Survival rates and Vacancies.
The theoretical models of chapters 1 and 2 predict that regions with a relatively 
higher level of education will have higher job creation and lower unemployment 
durations. We can use the Kaplan-Meier empirical survival in unemployment 
to have an initial idea about the differences in unemployment durations across 
the UK local labour markets during the 1990s. The empirical survival is the 
fraction of unemployment spells ongoing at the start of a month which do 
not end during that month9. It represents the probability of remaining un­
employed given that you have been unemployed for x months. In general, the 
most qualified occupations seem to have the lowest probability of remaining in 
unemployment for all durations (figure 3.3). An exception are the Service oc­
cupations which have the lowest survival for durations longer than two months.
If we now look across regions, we observe that the empirical survival in unem­
ployment is greater in the region with the highest education level (Scotland) 
than in the one with the lowest level (Metropolitan West Midlands) (figure
9 The empirical survivor for month t is equal to the number of spells which do not end 
during month t, divided by the size of the risk set at the beginning of month t. The size 
of the risk set at the beginning of month t is the number of people whose spells have not 
ended or been censored at the beginning of month t.
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3.4). This is not true for all regions. For example, Greater London has one 
of the highest survival rates for all durations of unemployment although it 
has one of the most qualified workforce, while Rest of Northern region has a 
medium survival rate but one of the lowest levels of qualifications. Finally, 
we can also look at different regions by occupation. In figure 3.5 we compare 
the empirical survival in unemployment state of the top and bottom regions 
in terms of qualifications by four occupation groups. It is clear from this fig­
ure that regions with a more qualified workforce enjoy lower probabilities of 
remaining unemployed.
A similar picture is obtained by looking at unemployment durations. The most 
skilled occupations have the lowest durations, while regional education by oc­
cupation is negatively correlated with unemployment duration (see figures C.l 
and C.3 in appendix C.5).
Another important variable determining the performance of a labour market 
is labour market tightness, measured as the ratio of opened vacancies to the 
number of unemployed. Contrary to what was expected, figure 3.6 suggests 
that the most skilled occupations have the lowest market tightness. However, 
this is not longer true when we look at the relation between education and 
labour market tightness by occupational group and region. In figure 3.7, we 
see that there is a positive correlation between these variables for the more 
skilled occupations, but a negative one for the least skilled ones. This result 
is strongest when we drop the top and bottom regions in terms of education 10.
In conclusion, all the descriptive evidence points towards a positive relationship 
between regional education by occupation and labour market performance, 
confirming the conclusions of the theoretical model. Of course, it could be 
possible that the regions with the most qualified workforce have labour mar­
kets performing better simply because more qualified people face lower unem­
ployment rates and shorter unemployment durations and not because of an 
external effect. That is why we now move to test this hypothesis using econo­
metric techniques which allow us to control for the individual and regional 
characteristics which could be driving this result.
10Scotland, South East, metropolitan West Midlands and rest of the Northern region
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Figure 3.6: Market tightness by occupation
Figure 3.7: Average education vs labour market tightness by occupation (line 
with crosses excludes 3 top & bottom regions)
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3.4 E conom etric specification.
In order to study the determinants of the transitions from unemployment, we 
apply econometric duration models to the duration of unemployment spells.
The time to exit of unemployment can be thought of as a continuous random 
variable, T. This variable represents the duration of stay in the state of un­
employment. The probability distribution of the duration of unemployment - 
the probability that the random variable T is less than some value t - can be 
specified by the distribution function F(t ) = Pr(T < t). The corresponding 
density function is f ( t ) =  dF(t)/dt.
Two other functions which are particularly relevant in studying duration data 
are the Hazard and the Survivor functions. The survivor function, S(t), repre­
sents the probability of remaining in a specific state, i.e., the probability that 
the random variable T  will equal or exceed the value t. It can be defined as 
S(t) = 1 — F(t) — P r(T > t). The hazard function, A(£), is the rate at which 
unemployment spells will be completed at duration t , given that they last 
until t. It is defined as \{t) = f( t ) /S(t) .  Both of these functions depend on 
a vector of explanatory variables x{t) and some unknown coefficients (3 and Ao-
We consider a proportional hazard model (Cox (1972)). This model separates 
the hazard function \[t,x(t),(3, Ao], into two parts in the following way:
\[t,x{t),(3, A0] =  A0{t)<p[x{t),p]
The first part, Ao(£), is called the ’’baseline” hazard and represents a functional 
form for the dependence of the hazard on duration t. The second part, </>[.], 
describes the way in which the hazard shifts between individuals endowed with 
different x(t) at a given duration t. That is, the effect of explanatory variables 
is to multiply the hazard A0 by a factor 0  which does not depend on duration 
t. A convenient specification of </>[.] is
<f)[x(t),(3\ =exp[x{t)'(3]
since it ensures the non-negativity of A[.] without constraining the parameter
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space for (3. In addition, with this specification we can interpret the coefficient 
(3 as the proportional effect of x(t) on the conditional probability of completing 
a spell. This is shown as follows:
a  In A[t,x(t),(3, A0] =
3x(t) P
So far we have been considering the transition out of unemployment to be a 
continuous process, but in our dataset we only observe it on a monthly basis. 
Therefore, we have to use a discrete-time hazard function, hi{t). This function 
denotes the conditional probability that an unemployment spell lasts until time 
t +  1 , given that it has lasted until t. We will use a complementary log-log 
specification, which has been shown to be the discrete-time counterpart of an 
underlying continuous-time proportional hazard model (Prentice and Gloeckler 
(1978)).
h i ( t )  =  Pr[Ti = t  + 1 | T i  >  t , X i ( t ) \  (3.9)
f t + i
= 1 — exp { —{ - / '  M . * }
= 1 -  exp j -  exp[xi(t)'(3] • A0 (s)d sj
given that Xi(t) is constant between t and t + 1. Equation (3.9) can be rewritten 
as
hi(t) =  1 -  exp { -  exp[xi(t)'(3 +  7(0]} (3.10)
where
/
£+1
A 0(s)ds
denotes the integrated baseline hazard. We will estimate two different func­
tional forms for this function. Initially, we do not assume a specific functional 
form for 7 (t) and estimate the model semiparametrically. This method esti­
mates independently the value of each step in the baseline hazard. Then, in 
order to check the robustness of our results, we estimate the model paramet­
rically assuming 7 ( 0  takes the following Weibull form (see Kiefer (1988))
7  (t) = a 0tai (3.11)
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The survivor function in discrete time can be shown to equal
t%
S(u) = Pr[T{ > t] = J ] [ l  -  MO] (3-12)
t = 1
The joint probability distribution of a sample of n observations of U can be 
represented by the log-likelihood function. Some of the n observations might 
be right-censored, that is, they represent uncompleted durations. These obser­
vations will contribute to the likelihood only with the survivor function since 
all we know is that the spell of unemployment has lasted until moment t{. 
We can define a censoring indicator q , such that q  = 1 if the zth observa­
tion is uncensored, and q  = 0 otherwise. Therefore, the contribution to the 
log-likelihood of the zth individual with a spell of length ti is given by
In Li -  Ci In f(ti)  + (1 -  q) In S{U)
Substituting the definition of the hazard function and equation (3.12) into this 
expression we obtain the following
\ +  (1  -  q ) ^ l n [ l  -  hi{t)]
I t = l
ti
= Ci {Inhi{ti) -  ln[l -  hi(U)]} +  ^ l n [ l  -  hi(t)] (3.13)
t = l
Finally, substituting the discrete-time hazard function (equation 3.10), we get 
the likelihood function that will be estimated
In L i  =  Ci {In [1 -  exp { -  exp[ x ^ U Y P  +  7^ )]}] ~  exp[^(^)'^ +  7(^)]}
ti
-  ^ 2  exp[xi(t)'P +  7 (£)] (3.14)
t = i
In the above discussion, we have wrongly considered that there is only one 
possible transition out of unemployment. An unemployment spell can termi­
nate when the individual finds a job, but also when he gives up searching and 
becomes inactive. Given that we are interested in the first type of transition, 
we need to estimate a competing risk model of duration that distinguishes
t i - i
In L i  = Ci < Inh i ( t i )  + ^ l n [ l  -  h i ( t ) \
t = i
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exit into employment from exit into inactivity. Narendranathan and Stewart 
(1993) show that the parameters of the hazard into employment can be esti­
mated by treating durations finishing for other reasons as censored at the time 
of exit. Having done this, the proportional hazard specification used for the 
single-risk model can be applied to the job-finding hazard.
Using this methodology we can control for unobserved heterogeneity by condi­
tioning the hazard rate on an individual’s unobserved characteristics, summa­
rized in the variable v (Lancaster (1990), chapter 4). This is a random variable 
taking on positive values, with the mean normalized to one (for identification 
reasons) and finite variance a2. Then, the conditional hazard function (in 
continuous time) can be re-written as:
X[t, x(t), (3, A0] =  A0(t) exp[x(t)'(3 +  v,-]
with Vi independent of Xi and t. Since each individual Vi is unobserved, we 
have to specify a distribution for v, so that we can write the unconditional 
hazard and the survivor function in terms of parameters that can be estimated 
and of the observable regressors included. This is known as ’’integrating out” 
the unobserved effect. In principle, one could use any continuous distribution 
with positive support, mean one and finite variance. However, in the case of 
the discrete time proportional hazard model that we are using in this work, 
the Gamma distribution has been the most popular choice in the empirical 
literature. This takes the form
f (v)  oc va 2 -1  exp(—cr~2v)
The resulting proportional hazard specification identifies three sources of vari­
ation among individual hazard rates: the duration of unemployment (t ), the 
observable differences among individuals (x(t)) and the unobservable ones (v). 
In a competing risk framework like this one, we also have to impose the inde­
pendence of these disturbance terms across the cause specific hazards. Under 
these assumptions, the log likelihood described in equation 3.14 becomes the
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following:
U- 1
In ^  =  ln [(l+  <j2 ^ e x p { a ;'/?  +  7 (0 } ) “ 1/<T2
t=l
-q(1 + a2 ^ 2  exP {xiP + 7W})_1/<t2] (3-15)
t=l
Finally, since the variable of interest, the mean and standard deviation of 
education, varies only across time, regions and occupation groups, when cal­
culating the standard errors we have to allow for correlation of the errors 
between individuals belonging to the same cluster (see Moulton (1986) for a 
detailed analysis of this problem for the OLS case). This is done by estimating 
the robust Var((3) using White’s method (White (1980) and White (1982)), 
substituting the score vector for the score vector corresponding to the whole 
cluster. These may be called super-observations and are obtained by summing 
the score vectors of all the individuals belonging to the same cluster. The score 
vectors corresponding to the super-observations are independent and therefore 
White’s method still holds.
3.5 R esults
We are now in a position to study the effect of education externalities in the 
matching process on the conditional probability of leaving unemployment. The 
theoretical model predicts that education matching externalities will affect pos­
itively the hazard of employment (re-employment probability), everything else 
equal, and this effect will be stronger the more qualified the segment of the 
labour market.
In the estimation we let local labour market variables vary quarterly, since 
that is the highest level of disaggregation that provides values of these vari­
ables which are representative of the total population.
The results of the estimation are reported in table 3.6. We estimate first the 
econometric model using a semi-parametric approach, where the hazard is left 
unspecified (columns I to III). Secondly, we re-estimate the model using a fully 
parametric approach, assuming the hazard takes a weibull form (columns IV to
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VI). Each of the specifications is estimated first including all individuals in the 
sample (columns I & IV) and then splitting the sample into skilled (columns 
II & V) and unskilled occupations (columns III & VI).
The use of a proportional hazard model implies that the coefficients have a 
clear interpretation. If the sign is positive, an increase in the value of that 
variable has a positive effect on the baseline hazard. That is, it increases 
the probability of leaving unemployment for all durations. If it is negative, 
it will shift the baseline hazard down and reduce the probability of leaving 
unemployment.
Table 3.6: Maximum likelihood estim ates of re-employment
probabilities by occupation group
Variables
sem iparamet r ic weibull
all high low all high low
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t i e s
Average education 0.509* 1.187*** -1.862** 0.602** 1.261*** -1.853**
s.d. of education -0.454** -0.650** 1.869*** -0.440** -0.607** 1.960***
R e g io n a l L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp rate -0.618*** -0.418** -0.957*** -0.619*** -0.407** -0.978***
Vacancy rate 0.020 -0 .0 2 6 0.023 0.030 0.011 0.025
Inactivity rate 1.108** 1.770*** 0.511 1.017** 1.646*** 0.463
R e g io n ’s  M ig r a t io n  r a tio
Migration ratio 0.077** 0.035 0.121*** 0.073** 0.029 0.119***
I n d iv id u a l  C h a r a c te r is t ic s
Sex -0 .0 3 4 -0 .0 6 7 -0 .0 2 7 -0 .055* -0 .085* -0 .0 4 6
16-24 years of age 0.116** 0.170** 0.081 0.115** 0.175** 0.066
25-34 years of age 0.465*** 0.454*** 0.486*** 0.465*** 0.464*** 0.467***
35-49 years of age 0.346*** 0.393*** 0.279*** 0.339*** 0.390*** 0.260***
W hite 0.235*** 0.322*** 0.130 0.228*** 0.319*** 0.123
Married 0.168*** 0.124** 0.242*** 0.156*** 0.107* 0.232***
Migrant 0.057 0.029 0.088 0.062 0.031 0.096
Head of Household 0.147*** 0.191*** 0.097** 0.149*** 0.197*** 0.096**
I n d iv id u a l ’s  E d u c a t io n
Other Voc 0.145*** 0.176** 0.129** 0.147*** 0.171** 0.134**
Other Acad 0.019 -0 .0 6 7 0.050 0.019 -0 .0 7 0 0.052
continued on next page
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Table 3.6: continued
Low Voc 0.139*** 0.160*** 0.141** 0.130*** 0.144** 0.142**
0  Level 0.039 0.101 0.017 0.046 0.102 0.031
Mid Voc 0.061 0.332*** -0 .2 5 3 0.060 0.318*** -0 .2 4 9
A Level 0.017 0.089 -0.035*** 0.018 0.087 -0 .0 3 4
High Voc 0.289*** 0.413*** 0.105*** 0.281*** 0.396*** 0.110
Degree 0.176*** 0.248*** 0.103* 0.176*** 0.245*** 0.089
L a s t  J o b ’s  O c c u p a tio n a l G ro u p
Operator 0.893*** 1.292*** 0.877*** 1.284***
Sales 0.889*** 1.313*** 0.885*** 1.317***
Personal 0.919*** 1.353*** 0.916*** 1.357***
Clerical 0.776*** 0.715***
Craft 0.884*** 0.350** 0.873*** 0.399**
Technical 0.804*** -0 .0 7 1 0.759*** -0 .0 2 7
Professional 0.714* -0.567** 0.629* -0.522**
Manager 0.483 -0.749*** 0.368 -0.747***
H o u s e h o ld  S t r u c tu r e
no dep child <  6 0.078*** 0.337 0.087**
***00oo 0.347 0.089**
no dep child < 1 6 0.312*** 0.048*** 0.294*** 0.326*** 0.053*** 0.312***
no working 1.070*** 1.072*** 1.088*** 1.105*** 1.103*** 1.126***
one person house 1.765*** 1.772*** 1.748*** 1.813*** 1.813*** 1.794***
two person house 1.089*** 1.055*** 1.136*** 1.135*** 1.089*** 1.198***
B e n e f i t s
Housing benefit -0.305*** -0.325*** -0.265** -0.298*** -0.314*** -0.266**
Unemp benefit -0 .1 2 9 -0.149*** -0 .084* -0 .0 4 3 -0 .0 6 6 0.002
Family credit 0.313*** 0.119 0.389*** 0.366*** 0.230 0.403***
constant
a
12.242***
0.055***
-18.079***
0.045***
-4.329***
0.070***
Log Likelihood
x 2
No cases
-1 6 0 7 9  -8 1 3 9  -7 8 6 8  
33658 15967 26797 
15974 7459 8515
-1 6 3 5 7
5129
15974
-8 2 6 4
2696
7459
-8 0 3 2
3921
8515
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Region, Time and Occupation dummies and Indus­
try’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
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3.5.1 Estim ation Results for the Education Externality
We consider first the variables measuring the distribution of education: av­
erage education and standard deviation of education in the occupation group 
and region. The estimated coefficients have the expected signs, confirming 
the existence of a positive and significant effect of education externalities in 
the matching process in UK local labour markets (table 3.6 column I). The 
estimated coefficient for the average education in the occupation and region 
is positive and significant at the 1 0 % significance level, while the coefficient 
for the standard deviation of education is negative and significant at the 5% 
significance level. This implies that the re-employment probability is higher 
for individuals belonging to a segment of the local labour market where the 
average level of education is higher and where the standard deviation is lower.
When we estimate the model separately for skilled and unskilled occupations 
we realize that this result is driven by the skilled occupations.11 In table 3.6, 
columns II Sz III we see that a higher average level of education increases the 
probability of leaving unemployment for the skilled occupations but decreases 
it for the unskilled ones. That is, education externalities have a strong posi­
tive effect on the matching process of the skilled segments of UK local labour 
markets, whilst they have a negative effect on the matching process of the 
unskilled segments. The reason for this differential effect is that an increase in 
the average education level of a labour market generates two opposing forces 
affecting the matching process: a external effect and a competition effect. The 
external effect appears because a more qualified workforce increases expected 
profits by firms raising job creation and reducing unemployment duration. 
However, when average education is higher, the competition between unem­
ployed individuals for the available vacancies will be more intense, increasing 
unemployment duration 12. In the case of skilled jobs, where the worker’s 
qualifications are very important for firms, one would expect the external ef-
11 Skilled occupations correspond to occupations 5-9 of the SOC classification, while un­
skilled occupations correspond to occupations 1-4. We have tried different definitions of 
skilled occupations but this seems to be the relevant one.
12 The theoretical model developed in this chapter only considers the external effect be­
cause it assumes random matching. This implies that firms will employ any worker they 
meet. If we relax this assumption to allow firms some directed search, the competition effect 
will appear, compensating part of the external effect. However, as long as firms cannot 
segment perfectly the labour market, the external effect will still be present.
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Figure 3.8: Baseline hazard all individuals Figure 3.9: Baseline hazard by occupation
group
feet to dominate the competition effect. In the case of unskilled jobs, firms 
might consider education as a minimum requirement but not as a fundamental 
determinant of the expected profits from the job. This means that job creation 
will react very little to a more qualified workforce and the competition effect 
will dominate the external effect.
Figure 3.8 shows the estimated baseline hazard of the representative individual 
for the standard model (table 3.6 columns I). The hazard of re-employment 
is increasing for durations up to 4-5 months and then decreasing, with some 
small peaks, which is consistent with the literature on unemployment dura­
tion (see Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) and Boheim and Taylor (2000)). 
The estimated baseline hazard for skilled and unskilled occupations shows a 
very similar picture (figure 3.9). The skilled occupations have a higher hazard 
than the unskilled ones for all durations. This means that individuals from 
the skilled occupations have a higher probability of leaving unemployment in­
dependently of how long they have been unemployed for
In order to have an idea of the magnitude of this on the probability of re­
employment we look at the shift in the estimated baseline hazard of a repre­
sentative person after a change in the average level of education. A 1% rise in 
average education shifts the hazard of the representative individual by 1 .2 % 
on average, while a 1% decrease in the standard deviation of education shifts 
the hazard by 0.5% on average (table 3.7). A similar pattern is obtained for 
the Skilled Occupations, although of a bigger magnitude - 2.8% and 0.7% for
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Table 3.7: Average % change in baseline hazard of the representative individual
All
Skilled
Occup.
Unskilled
Occup.
1% |  average education 0.95 2.65 -3.16
1 % I standard deviation of education 0.39 0 .6 8 -1.41
average region to Scotland 6.04 7.53 -8.64
average region to West Mid (met) -6.42 -22.27 13.28
a 1% change in the variables. The Unskilled Occupations show the opposite 
pattern. These numbers are comparable to those obtained by other studies 
in the literature. Moretti (1998) finds that a 1 % rise in the share of college 
graduates increases wages of graduates by 1.2%, while Rauch (1993) finds that 
a one-year increase in average schooling raises individual wages between 3 and 
5%.
One can also use this method to have an idea of the magnitude of the effect of 
regional differences in the distribution of education. A representative individ­
ual would experience an increase in the probability of finding a job of 2 0 .6 % if 
the regional level of education increased from the national mean to the level of 
the top region (Scotland). That same individual would experience a reduction 
in his probability of leaving unemployment of 8.9% if the level of education de­
creased from the mean to the level of the worst region (West Midlands Met.). 
That is, the regional differences in education could imply a difference in the 
probability of leaving unemployment of up to almost 30%. This number goes 
up to 33% when we consider the skilled occupations only, while it goes down 
to 2 1 % for the unskilled occupations.
The model has also been estimated separately by sex and occupational group 
and by age group and occupational group (Tables 3.8 and 3.9) . 13 The effect of 
the education externality in the matching process shows a similar pattern for 
all the categories, with a significant and strong effect for the skilled occupations 
and either negative or insignificant for the unskilled occupations. However, the 
magnitude of the effect is larger for men and older workers (the coefficient of
13The age groups are defined as follows: young =  16-34 & old =  35-59 if female and 35-64 
if male. We run these estimations separately, not because we believe the externality should 
affect these groups differently, but because for other reasons, like female participation or 
youngsters’ lack of job experience, these might be completely different labour markets.
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the standard deviation of education is negative but insignificant).
Table 3.8: Maximum likelihood estim ates of re-employment 
probabilities by sex and occupation group
male female
Variables all high low all high low
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t i e s
Average education 0.407 1.216*** -2.276** 0.822* 1.154** -0 .7 0 1
s.d. of education —0.446* -0.847** 2.183*** -0 .4 6 6 -0 .2 7 3 0.865
R e g io n a l L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp rate —0.758*** -0.584** -1.090*** -0 .348 0.048 -0.750**
Vacancy rate 0.016 0.101 -0 .0 3 9 -0 .013 -0 .0 9 5 0.117
Inactivity rate 0.681 1.442* -0 .0 8 2 1.689** 2.519** 1.637*
R e g io n ’s M ig r a t io n  r a tio
Migration ratio 0.125*** 0.079 0.192*** 0.013 -0 .0 3 2 0.056
Log Likelihood —6489 -2 8 4 6 -3 5 8 0 -9 4 7 4 -5 1 9 5 -4 2 2 5
X2 17396 5540 14615 19604 11642 12525
No of cases 8963 4674 4289 7011 2785 4226
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Individual controls (see table C.5); Region, Time
and Occupation dummies and Industry’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
Table 3.9: Maximum likelihood estim ates of re-employment
probabilities by age group and occupation group
16-34 35-59/64
Variables all high low all high low
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t i e s
Average education 0.485 1.302*** -1.671* 0.537 0.950** -2.804***
s.d. of education —0.259 -0 .5 7 0 2.109*** -0.657** -0 .6 2 0 2.096**
R e g io n a l L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp rate —0.565*** -0 .1 9 8 -0.932*** --0.686*** -0.601** -1.027***
Vacancy rate 0.052 0.146 0.064 -0.072 -0 .1 7 2 -0 .0 6 4
continued on next page
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Table 3.9: continued
Inactivity rate 0.821 1.842** -0 .0 2 6  1.585** 1.328*** 1.708
R e g io n ’s  M ig r a t io n  r a tio
Migration ratio 0.079* -0 .0 3 0  0.154*** 0.069 0.095 0.049
Log Likelihood -9 5 4 2 -4 3 5 5 -5 1 2 1 -6 3 9 4 -3 6 9 3 -2 6 4 5
x 2 19673 8301 17761 16481 9603 9010
No of cases 9495 3865 5630 6479 3594 2885
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Individual controls (see table C.6); Region, Time 
and Occupation dummies and Industry’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
This is due to the fact that these two groups have more permanent links with 
the job market, while women and younger workers spend important periods 
inactive due to childbirth for the former and studies for the latter.
So far in this chapter we have looked only at unemployment durations with a 
maximum length of 14 months to avoid having a stock sampling bias problem. 
However, it would be interesting to know how important is the length of the 
unemployment duration for the matching education externality. One would 
expect that education externalities are more important for individuals who 
are well attached to the labour market, and on average that will be the case 
for the shorter durations. Firms searching for workers will most certainly dis­
criminate against people who have been unemployed for long periods of time 
independently of the average quality of workers looking for jobs in that labour 
market segment. The main reason being that human capital depreciates and 
becomes obsolete very quickly after long spells of unemployment.
In order to test this hypothesis we have re-estimated the duration model using 
all the unemployment spells in the sample. The problem with using this sam­
ple is that the unemployment spells that started before the individual joined 
the survey are over-represented in it, since during that period of time other in­
dividuals included in the sample experienced shorter spells of unemployment, 
but they were not recorded because they finished before the survey started. 
However, this is solved by conditioning the log-likelihood function on the length
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of unemployment at the first interview date (seeLancaster and Chesher (1983) 
and Lancaster (1990))14. The results using this full sample (see table 3.10 are 
consistent in general with those for the standard sample. However, the effects 
are smaller in magnitude and insignificant for the unskilled occupations. We 
interpret this as a possible confirmation of the arguments explained above.
Table 3.10: Maximum likelihood estim ates of re-employment 
probabilities by occupation group using all the durations in 
the sample, controlling for entrance to sample.
Variables all occup high occup low occup
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t ie s
Average education 0.295** (0.143) 0.536*** (0.191) -0 .0 3 6 (0.273)
s.d. of education 0.036 (0.131) 0.209 (0.169) 0.243 (0.274)
R e g io n a l L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp rate -0.756*** (0.097) -0.870*** (0.133) -0.650*** (0.137)
Vacancy rate 0.094*** (0.027) 0.033 (0.047) 0.141*** (0.030)
Inactivity rate -0.637*** (0.158) -0 .411* (0.222) -0.762*** (0.220)
R e g io n ’s  M ig r a t io n  r a tio
Migration ratio 0.178 (0.224) 0.113 (0.292) 0.198 (0.330)
Log Likelihood -3 1 1 1 0 -15461 -15 5 6 8
x2 39755 21116 25824
No cases 40041 18258 21783
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Individual controls (see table C.7); Region, Time 
and Occupation dummies and Industry’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
Finally, we need to know how important are these matching education exter­
nalities with respect to technological externalities. As was mentioned earlier, 
the theoretical model does not provide a way of distinguishing between these 
two types of externalities. In this study we have tried to do this by including a 
variable in the estimation which acts as a proxy for the regional technological
14See appendix C section C.4 for a description of the econometric methodology.
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level. These variables are the share of employment of each industry in each 
region over time. In table 3.11 we have the results of estimating the standard 
econometric model excluding the variables measuring technology. These esti­
mation results are very similar to those of the standard estimation (including 
the regional technological level) although slightly smaller. This suggests that 
the technological externalities do not reduce the probability of leaving unem­
ployment for all durations. If we accept this way of controlling for technology 
as correct, one should conclude that the most relevant type of externality in 
the matching process are the pecuniary externalities and not the technological 
ones.
Table 3.11: Maximum likelihood estim ates of re-employment 
probabilities by occupation group dropping industrial share
Variables all occup high occup low occup
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t ie s
Average education 0.385 (0.284) 0.955*** (0.338) -1.953*** (0.740)
s.d. of education —0.424* (0 .2 2 2 ) -0.597 (0.283) 1.930*** (0.578)
R e g io n a l L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp rate -0.681*** (0.153) -0.584*** (0.199) -0.908*** (0.218)
Vacancy rate 0.034 (0.041) 0.006 (0.073) 0.034 (0.051)
Inactivity rate 0.563 (0.429) 0.844 (0.550) 0.417 (0.611)
R e g io n ’s M ig r a t io n  r a tio
Migration ratio 0.081** (0.034) 0.063 (0.045) 0.108*** (0.040)
Log Likelihood -16093 -8157 -7878
x2 30291 14990 23190
No of cases 15974 7459 8515
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Individual controls (see table C.8); Region, Time 
and Occupation dummies and Industry’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
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3.5.2 Estim ation Results for the regional labour market 
variables
The effect of regional labour market variables on unemployment duration in the 
standard model estimated are shown in the second and third parts of table 3.6.
The regional unemployment rate has a negative sign and is significant at the 
1% significance level. This means that a rise in regional unemployment reduces 
the probability of leaving unemployment for all durations. The reason for this 
is that the bigger the number of people unemployed the greater the number 
of people looking for work and therefore the lower the market tightness, which 
reduces the probability of finding a job. This is an standard theoretical re­
sult of matching models (see Pissarides (2000) and Petrongolo and Pissarides 
(2 0 0 1 ) for a survey of the literature) and is in accordance with the models of 
chapters 1 & 2 . As one would have expected, the regional unemployment rate 
has the greatest effect in reducing the probability of staying unemployed of the 
individuals belonging to the unskilled occupations. The estimated coefficient 
is more than double that for the skilled occupations.
The vacancy rate has a positive sign, as expected from the theoretical model 
(see also Petrongolo (2001)). The larger the number of vacancies opened, the 
easier it is for unemployed individuals to find a job and therefore the shorter 
the average unemployment spell. However, it is not significant at the 10% 
level. This is most probably due to the fact that vacancies registered at job 
centers are known to under-represent the total number of vacancies. 15
The inactivity rate has a positive and significant effect, indicating that the 
unemployed have a higher probability of finding a job in regions with high in­
activity. This result is driven by the skilled occupations and unskilled women. 
Amongst the skilled, younger workers have a stronger effect. This result is 
in line with the theoretical model, since the more people inactive in an area, 
the less people looking for work (employed or unemployed) and the higher the
15There is an alternative explanation if the education externality works through vacancy 
creation, the vacancy rate might not have a significant effect because it is already proxied 
by the average level of education. However, this seems unlikely, since dropping the regional 
average and standard deviation of education from the estimation increases the significance 
of this variable only marginally.
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market tightness, which increases the probability of finding a job. However, 
this result could also be indicating the existence of another external effect. 
The people who are more likely to withdraw from the active population are 
the long-term unemployed, who in general have less skills. Therefore, a lower 
participation might improve the average education of people looking for work 
and exert a positive education externality on the rest of the individuals. This 
would explain why it affects mainly the skilled occupations. Alternatively, it 
could simply indicate that the regions with better education systems have a 
more qualified workforce suffering less unemployment, but also more people 
studying and therefore a higher inactivity rate.
The theoretical model of chapter 2 shows that the migration of skilled workers 
might help the concentration of skilled workers in the best regions. This would 
imply a sorting process by which the best regions get the best people and could 
generate an endogeneity bias in the estimate of the education externality. In 
order to control for that bias we have included the migration ratio (number 
of immigrants /  number of emigrants) by region and year. 16 The estimated 
coefficient is positive and significant suggesting that unemployed individuals 
in regions with high immigration (low emigration) suffer shorter durations, as 
predicted by the theoretical model. However, the coefficient is insignificant for 
the skilled occupations, where the sorting process ought to be strongest. This 
suggests that, although migration flows increase re-employment probabilities, 
the possible endogeneity bias is not an important problem in this case.
By sex and age group, we find that unemployment has a strong and signif­
icant effect for men and older workers of all occupations, while it has only 
a significant effect for low skilled women and young workers. This reflects 
the fact that men and older workers are more attached to the labour mar­
ket, since more often they are heads of households and have to support their 
families economically. When active, skilled women and young workers suffer 
lower unemployment rates. Inactivity has a significant effect for women of all 
occupations and for skilled men and young workers. The migration ratio has 
a significant effect for unskilled male and young workers.
16It would be preferable to have the migration ratio by occupational group in each region, 
but this data is only available from the Labour Force Survey and the sample size is too small 
to draw any significant conclusions.
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3.5.3 Estim ation Results for individual and household  
variables
One would want to include as many individual and household characteristics 
as possible, in order to reduce the probability of having an omitted variable 
bias. The estimated coefficients of the individual and household variables in 
the standard model estimated are shown in the lower part of table 3.6. In 
general, these coefficients have the expected signs, which are consistent with 
the existing literature.
The main results for the individual variables are the following: Men have a 
higher probability of moving into employment than women. Age has a U- 
shaped effect: the age group 25-34 has the highest hazard rate into employ­
ment, followed by the group 35-49, then the younger group (16-24) and finally 
the older group (over 50) (see Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) & Arulam- 
paran and Stewart (1995)). Individuals of white origin have higher hazard rates 
into employment. This result is probably due to the use of a white/not-white 
breakdown. Other studies using more detailed racial information (Boheim and 
Taylor (2000)) have found that individuals of Afro-Caribean origin have the 
lowest hazard rates into employment, while those of Pakistani and Indian ori­
gin have higher rates than whites. Married individuals and heads of households 
are more likely to find a job quicker. Migrants also have a higher hazard rate 
into employment, as was suggested by the theoretical model of chapter 2. How­
ever the estimated coefficient is not significant at the 1 0 % level of significance. 
Finally, a higher level of education improves the re-employment probability of 
unemployed individuals, in particular if it is a vocational qualification or a de­
gree. Having A levels only does not seem to contribute much to increasing the 
probability of leaving unemployment. The reason might be that employers see 
this qualification as a requirement towards a higher qualification level (degree 
or more) and therefore consider that they do not add anything on their own 
merit.
The variable measuring last job’s occupation shows that the hazard of finding 
a job is quite similar across occupational groups. All the occupations have a
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higher hazard than the reference group, which includes other occupations and 
unknown. However, it is quite surprising that managers have a significantly 
lower probability of finding a job when unemployed. Also when looking only 
at skilled occupations, it seems that it is the craft and clerical occupations 
which have the highest probability of finding a job.
If we now look at the household variables, we observe that household composi­
tion has a fundamental effect on the probability of transition into employment. 
Having economically dependent members in a household increases greatly the 
individual hazard rate into employment, specially if they are over 5 years of 
age. Dependents under 6  years old increase the hazard for men but reduce it 
for women. On the other hand, individuals living on their own or as a couple 
have a much greater probability of leaving unemployment. The most probable 
reason for this is that they have to maintain themselves to live. However, it is 
also true that in order to afford your own accommodation you have to have a 
certain economic level, so this variable could be acting as a proxy for household 
income. We also find that there is a positive effect of belonging to a household 
where most of its members work. This may be due to the fact that the other 
household members working help to maintain a link with the labour market 
and create the right environment to look for work.
Finally, to have unemployment or housing benefits greatly reduces the proba­
bility of leaving unemployment. This is a well known stylized fact of the unem­
ployment literature (see Narendranathan, Nickell and Stern (1985)). However, 
to have financial help from relatives has the opposite effect. The reason for this 
is that this source of income will obviously be limited and the money borrowed 
will probably have to be returned, which gives the individual an incentive to 
get a job as soon as possible.
3.5.4 Robustness of Results
We have undertaken two types of robustness checks. First, we have tried to 
challenge the empirical results by making alternative assumptions about the 
hazard function and the segmentation of the labour market. Then, we have 
also tried to take into account some of the standard problems of estimation in 
this literature.
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First of all we have re-estimated the basic model of equation 3.14, chang­
ing some of the assumptions in order to be sure that the results are robust. In 
table 3.6 columns IV-VI, we re-estimate the basic model of equation 3.14 using 
a fully parametric approach assuming a Weibull hazard function (see equation 
3.11). These estimations show that the results reported are consistent across 
different parameterizations of the hazard function. The average level of edu­
cation and standard deviation have similar sign and significance, however the 
magnitude of the coefficient of average education is slightly smaller when we 
use a semi-parametric hazard function (0.51 versus 0.6). In addition, to make 
sure that it is not the level of disaggregation that is driving our results, we 
have re-estimated the basic model considering a more disaggregated definition 
of labour market segmentation. In particular, we assume that the local labour 
market is divided into 9 occupational groups (SOC 91). Again, the results are 
consistent with the basic model (table 3.12).
Table 3.12: Maximum likelihood estim ates of re-employment
probabilities by occupation group, more disaggregated.
Variables all occup high occup low occup
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t i e s
Average education 0.413* (0.215) 1.031*** (0.294) -0 .1 9 3 (0.390)
s.d. of education -0.302 (0.183) -0 .2 4 3 (0.224) 0.136 (0.388)
R e g io n a l L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp rate -0.631*** (0.157) -0.455** (0.206) -0.862*** (0.226)
Vacancy rate 0.039 (0.040) 0.028 (0.068) 0.032 (0.051)
Inactivity rate 1.096** (0.476) 1.708*** (0.657) 0.563 (0.668)
R e g io n ’s  M ig r a t io n  r a tio
Migration ratio 0.076** (0.034) 0.026 (0.049) 0.120*** (0.045)
Log Likelihood -1 6 0 7 9 -8 1 3 9 -7 8 7 3
X2 25539 13529 16101
No cases 15974 7459 8515
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Individual controls (see table C.9); Region, Time 
and Occupation dummies and Industry’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
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However, in this case the magnitude of the effect of average education is smaller 
than in the standard case (0.41 vs 0.5), and the effect of the variance of edu­
cation is not statistically significant at the 1 0 % level.
Finally, table 3.13 shows the results of re-estimating the basic case allowing 
for Gamma distributed individual unobserved heterogeneity, both for the semi- 
parametric and for the Weibull hazard function. This technique controls for 
individual omitted characteristics which are uncorrelated with the observed 
variables and time.
Table 3.13: Maximum likelihood estimates of re-employment 
probabilities by occupation group allowing for Gamma dis­
tributed individual unobserved heterogeneity
Semiparametric Weibull
Variables all high low all high low
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t ie s
Average education 0.389 0.883** -2.125*** 0.423 0.896** -2.203***
Standard dev edu -0 .3 0 2 -0.530* 2.332*** -0 .2 9 3 -0 .558* 2.544***
R e g io n a l L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp rate -0.811***' -0.625*** -1.148*** -0.867*** -0.669*** --1.234***
Vacancy rate 0.025 -0 .0 4 6 0.037 0.027 -0 .0 6 2 0.045
Inactivity rate 1.147** 1.621** 0.707 1.147** 1.567** 0.768
R e g io n ’s  M ig r a t io n  r a tio
Migration ratio 0.078** 0.029 0.122** 0.082** 0.034 0.122**
constant -12.940*** -17.370*** --5.607
a 0.660*** 0.598*** 0.732***
Gamma Variance 0.439*** 0.412*** 0.450*** -0.550*** 0.598*** 0.732***
Likelihood ratio st. 225.92 109.355 157.170 354.00 156.72 170.21
Log Likelihood -15 9 6 6 -8 0 9 3 -7 8 1 4 -1 6 0 6 8 -8 1 3 9 -7 8 7 7
No of cases 15974 7459 8515 15974 6521 9453
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Individual controls (see table C.10); Region, Time
and Occupation dummies and Industry’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
Unobserved heterogeneity seems to be important in this empirical model. The
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likelihood ratio test indicates that we cannot reject the model with unobserved 
heterogeneity and the estimated gamma variance is significantly different from 
zero. The average level of education and the standard deviation of education 
still have a significant effect when we run the estimations separately for high 
and low occupations, although of smaller magnitude (a coefficient of 0.9 in­
stead of 1.2). However, the external effect is not significant when we include all 
occupations. This indicates that part of the effect is due to unobserved charac­
teristics. However, the fact that it is still significant for the skilled occupations 
means that there exist important education externalities in the matching pro­
cess taking place in the UK local labour markets.
In addition, we have also tried to take into account some of the standard 
econometric problems one encounters when estimating external effects. In 
particular, we have worried about the endogeneity of independent variables, 
an omitted variable bias and the identification of the external effect (see Brock 
and Durlauf (2000) and Dietz (2001) for two excellent surveys about the liter­
ature dealing with these estimation problems).
The endogeneity of independent variables is a common problem to all studies 
of external and neighbourhood effects. The question is whether the area char­
acteristics used to measure these effects are exogenous variables or not with 
respect to the formation of the area. If location was predetermined and fixed 
for all individuals there would not be a problem. However, we know that indi­
viduals are able to choose to a certain extent the area and group they belong 
to. This could generate a sorting process by which individuals with similar 
characteristics live together. This would then be problematic for the estima­
tion of the external effects because the characteristics determining the group 
of interest are the same as those determining the problem we are studying, 
therefore generating biased and inconsistent estimators (Greene (1993)).
The omitted variable bias is another potential problem in this study. The 
problem is that there might be omitted variables which axe correlated with 
both the dependent variable and the regressors measuring the distribution of 
education. This correlation would make these covariates wrongly significant. 
Most studies in this literature solve both of these problems by using instru­
ments for the variables measuring the distribution of education. We would
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require a variable that is correlated with the distribution of education but 
is *not correlated with the sorting process or any omitted variable. This is 
particularly difficult for our case since this variable would have to vary both 
across occupation groups within regions and over time. The previous studies 
in this literature which used instruments where cross-sectional and focused on 
education externalities by geographical area, not by occupational group. This 
allowed them to use instruments which vary across areas but not across time, 
like the demographic structure a decade before (Moretti (1998) & Ciccone and 
Peri (2000)). This leaves us with only one possible instrument, past values 
of the variables determining the education distribution. However, since the 
sorting process normally takes a long time, persistence is very likely and the 
endogeneity problem will not be solved by this method. The same would apply 
to the omitted variables bias if the omitted variables were persistent. There­
fore, due to the difficulty of finding a good instrument, the relevant question 
that we should answer is how important is the endogeneity due to the sorting 
process in this particular study.
There are some reasons why the sorting process might not have an important 
effect on the estimation of external effects in this study. First of all, the areas 
used in this study - occupation group (4 groups) within each of 19 regions - 
are very large and heterogeneous. This would make a perfect sorting process 
almost impossible. Migration of skilled workers will generate a higher con­
centration of qualified individuals in the most skilled occupations of the best 
regions, but there will still be a large number of workers from all types in each 
region (eg. because of house ownership or housing benefit)17.
Secondly, even if the sorting process is important, there is no reason to believe 
that it has has been increasing during the sample period or that it has been 
more acute than in the past. Thus, the effect of sorting would mainly be a level 
effect which should be captured by the region, occupation and time dummies.
Nevertheless, we have undertaken some simple tests to check the potential
17A clear example would be the Inner London axea, where we will have some of the 
most qualified individuals. However, due to its size and to the existence of very poor 
neighbourhoods, there are also large groups of medium and low qualified workers in all 
occupations.
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importance of endogeneity. One would expect the effects of the sorting process 
to be stronger in the areas at the extremes of the distribution - in the regions 
and occupations with the highest and lowest levels of education. However, 
when we run the regression excluding the regions that consistently have had 
the highest or lowest education level for the whole sample (Scotland, the South 
East, Metropolitan West Midlands and the Rest of the Northern region) 18 we 
find that the effect of the externality remains very significant and, if anything, 
is stronger (see table 3.14).
Table 3.14: Maximum likelihood estim ates of re-employment 
probabilities by occupation group dropping top & bottom  
region in education
Variables all occup high occup low occup
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t ie s
Average education 1.095*** (0.426) 1.726*** (0.517) -0 .9 9 2 (1.022)
s.d. of education —0.595 (0.344) -0.926** (0.428) 1.423* (0.837)
R e g io n a l L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp rate —0.768*** (0.208) -0.753** (0.318) -0.852*** (0.282)
Vacancy rate —0.042 (0.063) -0 .203*  (0.114) -0 .0 1 2 (0.076)
Inactivity rate 1.621*** (0.592) 2.578*** (0.836) 0.877 (0.774)
R e g io n ’s M ig r a t io n  r a tio
Migration ratio 0.134*** (0.050) 0.090 (0.067) 0.167*** (0.060)
Log Likelihood —8287 -3 9 2 7 4315
X2 17737 8430 16364
No of cases 8129 3574 4555
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Individual controls (see table C .ll); Region, Time 
and Occupation dummies and Industry’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
Another option would be to try to understand the mechanism behind the sort­
ing process. As was shown in the theoretical model of chapter 2 , one of the 
most important sorting mechanisms in this analysis is regional migration. If
18See section 3.3.1 for a more detailed discussion on this issue
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a large proportion of skilled workers move to the areas with highest wages 
and lowest unemployment rates, the average education of the workforce there 
will improve. At the same time, a high immigration rate will increase the 
demand for housing and raise the costs of living of the recipient area. This 
might push the least skilled individuals out of these areas, since they cannot 
afford to live there. Both of these forces increase the average education in 
the area, generating an even stronger education externality. In order to take 
into account this particular sorting mechanism we have controlled for people 
who have migrated into the region during the previous year but also for the 
aggregate migration flows in the region (ratio of immigrants to emigrants). 
The estimated coefficient is positive and significant when considering all oc­
cupations, but it is insignificant for the skilled occupations, where the sorting 
process ought to be strongest. This suggests that, although migration flows 
increase re-employment probabilities, the possible endogeneity bias is not an 
important problem in this case. Finally, if this type of sorting is present it 
should be strongest in the regions with the biggest migration flows. Therefore, 
we have re-estimated the model dropping the regions with biggest migration 
flows. The results remain unchanged.
We believe that all the above results indicate that, although there might be 
some endogeneity in the dependent variable, it is not having an important 
effect on the estimated coefficients.
It is not so easy to find simple tests to check the importance of a possible 
omitted variable bias. However, the fact that we include many individual, 
family and area variables in the estimation should reduce the importance of 
this effect. Moreover, in order to bias the coefficient measuring the external 
effect, the omitted variables have to vary both across groups and over time 
since the region, occupation and time dummies included in the estimation are 
already capturing any possible effect constant across groups or over time. One 
way of controlling for omitted variables in the estimation of a duration model 
is controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. However, this technique only con­
trols for omitted variables which are uncorrelated with both the covariates and 
time. Nevertheless, one could use it as an indicator of the importance of this 
problem. As was mentioned above, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
(table 3.13) does not make the external effect disappear for the skilled occupa­
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tions, although it reduces its magnitude. Therefore, even though it seems that 
this problem is not very important in this study, one should be aware that it 
could be biasing slightly the results.
Finally, the other important problem when estimating external effects is that 
of identification, also named the reflection problem by Manski (1993). This 
problem was first mentioned by Hauser (1970), but it was the work of Man­
ski which provided a framework to understand it. This problem arises when 
a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to 
infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour 
of the individuals that comprise the group. Manski shows that inference on 
endogenous effects is not possible unless the researcher has prior information 
specifying the composition of reference groups and if the variables defining 
reference groups and those affecting directly the outcomes are moderately re­
lated in the population. However, he also proved that identification is eased if 
the estimated model is non-linear, in particular for the binary response model. 
Brock and Durlauf (2000) extended that proposition to the case of duration 
models. The reason is that in a non-linear model, the external effect changes at 
a different rate than the direct effect of an individual’s own characteristics and 
therefore both can be independently identified. In addition, Brock and Durlauf 
(2000) showed that this problem is further eased if there is within-group het­
erogeneity. Otherwise, if the neighbourhood is homogenous, it is impossible 
to distinguish between the individual and the group with respect to outcomes. 
Our study fulfills both of these properties and therefore we understand that 
identification of the external effects should not be a problem here.
3.5.5 Transitions into Inactivity
One would also be very interested in knowing what effect does the education 
externality have on the transitions into inactivity. Table 3.15 reports the re­
sults of the competing risk model, studying the transitions from unemployment 
into inactivity are reported. It is quite interesting to see that the externality 
still has a significant, but in this case negative effect, on the hazard into in­
activity. This result is driven by the unskilled occupations, where the effect 
is strongest. Meanwhile the effect is negative but insignificant for the skilled 
occupations. This means that the higher the education level of your labour
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market segment, the least likely you are to become inactive for all unemploy­
ment durations.
A simple theoretical explanation for this result can be obtained by extending 
the model of chapter 1 to take into account labour market participation. Since 
an area with a highly qualified workforce benefits from high job creation, the 
individuals face a greater opportunity cost when inactive. In addition, if the 
greater job creation in the area attracts lots of migrants, the costs of living 
will increase, raising even further the opportunity cost of inactivity. These 
two forces will provide a greater incentive for individuals to participate in 
the labour market and continue looking for a job. This effect is stronger for 
the least skilled qualifications probably, because this group has the biggest 
incentives of becoming inactive.
Table 3.15: Maximum likelihood estim ates of transitions to
inactivity
Variables all occup high occup low occup
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t i e s
Average education —0.729* (0.410) -0 .8 2 1 (0.593) --1.727** (0.804)
s.d. of education 0.081 (0.365) -0 .0 9 9 (0.468) 1.151 (0.712)
R e g io n a l L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp rate 0.163 (0.244) 0.200 (0.398) 0.112 (0.297)
Vacancy rate 0.031 (0.044) 0.071 (0.126) 0.006 (0.047)
Inactivity rate 0.043 (0.696) 0.164 (1.196) 0.108 (0.864)
R e g io n ’s  M ig r a t io n  r a tio
Migration ratio —0.083* (0.047) -0 .0 4 4 (0.086) --0.091 (0.059)
Log Likelihood —8785 -3 5 4 0 -5 1 5 9
X2 72446 34634 47509
No of cases 15974 7459 8515
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Individual controls Individual controls (see table 
C.12); Region, Time and Occupation dummies and Industry’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
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3.6 Vacancy C reation and E ducation E xter­
nalities.
The theoretical models developed in this thesis showed that education exter­
nalities might have an important effect on the matching process. A higher 
level of education improves the expected profits per vacancy opened and there 
is higher job creation and market tightness. This effect will be stronger if there 
is migration of skilled individuals. Therefore, the external effect of education 
is always generated through a higher vacancy creation (market tightness). So 
far, we have shown that education externalities raise the probability of finding 
a job, but we have not analyzed the mechanism through which this effect is 
working. In this section we will try to do so, by using a quarterly panel on 
vacancies notified to UK job centers by occupational group (using the SOC 
91 classification) and 19 regions for the period 1992-99. This data is obtained 
from job centers and is provided by NOMIS. We are conscious that the num­
ber of vacancies posted at job centers could be significantly lower than the real 
number of vacancies, especially for the most skilled occupations. This means 
that any result from this analysis should be considered as a lower bound of the 
total real effect of education externalities on vacancy creation. The covariates 
are obtained from the spring quarter of the non-longitudinal LFS.
We estimate a fixed effects panel using the log of market tightness in the local 
labour market as the dependent variable. This is defined as the number of 
vacancies notified divided by the number of unemployed by quarter, 9 occu­
pational groups and 19 regions. The covariates are the average education and 
standard deviation of education of the occupation group within each region 
and quarter, the regional unemployment and inactivity rates and the annual 
immigration and emigration rates by region and occupation. The fixed effects 
used in the estimation are occupation, region and quarter.
The estimation results show that the education externality is an important 
determinant of market tightness in the UK local labour markets of the 1990s 
(table 3.16). The effect has a similar pattern to the one on the duration of 
unemployment. An increase in the average education of the local labour market 
raises market tightness, while an increase in the standard deviation reduces it.
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This effect is strongest for the skilled occupations. However, in this model 
the average education also has a positive effect on the market tightness of the 
unskilled occupations but of smaller magnitude, while the standard deviation 
has a negative effect.
Table 3.16: Fixed Effects estim ation of the Vacancy rate by 
quarter, region and occupation
Variables Fixed Effects I.V. Fixed Effects
all low high all low high
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t ie s
Av. education 0.895*** 0.682*** 1.374*** 1.903*** 1.596*** 2.831***
(0.162) (0.198) (0.251) (0.251) (0.303) (0.391)
s.d. education -0.313*** -0.180*** -0.190*** -0.483*** -0.286*** -0.318***
(0.045) (0.062) (0.057) (0.074) (0.110) (0.093)
R e g io n a l L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp rt -1.004*** -0.818*** -1.144*** -0.963*** -0.755*** -1.100***
(0.033) (0.042) (0.046) (0.035) (0.045) (0.050)
Inactivity rt 1.880*** 1.683*** 2.060*** 1.856*** 1.627*** 2.078***
(0.120) (0.148) (0.180) (0.124) (0.156) (0.185)
R e g io n a l M ig r a t io n  by  o c c u p a tio n
Immigration rt 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.042***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014)
Emigration rt 0.027*** 0.016*** 0.033 0.018** 0.005** 0.023
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
No Observations 5798 2576 3222 5126 2276 2850
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Region, Time and Occupation dummies and Indus­
try’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
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3.7 Conclusions
This study examines the effect of education externalities on the matching pro­
cess taking place in UK local labour markets. First of all, we have shown 
theoretically that a higher level of education of the workers participating in 
the labour market raises the expected profits of opened vacancies, since firms 
expect to be matched with a more qualified worker. This increases job cre­
ation and reduces the unemployment rate. Then, we tested this empirically by 
estimating the effect of the education distribution in a labour market (mea­
sured by the average and standard deviation of education) on the probability 
of transition from unemployment to employment.
We found that, for individuals belonging to skilled occupational groups (man­
agers/professionals and technical occupations), a higher average level of educa­
tion increases the probability of transition from unemployment to employment, 
while a higher standard deviation, or a more unequal distribution, reduces it. 
However, the opposite is true for individuals belonging to less skilled occupa­
tional groups (technical, service and manual). The reason behind this is that 
in the latter case the increase in the competition for vacancies among unem­
ployed workers due to the higher level of education more than offsets the effect 
of the education externality. When we also include longer durations (of up 
to five years) in the estimation, the effect of the externality on the hazard of 
skilled occupations is still significant but almost half the size of the coefficient 
in the standard estimation.
The effect of the education externality on the hazard into employment is not 
only statistically significant but also relevant in magnitude. A rise of 1 % in the 
average level of education shifts up the baseline hazard of the representative 
individual by 1% on average if we include all occupations, and by 2.7% when 
we consider only the more skilled occupational groups. Regional differences in 
the distribution of education also have a very large effect shifting the baseline 
hazard by around 12% for all occupations and by 30% for the more skilled 
occupations.
The estimated baseline hazard of the representative individual is increasing 
for durations up to 5 months and then decreasing, with some small peaks.
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This is true for all individuals and by occupational group. However, skilled 
occupational groups have a higher baseline hazard for all durations, indicating 
that they have a higher probability of leaving unemployment independently of 
how long they have been unemployed for.
The results remain equally significant when we estimate the model separately 
by sex and age group. However, as one would expect, they are stronger for 
men and older workers, since these two groups have more permanent links with 
the labour market.
Finally, the estimated results are very robust. They are still present when we 
estimate the model using different parameterizations of the hazard function, 
different definitions of labour markets within a region and also when controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, the results are also robust to the 
standard econometric problems considered in the literature.
Chapter 4
Education externalities and  
staying-on in education at 16,
17 and 18 years o f age in the  
U K  regions (1979-99).
4.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the existence and the scale of regional education exter­
nalities on the education decisions of teenagers in the UK. First, we develop 
a simple model, based on chapters 1 and 2 , to address this issue theoretically. 
Then, we test it empirically using data from the UK Labour Force Survey for 
17 UK regions over the period 1983-99.
The literature on education externalities has developed greatly since the sem­
inal work by Romer and Lucas (Romer (1986), Lucas (1988)). They showed 
theoretically that, in an area with a higher average level of education processes 
like the exchange of ideas, imitation or learning by doing are more likely to 
occur, in turn fostering technological progress. From a different strand of eco­
nomic literature, the one studying economic geography, Krugman (Krugman 
(1991a), Krugman (1991b)) showed that externalities can also appear in the 
market process of exchange. In an area with a greater concentration of pop­
ulation and therefore higher demand for products, there are higher incentives 
for industrial localization, and viceversa, generating important economies of
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scale. In chapters 1 & 2 of this thesis we show that a similar type of externality 
may exist in the labour market due to the interaction between the localization 
of the supply and demand of skilled labour. One of the main implications of 
these theories is that workers in an area where there are strong external effects 
will on average earn higher wages and suffer lower unemployment rates. The 
empirical literature has concentrated in testing the effect of externalities on 
wages (see Rauch (1993), Moretti (1998) and the introduction to chapter 3 
of this thesis), while in chapter 3 of this thesis we have tested the effect of 
externalities on unemployment duration.
However, also embedded in any theoretical model studying the micro-foundations 
of education externalities is the result that young people will stay-on longer in 
education the stronger the external effect is. Young persons living in an area 
with a stronger external effect will accumulate more human capital because 
they will expect to earn higher wages and suffer lower unemployment rates 
when they enter the labour market. Nevertheless, very little empirical work 
has been done to study this externality1.
In this chapter we attempt to estimate the effect of education externalities on 
education decisions by controlling for the distribution of education within a 
region. In practice, this is done by including as regressors in the estimation the 
share of the working age population for each level of educational attainment.
In order to be able to identify empirically the effect of education externalities 
on education decisions we need detailed micro data on individual education 
decisions, individual characteristics and family background covering a large 
time span. We also need macro data on the regional distribution of educa­
tion and other labour market variables. Unfortunately, the datasets looking 
at education decisions, generally used by the education literature, are only 
available in the form of a few cross-sections of data. In addition, they do not
1 There is a large literature studying the impact of the idiosyncratic characteristics of the 
area in which an individual lives on the economic decisions he makes - so called ’neighbour­
hood effects’. However, this area of research is interested in studying peer group effects, 
cluster effects and the failure of information mechanisms. Therefore, it looks at very re­
duced geographical areas (see Jenks and Mayer (1990) for a survey of the early literature, 
Crane (1991), Case and Katz (1991), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996b) and Fernandez and 
Rogerson (1996a))
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allow for the construction of the aggregate series required by this study. An 
example of this approach is Rice (1999). She uses three waves of the Youth 
Cohort Survey to obtain a sample of 50.000 individuals covering the period 
1988 to 1991 to study both the micro and macro components of the education 
decision. However, due to the short time span of the data she has difficulty in 
finding a significant impact of some of the macro variables, after controlling 
for individual characteristics and area effects.
An alternative approach is to use a general survey, which is available on a 
regular basis, to select those individuals who are in the process of making the 
decision whether to remain in the education system at the moment of the inter­
view. In other words, to study the participation decision at sixteen one selects 
all the sixteen year olds within each wave of the survey. Potentially, this ap­
proach can provide the econometrician with a large source of data in both the 
cross-sectional and time dimensions. Using this approach Micklewright, Pear­
son and Smith (1990) obtain data on sixteen year olds’ education decisions 
from the Family Expenditure Survey for the period 1978-84, to test the effect 
of unemployment on education decisions. However, due to the small number 
of cross sections of data used, they only find a significant and negative effect 
of the unemployment rate on education decisions when they exclude their full 
set of regional and time dummies.
In this work we follow the same approach as Micklewright et al. (1990) to 
construct our sample collecting the maximum time series of data available. 
Using 17 successive cross-sections of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) covering 
the period 1983-99 we obtain a sample including around 35,000 sixteen year 
olds, another with 34,000 seventeen year olds and finally one with 30,000 eigh­
teen year olds. Furthermore, since the LFS also reports the number of years 
each person has been in full-time education we can estimate separately the 
determinants of the probability to participate in education at a particular age 
(the participation rate) and the probability of remaining in education for an 
additional year at a certain age (the staying-on rate). In addition, we can use 
the LFS to construct variables measuring the regional distribution of educa­
tion, as well as labour market variables by level of educational attainment. 
Finally, since the LFS is a household based survey, i.e., the whole family is 
interviewed, we are able to control for a large number of individual and family
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characteristics.
The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. The probabil­
ity of an individual staying-on in education after 16, 17 and 18 years of age 
is significantly influenced by the distribution of education within each region. 
We find that the higher the share of the population with a degree, the higher 
the probability of remaining in education at sixteen and eighteen years of age, 
with elasticities of 0.16 and 0.25, respectively; while the higher the share of the 
population with higher vocational qualifications, the higher the probability of 
continuing studying at seventeen, with an elasticity of 0.08. This effect may 
seem quite small in magnitude. However, with the large increase in qualifica­
tions over the sample period it implies a rise in the predicted probability of 
remaining in education of 8 p.p., 7p.p. and 19p.p. for sixteen, seventeen and 
eighteen year olds, respectively. We interpret this result to indicate that the 
external effects have an important effect on education decisions.
Finally, we also use the fact that we have a large sample spanning over two 
decades to estimate the effect of regional labour market variables on the educa­
tion decision. In particular, we look at the effect of the regional unemployment 
rate by educational attainment and of the returns to education.
There already exists a large literature looking at the effect of labour market 
variables on education decisions using aggregate UK data. 2 The fundamental 
conclusion of this research is that the state of the labour market plays an im­
portant role in determining participation rates in non-compulsory education, 
with the returns to education having a relatively large effect and the unemploy­
ment rate a relatively small effect.3 However, there have been few attempts to 
study both the macro and micro components of the education decision. This 
is due to the great difficulty, already mentioned above, to obtain individual 
datasets spanning over a long period of time. Those who have attempted this
2This literature in the UK started with the work of Pissarides (Pissarides (1981), Pis- 
sarides (1982)), and continues to be an active area of research to this day (McVicax and 
Rice (2001)). Research has also focused on the variation in participation in education both 
across countries (McIntosh (1998)) and across regions (Clark (2001)).
3Typically, a 1% rise in the rate of return to education raises male (female) participation 
by 1.2% (0.1%) while a 1% increase in the youth unemployment rate increases the male 
(female) participation rate at sixteen years of age by only 0.06% (0.1%) (see McIntosh 
(1998)).
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using the available data have generally found the macro variables to have an 
insignificant impact on the participation (although this may well reflect the 
limitations of their data). Rice (1999) using three waves of the Youth Cohort 
Survey between 1988 and 1991 finds that the local unemployment rate does 
not have a significant effect on individual’s decisions whether to participate in 
post compulsory education. However, when she interacts the unemployment 
rate with the ability of the individual, she recovers a highly significantly role 
for the local labour market in determining educational participation.4 The 
magnitude of the effect varies greatly with ability, but if we look at a male 
(female) with average GCSE attainment the estimated elasticity is 0 . 2  (0.1) . 5 
On the other hand, the rate of return to education for a male with average 
GCSE attainment has an elasticity of 1.5 (0.6 for females). Micklewright et al. 
(1990) using data from the Family Expenditure Survey for the period 1978-84 
only find a significant and negative effect of the unemployment rate on edu­
cation decisions when they exclude their full set of regional and time dummies.
The main results from the analysis of the regional labour market variables can 
be summarized as follows. The probability of an individual staying-on in edu­
cation after 16, 17 and 18 years of age is significantly influenced by the state of 
the regional labour market. Young persons of all ages take into account the op­
portunity costs and expected gains from education when they decide whether 
to continue studying or not. They have a greater incentive to leave education 
if the labour market for unskilled workers in their region is buoyant, that is, 
if the unemployment rate for these workers is low and their expected lifetime 
earnings are high. On the contrary, the greater the gap between the state of 
the skilled and unskilled labour markets - i.e. the lower the unemployment 
rate of the skilled relative to the unskilled and the greater the gap between 
their expected lifetime earnings - the greater the incentive for them to remain 
in the education system. We find that at all ages the higher the unemployment 
rate faced by individuals with A Levels or less (unskilled plus semiskilled) and 
the lower the unemployment rate for individuals with degree or more (skilled),
4The fact that she splits the effect of unemployment into three coefficients corresponding 
to low, medium and high level unemployment area and that when she includes local labour 
market dummies the effect disappears demonstrates the practical difficulties in obtaining 
significant coefficients with samples covering such a short time span
5Although this value is about three times those obtained using macro data for males, it 
is not clear how much of it is due to ability and how much to unemployment.
CHAPTER 4. EDUCATION EXTERNALITIES IN EDUCATION 117
the higher the probability of remaining in education. We find this effect to be 
quite small in magnitude, which is in line with the findings from the macro 
based research on aggregate labour market data, and only statistically signif­
icant for sixteen year olds, with elasticities of 0.07, 0.035 and -0.037 for the 
unskilled, semiskilled and skilled unemployment rate, respectively. A possible 
reason why this effect is only significant for sixteen year olds could be that 
those who leave at a later age will have some higher qualification and therefore 
face a much lower unemployment rate.
The returns to education (the ratio of the present discounted value of perma­
nent earnings for those with and without higher qualifications) have a positive 
effect on the staying-on rate in education, with an elasticity of 0.4, 0.2 and 0.7 
for sixteen, seventeen and eighteen year olds, respectively. This effect is sta­
tistically significant for sixteen and eighteen year olds. The magnitude of this 
effect is about a third of the estimated effects using aggregate data for sixteen 
year olds and about one half that for eighteen year olds. Nevertheless, our 
results imply that the rate of return on educational qualifications have a large 
impact on staying-on rates. During the sample period the returns to education 
have risen by around 29% which implies a rise in the predicted probability of 
remaining in education of 9p.p., 4p.p. and 17p.p. for 16, 17 and 18 year olds, 
respectively.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 we introduce a theoretical 
model of the educational participation decision to motivate the research and 
then we explain our estimation strategy. Section 4.3 describes the dataset on 
which this research is based and the particular variables we will use. The 
results are discussed in section 4.4, while section 4.5 examines the robustness 
of our results. Finally, section 4.7 concludes.
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4.2 T heoretical m odel
The theoretical framework we outline here has its origins in the classic hu­
man capital investment model pioneered by Becker (1964) and Ben-Porath 
(1967).6 According to this model, an individual decides her optimal invest­
ment in education by comparing the present discounted value of expected net 
future earnings over the different alternatives she faces. If she invests in ob­
taining an educational qualification she will expect to be able to demand a 
larger stream of earnings in the future, since skilled individuals (skilled and 
educated are taken to be equivalent) to earn higher wages and face lower unem­
ployment rates than the unskilled. However, investments in education are not 
costless - she must pay the direct costs of education: tuition fees and her costs 
of living, plus the indirect cost of education: the opportunity cost of foregone 
current earnings. She will invest in education if the expected benefits of that 
investment exceed the expected costs (leaving aside any consideration of the 
risk aversion of the individual - the costs of education are largely certain and 
must be paid today, while the benefits are uncertain and may not be realised 
for years, if not decades).
Individuals stay on in education in order to acquire the human capital that will 
reap a return once they enter the labour market. However, the stock of human 
capital they accumulate depends not only on the time spent in education but 
also on their innate ability to learn, which depends to a large extent on their 
family background and their environment.
Of course, most governments insist that all individuals remain in education 
until a given age (typically sixteen) in the hope that they will acquire some 
minimum level of human capital. However, when a young person reaches the 
end of compulsory education she then has to decide between two alternatives, 
to continue studying or to enter the labour market and look for a job. Consider 
the following expression:
V?(t) =  q ? m ,  * w J W M  +  *?(“<)] * < K ( t ) , (4.1)
6The following model draws not only upon the variant of the human capital model de­
veloped in chapter 1 but also upon the model presented in Rice (1999).
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Let us define the stock of human capital with which an individual leaves ed­
ucation as hf. She enters the labour market, where she will find a job with 
probability <?“(£). Following the model developed in chapter 1 , this probability 
is a function of the unskilled employment rate in her regional labour market 
(qu(t)) and her own efficiency in searching for work, which depends on her 
ability. If she finds a job she will earn a wage which is a function of the hu­
man capital she accumulated and of the level of demand in her region. Finally 
V*[qf * wf] is the maximized present discounted value of expected net bene­
fits from age t + 1  onwards, conditional on the amount of human capital she 
accumulated at age t (hf) and on the future conditions of the regional labour 
market for unskilled individuals.
If the young person decides to continue in full-time education, the present 
discounted value of future earnings is:
Vi{t)  =  ~ ceW + V*{qt[q(t),h%(ai)] * w?[wa(t)yh?(oi)]} (4.2)
That is, in period t she will have to bear the direct costs of full-time education 
(<ce{t)). However, from the moment she leaves education and enters the labour 
market looking for a job (t +  1 ), she will face a lower unemployment rate 
and higher wage because of the extra human capital she has accumulated 
{V*[qf * u>f]). The individual will therefore decide to continue in full-time 
education at time t if the difference in present discounted value of earnings 
from the two alternatives, V s(t) — V u(t), is positive.
V \ t )  -  V»(t) =  -ce(t) + q? * <  +  (V{qt  * w°] -  F*[g“ * < ] )  > 0 (4.3)
Education externalities enter this equation in two ways. A higher Level of 
average education in the labour market fosters higher job creation, raising the 
employment rate, as was shown in chapters 1 and 2. In addition, a more 
educated workforce will improve the transmission of new information through 
the population fostering technological progress which in turn raises workers’ 
productivity and wages. This means that the wage and employment rate in 
equation 4.3 depend also on the average level of education in the labour market
(Em).
9i{q{t),hi(ai),E [hi]} (4.4)
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t i t  (<**)> E lh i \ }  (4-5)
In order to be able to test this theory empirically, we have to express this 
equation in terms of observable variables and unobservable characteristics. 
The local labour market is taken to be the UK Standard Statistical region 
in which the individual resides, split into metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
areas where possible. Then, the difference in the present discounted value of 
earnings defined above for individual i in region j will depend on two sets of 
observable variables: the characteristics of individual i and her family (X^) 
and the characteristics of region j ’s labour market and education system ( R j )  
together with an unobservable random component (uij).
Vs(th -  K”(t)y = Rj, Uij) (4.6)
For estimation purposes we assume that this expression follows a normal dis­
tribution:
( V t - V ^ - N i Z ' ^ a 2) (4.7)
where = [Xij, Rj} and j3 and a2 are constant across the population. Then, 
the probability that the ith individual living in region j chooses to remain in 
full-time education will be the following:
rZd'p/o
P r (V *  -  Vj“ > 0) =  (27T)-1/2 /  exp(—z2j/2)dzij (4.8)
J  — OO
The parameters of the probit function are estimated from the sample informa­
tion on whether the individual is still in full-time education or not, p*, and on 
the individual and regional characteristics Z,j. As in all probit models the full 
set of parameters is not identified. This is solved by normalizing a = 1. The 
likelihood function will then be the following:
n
L = n [ $ ( - / ^ ) P [ l  -  $(-/3 '^ )]1“Pi (4.9)
i—1
where $  denotes the distribution function of a standard normal variable and 
Pi is the realization of the probability of staying-on in education.
Finally, since our variables of interest: the characteristics of region j ’s labour 
market and education system (Rj), vary only across time and regions, when
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we calculate the standard errors we have to allow for correlation of the errors 
between individuals belonging to the same cluster (see Moulton (1986)). This 
is achieved by estimating the robust Var(f3) following White’s method (White 
(1980) and White (1982)), substituting the score vector (or gradient vector) 
for the score vector corresponding to the whole cluster. These may be called 
super-observations and are obtained by summing the score vectors of all the 
individuals belonging to the same cluster. The score vectors corresponding to 
the super-observations are independent and so White’s method holds.
4.3 T he data
The data used is drawn from the yearly non-longitudinal Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) for the period 1983-1991 and from the spring quarter of the quarterly 
LFS for the period 1992-997. The yearly LFS is designed to be representa­
tive of the total population in the UK, containing detailed information on the 
highest educational attainment of individuals and participation in education 
as well as family and individual characteristics. In addition, it allows us to 
obtain aggregate variables reflecting the evolution of the British regional labor 
market over time.
The non-longitudinal LFS is conducted in Spring every year on all members 
of around 60,000 households. Although the LFS started in 1975, the survey 
was biannual until 1983. In addition, there are no education variables until 
1979. On the other hand, from 1999 regions are reported only using the new 
classification of regions (GOR) . 8 For these reasons the period of study will be 
1983-1999. This period of seventeen years covers most of the dramatic changes 
in education participation that have occurred in Great Britain in modern times: 
the explosion in education participation of the eighties and its halting in the 
mid nineties. Furthermore, almost two economic cycles occurred during this 
time in Britain.
The dependent variable is the staying-on rate in full-time education after the
7 A l t h o u g h  t h e  L F S  w a s  p u b l i s h e d  y e a r l y  f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 8 3 - 9 1  t h e  d a t a  a c t u a l l y  r e f e r r e d  
t o  t h e  s p r i n g  q u a r t e r .
8 A l t h o u g h  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  ( S S R )  c a n  s t i l l  b e  r e c o v e r e d  u s i n g  c o u n t y  i n f o r m a ­
t i o n ,  t h i s  v a r i a b l e  w a s  a l s o  d r o p p e d  f r o m  2 0 0 0  o n w a r d s .
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legal leaving age of sixteen. The law in the United Kingdom obliges individuals 
to stay in education until the end of the academic year in which they turn 16. 
In particular, it states that those born between September and January must 
wait until the following Easter to leave, whilst those born between January 
and August may leave in June. In Scotland, the individual may leave at the 
end of December if their sixteenth birthday is in September-February. Since 
the LFS undertakes all the interviews during the Spring quarter (March-May), 
it would be impossible to study the participation decision at the immediate 
moment in which they are legally free to leave school. Furthermore, what 
is relevant for education participation is whether they continue studying for 
another academic year or not. Therefore, the sample will include only those in­
dividuals who are interviewed during the academic year after the legal leaving 
age. That is, the individuals who are or will be seventeen during the academic 
year in which they are interviewed. This leaves us with a sample of 35,359 
individuals - 18,314 males and 17,045 females.
Having determined who should be included in the sample, the dependent vari­
able, ”staying-on in education after 16” is defined as follows: a dummy equal 
to 1 if the individual remains in education in the academic year during which 
he will be seventeen and 0 otherwise. In our sample, on average 44% of chil­
dren leave education by the end of the year in which they reach sixteen. This 
number rises to 48.8% for males, whilst is only 39% for females. This picture 
has changed dramatically during the sample period, with the staying-on rate 
at sixteen increasing from around 43% in 1983 to 70% in 1999.
Most UK studies on education have concentrated on 16 year-olds, since the 
UK has traditionally had a comparatively low participation rate compared to 
other developed countries. However, it seems particularly interesting to know 
what are the important factors determining the decision to stay on in educa­
tion at later years and how they differ from the 16 year-olds case. Therefore, 
this study also looks at the decision to stay on in education after seventeen 
and eighteen years of age. The corresponding sample is obtained in the way 
described above, except that now we include only individuals who will be eigh­
teen during the academic year in which they are interviewed (nineteen for those 
staying-on after eighteen years of age). In this case we also have to take into 
account the fact that some people left full-time education before they were 17
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Figure 4.1: Staying-on in education rate Figure 4.2: Participation in education rate
(18). These individuals are excluded since otherwise we would be underesti­
mating the staying-on rate. The dependent variable is defined similarly. These 
samples include 18,688 and 12,187 people respectively, 47% and 48% of which 
are males, respectively.
The estimation of the model requires two types of explanatory variables, indi­
vidual attributes and market characteristics. The first type includes personal 
and household characteristics. Both of them are obtained from the LFS since 
all members of the household are interviewed. However, it is possible that 
the individual has left the family home and is living on his/her own. In this 
case we would not have information on the family background. Since there 
is no easy solution for this problem and there are very few individuals in this 
situation, we drop them9.
The main focus of this paper is on the effect of regional variables on the 
staying-on rate. Therefore, one would want to control for as many individual 
characteristics as possible to correctly identify the regional effects. Previous 
studies have shown that family background is one of the main determinants of 
the children’s decision to study (Rice (1987), Micklewright (1989) and Andrews 
and Bradley (1997)). This effect might come through different mechanisms.
If ability is transmitted through the genes then one would expect children 
of skilled parents to have a higher staying-on rate, simply because they are
9 T h e r e  a r e  o n l y  2 3 4  i n d i v i d u a l s  in  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  a t  1 6  y e a r s  o f  a g e ,  w h i c h  r e p r e s e n t  l e s s  
t h a n  0 .7 %  o f  t h e  s a m p l e .  T h i s  n u m b e r  i s  1 .2 %  ( 2 2 0 )  a n d  4 .6 %  ( 5 3 8 )  f o r  1 7  a n d  1 8  y e a r - o l d s  
r e s p e c t i v e l y  ( 2 6 5  o u t  o f  1 8 .9 8 4  ( 1 .4 % )  a n d  5 9 1  o u t  o f  1 2 .8 2 4  ( 4 .8 % )  i f  i n a c t i v e  a r e  i n c l u d e d )
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more able. Since controlling for individual ability is not easy to implement, we 
include parents’ education. In addition, we control for individual ability by in­
cluding the individual’s educational attainment until the interview date. This 
variable may be endogenous since an individual that is planning to leave school 
might not have the incentive to obtain the highest education level possible at 
his age. However, if the child is planning to start working, the qualifications 
obtained will be very important to get a job, which might provide the right 
incentives to study10. On the other hand, household and parents’ characteris­
tics also reflect the environment the child is growing up in and this ought to 
have a great effect on the decision to study. In addition, in the UK education 
has been markedly different across different social classes. We try to capture 
this effect with the socioeconomic group and labour force status of the parents 
and by controlling for single parents. Finally, children’s education is a costly 
investment and parents will be constrained by their income. We do not have 
information on family income but the socioeconomic group, labour force status 
and number of older and younger siblings should be good proxies for it.
The variables reflecting regional market characteristics are the share of working 
age population by 9 levels of education, the unemployment rate and present 
discounted value of permanent earnings by education11, the pupil/teacher ratio 
and the industry’s share of employment. Most of these are obtained by ag­
gregating the individual LFS data, except for the permanent earnings, which 
come from the New Earnings Survey (NES) and the pupil/teacher ratio that 
is obtained from Regional Trends. The regions considered are based on the 
Standard Statistical Regions classification, split into metropolitan and non­
metropolitan areas whenever possible. This divides the UK into 17 regions: 
Tyne & Wear, rest of Northern region, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Rest 
of Yorkshire & Humberside, East Midlands, East Anglia, Greater London, 
Rest of the South East, South West, West Midlands metropolitan, Rest of 
West Midlands, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Rest of North West, Wales
1 0 W e  a l s o  r e p o r t  t h e  r e s u l t s  w i t h o u t  c o n t r o l l i n g  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  a b i l i t y  t a b l e  D . 5  i n  a p p e n d i x
D
11 T h e  w a y  p e r m a n e n t  e a r n i n g s  a r e  c a l c u l a t e d  i s  e x p l a i n e d  i n  a p p e n d i x  D
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and Scotland. 12 13
The education classification used divides qualifications into 9 levels (see ap­
pendix C). It distinguishes between academic and vocational qualifications. In 
addition, we have aggregated this variable into 4 groups, where academic and 
equivalent vocational qualifications belong to the same category, and 2  groups 
-below A level, A level or more. The socio-economic group of the head of house­
hold includes the following categories - Employers/Managers/Professional, In­
termediate occupations, Personal Service, Manual skilled occupations, Partly 
skilled occupations, Unskilled occupations, Unknown.
The literature on education externalities has used different variables to de­
scribe the distribution of education in an area. Most studies use the share of 
population with a certain level of education - Moretti (1998) and Ciccone and 
Peri (2000) use share with college degree, while Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) 
and Rauch (1993) use share of population with at least secondary schooling. 
Other studies, like the one of chapter 3 use average education in the area. 
However, it is not clear what is the most appropriate variable. In this work I 
have tried different measures, concluding it is most informative to include in­
formation about the whole education distribution, that is, the share of working 
age population for each level of education (excluding the lowest level). This 
will allow us to observe not only possible positive spill-over effects from the 
skilled groups but also negative effects from the unskilled groups.
12A  d e t a i l e d  l i s t  o f  t h e  c o u n t i e s  i n c l u d e d  i n  e a c h  r e g i o n  c a n  b e  f o u n d  i n  A p p e n d i x  B ,  
t a b l e  C . 2 .  A l t h o u g h  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  w e  h a v e  t w o  r e g i o n s  l e s s  s i n c e  w e  c a n n o t  d i v i d e  n e i t h e r  
t h e  G r e a t e r  L o n d o n  r e g i o n  ( i n t o  I n n e r  a n d  O u t e r  L o n d o n ) ,  n o r  t h e  S c o t l a n d  r e g i o n  ( i n t o  
S t r a t h c l y d e  a n d  R e s t  o f  S c o t l a n d ) .
1 3 N o r t h e r n  I r e l a n d  i s  n o t  i n c l u d e d  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  g e t t i n g  d a t a  o n  w a g e s  b y  
e d u c a t i o n  ( o c c u p a t i o n )  s i n c e  t h e  N E S  o n l y  c o v e r s  G r e a t  B r i t a i n .  T h e  o n l y  s u i t a b l e  s u r v e y  
w o u l d  b e  t h e  F a m i l y  E x p e n d i t u r e  S u r v e y ,  b u t  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  s m a l l  s a m p l e  s i z e  ( a r o u n d  8 5  
o b s e r v a t i o n s  p e r  y e a r )  w e  a r e  i n c l i n e d  n o t  t o  u s e  i t
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Table 4.1: Sample means of variables by staying-on
Variables 16year olds 17year olds 18year olds
stayer leaver stayer leaver stayer leaver
Prob(staying) 54.0 76.7 60.2
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t i e s
Share Other Voc 7.2 6.3 7.4 6.6 7.8 7.0
Share Other Acad 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.7
Share Low Voc 14.0 13.3 14.1 13.3 14.5 13.5
Share O Level 17.7 17.0 17.8 17.2 17.8 17.7
Share Mid Voc 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.4
Share A Level 6.7 6.2 6.7 6.6 7.0 6.6
Share High Voc 5.5 4.8 5.5 5.0 5.9 5.2
Share Degree 10.9 9.6 11.1 10.3 11.5 10.7
R e g io n a l L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp Unskilled 9.9 10.7 9.7 10.4 9.8 9.8
Unemp Semiskill 6.5 6.8 6.4 6.8 6.5 6.4
Unemp Skilled 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.6
Earnings Unskilled 100,418 98,328 101,384 100,669 102,381 101,557
Earnings Skilled 168,594 157,747 171,690 164,369 177,045 168,698
Earnings ratio 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7
R e g io n ’s  E d u c a t io n Q u a li ty
P up/teach primary 22.3 22.2 22.4 22.1 22.4 22.3
P up/teach 2ndary 15.9 15.7 15.9 15.7 15.9 15.9
I n d iv id u a l  A b i l i ty
Other Voc 0.5 2.0 0.6 1.9 0.9 1.5
Other Acad 6.7 20.8 2.9 8.7 1.7 2.8
Low Voc 0.9 2.4 3.8 8.5 4.0 9.6
0  Level 78.8 42.2 77.3 51.3 25.4 22.4
Mid Voc 1.6 4.4 5.0 8.2
A Level 58.0 43.8
High Voc 1.3 2.6
More 3.7 2.1 10.3 11.6 0.1 0.1
I n d iv id u a l  C h a r a c te r is t ic s
continued on next page
C H A P T E R  4. E D U C A T IO N  E X T E R N A L I T I E S  I N  E D U C A T IO N 127
Table 4.1 : continued
migrant 16.4 24.2 15.3 25.3 17.7 21.5
sex 52.3 43.4 53.0 52.6 49.3 55.5
notwhite 9.7 4.8 10.1 7.9 13.4 8.0
H e a d  o f  H o u s e h o ld ’s  E d u c a t io n
Other Voc 7.9 9.0 7.9 8.3 8.6 7.9
Other Acad 1.0 1.4 0.9 1.6 0.6 1.0
Low Voc 20.4 22.5 19.0 22.2 16.8 20.3
0  Level 10.6 6.8 11.2 9.3 9.3 10.5
Mid Voc 2.4 1.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.5
A Level 5.1 1.7 5.7 3.7 11.0 5.0
High Voc 6.8 2.8 7.0 4.4 7.5 5.8
Degree 19.1 3.0 22.0 7.4 21.3 14.2
H e a d  o f  H o u s e h o ld ’s  Socio -■e c o n o m ic  G ro u p
Man Unsk 3.2 6.4 2.8 4.1 2.9 3.6
Man Semisk 6.3 10.8 5.5 8.5 5.1 6.9
Man Skilled 24.8 36.6 22.1 30.8 19.3 25.2
Non-man Unsk 2.1 2.2 2.1 . 2.6 2.8 2.2
Non-man Semisk 17.2 10.8 18.1 14.4 18.6 16.9
Non-man Skilled 37.1 16.8 40.1 25.7 37.4 32.7
H e a d  o f  H o u s e h o ld ’s  L a b o u r  F orce S ta tu s
unemployed 16.6 21.7 16.8 21.1 24.4 20.7
inactive 4.7 8.6 4.1 5.7 4.2 4.8
H o u s e h o ld  S tr u c tu r e
single parent 11.1 16.8 11.6 15.1 19.2 14.7
youngsibl 82.0 81.2 79.9 75.9 74.2 71.4
oldsibl 39.7 51.3 31.1 38.3 24.2 30.3
No Observations 19,083 16,276 14,327 4,361 7,342 23,149
4.3.1 The distribution of education across regions
Since one of the main contributions of this chapter is the analysis of the effects 
of education externalities on education participation, it is useful to describe 
the education distribution in the UK regions.
The UK’s average level of education has been constantly growing since 1983 at 
an average annual growth rate of 2.45% (see table 4.2). This growth has been
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Table 4.2: Education’s share of UK’s working age population
A verage level A nnual G row th  ra te
83 90 99 83 -  90 90 -  99 83 - 9 9
A verage E ducation 3.23 3.75 4.58 2 . 0 1 2 . 2 0 2.45
Share o f  U K ’s w orking age popu la tion
No Qual 46.78 33.14 18.59 -3.65 -4.39 -3.54
Other Voc 4.97 6.90 10.03 4.84 4.54 5.98
Other Acad 4.52 4.10 3.88 -1.17 -0.53 -0.83
Low Voc 10.04 15.24 15.22 6.46 - 0 . 0 1 3.03
0  Level 14.68 17.79 18.47 2.65 0.39 1.52
Mid Voc 1.50 2.64 3.89 9.50 4.71 9.35
A Level 5.23 6.43 8 . 0 2 2 . 8 6 2.48 3.14
High Voc 3.62 4.26 7.48 2 .2 1 7.53 6.26
Degree 8.64 9.51 14.43 1.26 5.17 3.94
Share o f  U K ’s w orking age popu la tion  w ith so m e qualifica tion
Other Voc 9.35 10.32 12.32 1.30 1.94 1.87
Other Acad 8.49 6.13 4.77 -3.48 - 2 . 2 2 -2.58
Low Voc 18.87 22.79 18.69 2.59 -1.80 - -0.06
0  Level 27.59 26.60 22.69 -0.45 -1.47 - -1.04
Mid Voc 2.82 3.95 4.77 5.01 2.08 4.08
A Level 9.83 9.61 9.85 -0.28 0.25 0 . 0 1
High Voc 6.81 6.38 9.18 -0.79 4.40 2.05
Degree 16.24 14.23 17.72 -1.55 2.46 0.54
CHAPTER 4. EDUCATION EXTERNALITIES IN EDUCATION 129
driven by two main factors - the drastic reduction in the number of individuals 
without any qualification from 47% in 1983 to 19% in 1999 and the growth 
in all the most qualified groups, from Middle Vocational qualifications to De­
gree or more. Amongst these, the Middle Vocational group has grown most, 
mainly because it started at a very low level; but the High Vocational and De­
gree groups have also grown greatly14. This is still the case when looking only 
at the shares of each qualification group amongst the population with some 
skills. The three top qualifications have constantly gained ground against all 
other qualifications. At the same time, the groups with the lowest qualifica­
tions have reduced in size relative to other qualifications.
When we look at the distribution of education by regions (tables 4.3 & 4.415), 
we can see that there is great persistence in the distribution. The five regions 
at the top and bottom of the distribution in 1983 are still in the same position 
in 1999. This result holds whether we look at the average level of education 
or at the share of the working age population with degree or more. However, 
things vary much more when we look at the intermediate qualifications. In ad­
dition, the dispersion of the distribution has decreased slightly both in terms 
of the average level of education and of the share of population with degree.
Amongst the top regions (see table 4.3), Greater London and East Anglia 
seem to have specialized in skilled academic qualifications, with a very low 
share of high and middle vocational qualifications, while the other regions on 
the top have remained more diversified (Scotland, Rest of South East and 
South West)16.
If we now look at the 5 regions at the bottom of the distribution in table 
4.4, we can divide them into two groups. The first group, Metropolitan West 
Midlands and South Yorkshire, have a very unskilled population with a very 
low share of the top three qualifications and very high of the bottom four. 
The second group, Merseyside, Tyne and Wear and Rest of Northern region,
14T h e y  h a v e  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  3 .6 %  t o  7 .5 %  a n d  f r o m  8 .6 %  t o  1 4 .4 %  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  w i t h  m o s t  
o f  t h i s  g r o w t h  t a k i n g  p l a c e  i n  t h e  1 9 9 0 s
15 A l s o  s e e  t h e  r a n k i n g s  i n  t a b l e s  D . 2  a n d  D . 3  in  a p p e n d i x  D
16 A  s u r p r i s i n g  f e a t u r e  i s  t h a t  G r e a t e r  L o n d o n  a n d  S c o t l a n d  h a v e  v e r y  f e w  p e o p l e  w i t h  
o n l y  O  l e v e l s ,  p o s s i b l y  b e c a u s e  p e o p l e  i n  t h e s e  a r e a s  t e n d  t o  s t a y  l o n g e r  i n  e d u c a t i o n  u n t i l  
t h e y  a c h i e v e  a  h i g h e r  a c a d e m i c  q u a l i f i c a t i o n .
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Table 4.3: Education’s share of working age population by 5 top regions
No qual Other Voc Other Acad Low Voc O Level
region 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99
GrLon 44 16 5 15 4 3 7 1 0 16 16
RSE 39 14 6 9 5 4 1 0 14 17 2 1
EAng 46 18 7 11 5 5 9 14 14 2 0
Scot 47 18 4 1 0 1 2 12 15 14 15
SW 43 15 5 9 5 5 11 16 17 2 0
Mid Voc A Level High Voc Degree Average edu
region 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99
GrLon 1 3 8 8 3 6 12 2 2 3.7 5.0
RSE 2 4 6 9 4 8 12 17 3.8 5.1
EAng 1 3 5 6 3 7 8 14 3.3 4.6
Scot 2 4 9 12 4 1 0 9 14 3.6 4.9
SW 2 4 5 8 4 9 9 14 3.5 4.9
Table 4.4: Education’s share of working age population by 5 bottom regions
No qual Other Voc Other Acad Low Voc O Level
region 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99
SY 54 2 2 4 9 5 6 1 0 18 1 2  18
RN 50 2 1 5 9 5 5 11 2 0 14 18
WMid 56 25 5 1 2 5 5 9 13 12 17
Mersey 50 27 5 7 5 4 1 0 16 15 18
T&W 50 2 1 6 1 0 6 5 11 2 0 13 17
Mid Voc A Level High Voc Degree Average Edu
region 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99
SY 1 4 4 6 4 6 6 11 3.0 4.3
RN 2 5 3 6 3 7 6 1 0 3.0 4.4
WMid 1 4 4 6 3 6 6 1 0 2.8 4.1
Mersey 1 4 4 7 3 7 6 1 0 3.1 4.3
T&W 1 4 3 7 3 7 6 9 3.0 4.3
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Table 4.5: Education decisions in the UK
A verage level A nnual G row th  ra te
83 90 99 83 - 9 0  90 - 9 9  83 -  99
Education decisions
stay on edu 16 43.26 52.65 70.23 2.94 3.38 3.19
stay on edu 17 64.36 74.45 84.51 2.13 1.47 1.76
stay on edu 18 46.29 48.83 70.59 0.85 4.47 2.89
part. In edu 17 30.78 36.43 60.06 2.56 6.05 4.52
part. In edu 18 13.94 16.02 42.95 2.28 12.74 8.16
seem to have compensated for the lack of skilled academic qualifications with 
a slight specialization in skilled and semi-skilled vocational qualifications.
The staying-on rate has risen dramatically over the sample period for 16, 17 
and 18 year-olds, from 43%, 64% and 46% in 1983 to 70%, 85% and 71% respec­
tively in 1999 (see table 4.5). The same is true for participation in education 
rates for 17 and 18 years olds, with an increase from 31% and 14% to 60% and 
43% respectively. However, this transformation of the education decision has 
taken place in three different phases - in the first (1983-89), the staying-on rate 
at sixteen grows slowly reaching 52%, then in the second (1990-94) it explodes 
reaching its peak at 71% in 1994, and finally, in the third it stabilizes and even 
decreases slightly to around 70%. The fact that the staying-on rate is highest 
at 17 is due to the characteristics of the British curriculum. In the UK most 
young persons choose the academic route, whose intermediate qualifications 
(O and A level) are mainly considered as steps towards the attainment of a 
degree. Therefore, the people at highest risk of leaving education at seventeen 
are those undertaking vocational qualifications, which only account for 13% of 
seventeen year olds.
If we now look at the education decision by regions, we notice that the regions 
with the most qualified workforce also have the highest participation rates (see 
figures 4.3, 4.6 and 4.7). Exceptions to this are Merseyside and metropolitan 
West Midlands, which have one of the least skilled workforces but a very high 
participation rate. This is probably because they have had an important rise in 
middle and high vocational qualifications during the period, as well as A levels. 
However, when we look at staying-on rates at 17 and 18 years of age things
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are not so clear. While some of the most skilled regions (Greater London, 
Rest of South East and Rest of North West) remain in the top or middle of 
the distribution, the other top regions (Scotland for 17 year olds, South West 
and East Anglia) have quite low participation rates. However Scotland has 
the highest staying-on rate at 18 years of age.
4.4 R esu lts
As explained in section 4.2, the results were obtained by estimating the proba­
bility of staying-on in education by maximum likelihood using a Probit model. 
In this model, unlike in the linear probability model, an estimated coefficient, 
j3k, does not represent the total effect of the covariate, on the dependent 
variable. Instead, one has to calculate the derivative of the likelihood function 
with respect to that covariate to obtain its marginal value:
^ - $ ( * '/ ? )  =  t (x '0 )0k (4.10)
Therefore, we report both the estimated coefficients and the marginal values 
for the reference individual. For the labour market variables we report the 
elasticity instead.
The reference individual has the following characteristics: Male, white, non­
migrant, with O level as the highest qualification attained so far, lives with 
both of his parents, the head of his household has O Level or Middle voca­
tional qualifications and is working in a skilled manual or unskilled non-manual 
position, resident in the East Midland region. The rest of the covariates are 
calculated at mean value.
Four sets of regional variables are included in the estimation: the education 
distribution, unemployment rate by qualification, present discounted value of 
expected lifetime earnings by qualification and number of pupils per teacher. 
All these variables are included as logarithms.
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Table 4.6: Probit estimation of the individual’s probability 
of staying-on in education
Variables 16year olds 17year olds 18year olds
Coef Mg V Coef Mg V Coef Mg V
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t ie s
Share Other Voc —0.205*** -0.093 1 p h-* 00 O # * -0.054 -0.148 -0.058
Share Other Acad 0.024 0.011 0.240*** 0.072 -0.028 -0.011
Share Low Voc 0.041 0.019 0.399** 0.119 -0.082 -0.032
Share 0  Level 0.065 0.030 0.459* 0.137 0.402 0.158
Share Mid Voc 0.051 0.023 0.037 0.011 -0.015 -0.006
Share A Level -0.141 -0.064 -0.108 -0.032 -0.043 -0.017
Share High Voc -0.071 -0.032 0.275* 0.082 0.024 0.009
Share Degree 0.353*** 0.160 -0.096 -0.029 0.629*** 0.247
R e g io n a l  L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp Unskilled 0.156* 0.071 0.119 0.035 0.103 0.040
Unemp Semiskill 0.078*** 0.035 0.022 0.007 -0.008 -0.003
Unemp Skilled -0.082*** -0.037 -0.026 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002
Earnings Unskilled -2.011*** -0.911 0.084 0.025 -1.595** -0.628
Earnings Skilled 0.347 0.157 0.998* 0.298 1.909*** 0.752
R e g io n ’s  E d u c a t io n  Q u a li ty
Pup/teach primary -0.822** -0.372 0.019 0.006 -0.324 -0.127
Pup/teach 2ndary 0.817* 0.270 0.090 0.022 0.169 0.051
I n d iv id u a l  A b i l i ty
Other Voc -0.192*** -0.067 -0.042 -0.011 -0.003 -0.001
Other Acad -0.022 -0.007 0.092 0.022 0.195** 0.055
Low Voc 0.007 0.002 0.209*** 0.047 0.027 0.008
0  Level 0.872*** 0.332 0.918*** 0.313 0.720*** 0.262
Mid Voc 0.187** 0.042 0.172* 0.049
A Level 0.633*** 0.145
High Voc -0.009 -0.003
> 0  Level 0.956*** 0.212
> Mid Voc 0.780*** 0.126
> High Voc 0.738** 0.160
I n d iv id u a l  C h a r a c te r is t ic s
migrant -0.083* -0.028 -0.194*** 0.011 0.086 0.025
continued on next page
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Table 4.6: continued
sex 0.212*** 0.065 0.046** --0.053 -0.129*** -0.041
notwhite 0.739*** 0.182 0.412*** 0.083 0.554*** 0.132
H e a d  o f  H o u s e h o ld ’s  E d u c a t io n
Other Voc 0.080*** 0.026 0.116*** 0.027 0.144*** 0.041
Other Acad -0.090 -0.031 -0.218** -0.060 -0.198 -0.064
Low Voc 0.129*** 0.041 0.074** 0.018 0.065 0.019
O Level 0.305*** 0.109 0.221*** 0.061 0.116** 0.037
Mid Voc 0.311*** 0.111 0.112 0.029 0.189** 0.061
A Level 0.606*** 0.159 0.370*** 0.076 0.550*** 0.131
High Voc 0.447*** 0.125 0.312*** 0.066 0.251*** 0.069
Degree 0.937*** 0.209 0.633*** 0.111 0.343*** 0.090
H e a d  o f  H o u s e h o ld ’s S o c io -e c o n o m ic G ro u p
Man Unsk -0.197*** --0.069 -0.083 -0.021 -0.104 -0.033
Man Semisk -0.152*** --0.053 I**00i—Ho1 -0.040 -0.105 -0.033
Man Skilled -0.114*** - 0.036 -0.127*** --0.030 -0.090* -0.026
Non-man Unsk 0.039 0.013 -0.071 -0.017 -0.010 -0.003
Non-man Semisk 0.126*** 0.040 0.058 0.014 -0.047 -0.014
Non-man Skilled -0.122*** - -0.042 -0.137 -0.036 0.027 0.008
H e a d  o f  H o u s e h o ld ’s  L a b o u r  F o rce  S ta tu s
unemployed -0.163*** - -0.056 -0.041 -0.010 -0.094 -0.028
inactive 0.200 0.062 0.060 0.015 -0.008*** -0.003
H o u s e h o ld  S tr u c tu r e
single parent -0.039*** - 0.013 0.031*** 0.008 0.150 0.043
youngsibl -0.002 -0.001 0.012 0.003 -0.006 -0.002
oldsibl -0.105*** - 0.035 -0.066*** --0.017 -0.094*** -0.028
Constant 17.686** -9.105 -0.720
Prob(staying) 0.73 0.83 0.77
Log Likelihood -19084 -8769 -7255
X2 10499 4972 3415
Pseudo R 2 0.218 0.136 0.114
No Observations 35359 18688 12187
N O T E S
a )  * * *  d e n o t e s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  1 %  l e v e l ,  * *  a t  t h e  5 %  l e v e l  a n d  *  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l .
b )  O t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n :  R e g i o n  a n d  y e a r  d u m m i e s  a n d  I n d u s t r y ’s  s h a r e  o f  
e m p l o y m e n t .
continued on next page
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Table 4.6: continued
b )  S t a n d a r d  e r r o r s  a r e  c l u s t e r e d  b y  r e g i o n  a n d  y e a r .  T h i s  a l l o w s  f o r  c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  e r r o r s  b e t w e e n  
i n d i v i d u a l s  in  t h e  s a m e  c l u s t e r .
4.4.1 Estim ation Results for the education externality
The estimated coefficients in table 4.6 show that the variables measuring the 
distribution of education (the workforce’s shares by education) have an im­
portant effect on education decisions. However, these effects seem to come 
through different mechanisms at different ages. At sixteen and eighteen years 
of age the share of the region’s working age population with degree has a pos­
itive and significant effect on the probability of staying-on in education, with 
elasticities of 0.16 and 0.25, respectively. Meanwhile, at seventeen years of 
age, it seems that the positive external effects of education are coming primar­
ily from the high vocational qualifications, with an elasticity of 0.08, but also 
from the low and middle qualifications (other academic, low vocational and 
O levels). In addition, at sixteen and seventeen the share of population with 
the lowest qualification (other vocational) has a negative and significant effect.
The differences across age groups are probably a consequence of the different 
characteristics of the academic and vocational education-paths. The academic 
education-path is mainly built with the aim of reaching university and it has 
two main break-points, at 16 and 18 years of age, when children take their 
O Level and A Level examinations, respectively. This means that the main 
group at risk of leaving education at 16 and 18 years of age is the one with 
academic qualifications. Therefore, it is not surprising that it is precisely at 
these ages when the external effect comes from a high share of population with 
degree. Meanwhile, the vocational qualifications are much more self-contained. 
Although most of these qualifications are split into levels, each of them is val­
ued by employers on its own merit, allowing the children to find a job if they 
leave education. This means that young persons trying to attain vocational 
qualifications may leave at the end of any course and therefore they are the 
ones most at risk of leaving education at seventeen years of age. This could 
also explain why at this age the external effect does not come through one 
qualification but is more widespread across several of them.
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Table 4.7: Change in expected probability of representative individual after a 
change in the workforce’s share by education (percentage points)
workforce’s share staying-on rate
Initial Final 16 17 18
r ise  in  o f  w ork fo rce’s share o ver  p eriod  83-99
High Vocational 4.26 7.48 -2.27 7.28 0.81
Degree 9.51 14.43 7.54 -1.60 13.55
increase in  w o rk fo rce’s share fro m  m ean  to  to p  region
High Vocational 5.15 6.48 -0.75 2.42 0.27
Degree 10.33 15.65 ' 8.28 -1.76 14.89
redu ction  in  w orkforce ’a share fro m m ean  to  bo ttom region
High Vocational 5.15 4.08 0.32 - 1 . 0 2 - 0 . 1 1
Degree 10.33 7.34 -2 . 1 0 0.45 -3.78
To have an idea of the magnitude these numbers imply, in table 4.7 we have 
calculated the effect that the rise in the workforce’s share with degree or high 
vocational qualifications over the sample period would have on the predicted 
probability of staying-on in education for the representative individual. During 
the sample the workforce’s share with degree (high vocational) increased from 
9.5% to 14.4% (4.3% to 7.5%). This increase in the top qualifications would 
have implied a rise in the predicted probability of remaining in education of 
8 p.p., 7p.p. and 14p.p. for sixteen-, seventeen- and eighteen-year-olds, respec­
tively. That is, although the magnitude of the estimated elasticities might 
seem small (table 4.6), due to the big rise in qualifications over the sample, 
they actually imply a large increase in the probability of staying-on in educa­
tion.
This exercise can also be done to analyze the effect of regional differences in 
the education distribution. The second and third parts of table 4.7 report 
the effect of a change in the share of population with degree (high vocational) 
from the mean value to the rate prevalent in the best and worst regions in 
terms of this variable. According to this, an increase in the workforce’s share 
with degree from the level of the worst region to the level of the best region 
would increase the probability of staying on in education by lOp.p. and 19p.p. 
for sixteen- and eighteen-year-olds, respectively. However, the small regional 
differences in the share with high vocational qualifications imply a minor effect 
on the staying-on rate at seventeen years of age.
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The external effects might only be a reflection of the quality of the education 
system or of the region’s expenditure on education. In order to control for this 
we have included the number of pupils per teacher in primary and secondary 
schools in each region. Both of these variables are statistically significant at 
sixteen years of age, but insignificant for the rest. As expected, the more pupils 
per teacher in primary schools, the worse is the quality of the region’s education 
system and this reduces the probability of staying-on in education at sixteen. 
•On the contrary, the measure for secondary schools has the opposite effect. 
This result might reflect an endogeneity bias. If the budget for education of a 
local education authority is based on the population at schooling age living in 
the area, then the higher the share staying in secondary schooling, the higher 
the pupil-teacher ratio will be. This would not be true if schools’ budgets were 
based on the actual number of students. Obviously, this could not happen for 
the ratio in primary schooling, since everyone in the area is legally bound to 
attend school. A different interpretation could be that this variable is capturing 
a peer group effect - you are more likely to stay in secondary schooling if most 
of your peers stay.
4.4.2 Estim ation Results for the regional labour market 
variables
The individual probability of staying-on in education at all ages is significantly 
influenced by the state of the regional labour market. Young persons of all 
ages are taking into account the opportunity costs and expected gains from 
education when deciding to continue studying or not. They have a greater 
incentive to leave education if the conditions of the region’s unskilled labour 
market are good for them, that is, if the unemployment rate is low and the 
expected lifetime earnings are high. On the contrary, they prefer to continue 
studying if they expect to encounter better conditions in the region’s skilled 
labour market- low skilled unemployment rate and high skilled lifetime earn­
ings.
The estimated coefficients in table 4.6 show that at all ages the higher the un­
employment rate faced by individuals with O Levels or less and with A Levels 
or less (unskilled and semi-skilled) and the lower the unemployment rate for
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Table 4.8: Change in expected probability of representative individual after a 
change in the unemployment rate by education (percentage points)
unempl. rate staying-on rate
Initial Final 16 17 18
r ise  in  u n em p lo ym en t o ver  p eriod  90-93
unskilled rate 8.40 11.35 1.92 1.04 1.16
semi-skilled rate 5.28 7.03 0.78 0.18 -0.09
skilled rate 2.45 4.19 -2.14 -0.46 - 0 .1 0
increase in  u n em p lo ym en t fro m  m ean  to top  region
unskilled rate 10.25 7.05 - 2 .0 1 -1.09 - 1 .2 2
semi-skilled rate 6.64 4.67 -0.81 -0.19 0.09
skilled rate 3.72 3.02 0.69 0.15 0.03
reduction  in  u n em p lo ym en t fro m  m ean  to  bo ttom  region
unskilled rate 10.25 16.59 2.65 1.43 1.60
semi-skilled rate 6.64 9.39 0.75 0.18 -0.09
skilled rate 3.72 4.77 - 0 .6 6 -0.14 -0.03
individuals with degree or more (skilled), the higher the probability of staying- 
on in education. This effect is quite small in magnitude and only statistically 
significant for sixteen year olds. The elasticities for sixteen-year-olds are 0.07, 
0.035 and -0.037 for the unskilled, semiskilled and skilled unemployment rate, 
respectively. That this effect is only significant for sixteen-year-olds may be 
because those who leave at a later age most certainly have some higher quali­
fication and therefore face a much lower unemployment rate.
To have an idea of the magnitudes these numbers imply, in table 4.8 we have 
calculated the effect that the rise in unemployment during the last economic 
crisis 1990-93 would have on the predicted probability of staying-on in educa­
tion for the representative individual. During this period, the unemployment 
rate increased from 8.4% to 11.4% for the unskilled, from 5.28% to 7.03% for 
the semi-skilled and from 2.45% to 4.19% for the skilled. The rise in unskilled 
and semi-skilled unemployment would have increased the predicted staying-on 
rate by 1.9 p.p and 0.8 p.p respectively. The rise in skilled unemployment 
would imply a reduction in the staying-on rate of 2 .1  p.p. Regional differences 
in unemployment rates also imply large differences in the predicted staying-on 
rates. A reduction in the unskilled and semi-skilled unemployment rate from 
the level of the worst region to the level of the best region would reduce the 
probability of staying-on in education at sixteen by 4.7 and 1.6 p.p., respec­
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tively. A similar decrease in the skilled unemployment rate would increase 
the predicted staying-on rate by 1.4 p.p. The effects of the unskilled and 
semi-skilled unemployment are clearly larger since it is for these groups where 
regional differences are larger. These results suggest that the main effects of 
the unskilled and semi-skilled unemployment rates are due to regional differ­
ences, while the main effect of the skilled unemployment rate comes from the 
economic cycle.
The permanent earnings by education level or returns to education17 have a 
great effect on education decisions at all ages. The elasticities for unskilled 
and skilled earnings are -0.9 and 0.16 at sixteen, 0.03 and 0.3 at seventeen 
and -0.63 and 0.75 at eighteen (see table 4.6). However, the skilled earnings 
at sixteen and the unskilled earnings at seventeen do not have a statistically 
significant effect on staying-on rates. These elasticities imply a very large ef­
fect on staying-on rates. The rise in permanent earnings of unskilled workers 
by 9.8% during the sample period would have reduced the predicted proba­
bility of staying-on in education at sixteen by 7.5p.p. and at eighteen by 5 
p.p. (see table 4.9). Meanwhile the rise in earnings of skilled workers by 42% 
would have increased the predicted staying-on rate at seventeen by 10.5p.p 
and at eighteen by 25.9p.p.18. The regional differences in permanent earnings 
imply an even larger effect. The differences in unskilled earnings reduce the 
predicted staying-on rates at sixteen by 31.3p.p. and at eighteen by 20.8p.p. 
While the differences in skilled earnings increase the probability of remaining 
in education by 15p.p. at seventeen and by 37p.p. at eighteen.
Finally, following previous studies (Rice (1999), Raffe and Willms (1989)) we 
interact the labour market variables with individual’s ability. In particular, 
we look at the effect of regional unemployment and lifetime earnings on young 
persons with less than O Level or O Level or more. Table D.7 in appendix
17In the estimation of the model (table 4.6) we have included the permanent earnings 
separately by education instead of the ratio of skilled to unskilled earnings (also called rate 
of return to education) since they are more informative of the incentives faced by young 
persons at different ages. However, we have also estimated the model with the rate of return 
obtaining elasticities of 0.37, 0.17 and 0.71 for sixteen, seventeen and eighteen year olds, 
respectively. These effects are significant for sixteen and eighteen year olds.
18 The returns to education have risen by around 29% implying a rise in the predicted 
probability of remaining in education of 9p.p. and 17p.p. for sixteen and eighteen year olds, 
respectively
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Table 4.9: Change in expected probability of representative individual after a 
change in permanent earnings by education (percentage points) 
earnings staying-on rate
Initial Final 16 17 18
r ise  in  earn ings o ver  perio d  83-99
unskilled 94686 103919 -7.52 0 .2 0 -5.01
skilled 135970 193120 6.54 10.45 25.85
ratio 1.43 1.85 9.33 4.02 16.69
r ise  in earn ings fro m  m ean  to  top  region
unskilled 100175 131693 -29.18 0.79 -19.44
skilled 164937 238745 9.16 14.64 36.21
ratio 1.64 1.81 4.47 1.93 8 .0 0
redu ction  in  earn ings fro m m ean  to  bo ttom  region
unskilled 100175 92963 2.09 -0.06 1.39
skilled 164937 147297 -0.31 -0.49 - 1 .2 2
ratio 1.64 1.53 -1.16 -0.50 -2.08
D shows that in general, labour market variables have a significant effect on 
individuals with higher ability, but an insignificant one on low ability individ­
uals. An exception is the effect of permanent unskilled earnings for 16 year 
olds, and of permanent skilled earnings for 18 year olds, which are both very 
significant and of greater magnitude than for more able individuals. This re­
sults contradicts the previous findings in the literature, which suggested that 
labour market variables affected more the unskilled. This is most certainly 
due to our poorer measure of ability.
4.4.3 Estim ation Results for individual and household  
variables
In general, the estimated coefficients for the individual and household variables 
are all in line with previous studies using micro-data. Individual’s ability, as 
measured by the education attainment at the time of the interview, seems to 
be a very important determinant of the decision to stay on in education at all 
ages. As expected, individuals with the lowest qualifications (Low vocational, 
although not statistically significant for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, and 
other qualifications) have a lower probability of continuing studying, while O 
level or higher academic qualifications have the opposite effect. What is some­
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what more surprising is that middle and high vocational qualifications have 
a negative and significant effect. A possible reason could be that most voca­
tional courses are self-contained, providing a qualification widely accepted by 
employers, while most academic courses are steps towards a higher qualifica­
tion. Therefore, an individual studying a vocational qualification has a greater 
incentive to leave education after finishing the course19. A concern about con­
trolling for individual ability using education attainment is that this variable 
may be endogenous. An individual that is planning to leave school might not 
have the incentive to obtain the highest education level possible at his age. 
On the other hand, if the child is planning to start working, the qualifications 
obtained will be very important to get a job, which might provide the right 
incentives to study. In order to see the importance of this problem we have also 
estimated the model without controlling for individual ability (see table D.5 in 
appendix D). The estimated coefficients do not vary significantly, suggesting 
that even if there is any endogeneity in the way ability is measured, it is not 
affecting the results.
With respect to other individual characteristics, we find that women have a 
higher probability than men of continuing in education at 16 and 17 years of 
age. However, men are more likely to stay at 18 years of age. Children of 
white origin have a higher probability of staying-on at all ages. Both of these 
results are common findings in the literature (see Micklewright (1989) or Rice 
(1999)). The interpretation is that women and non-white persons feel that in 
order to succeed in their careers they will have to prove they are better than 
their white-male peers and, therefore, they start by acquiring more education.
The results also show the relevance of the family background in the child’s 
decision to stay on in education. The educational attainment of the head of 
the household increases the child’s probability of continuing in full-time edu­
cation. This effect is stronger, the higher the education level. However, except 
for the lowest qualifications, it is higher for academic than for vocational qual­
ifications. A similar pattern is obtained for 17- and 18-year-olds, with one 
exception - for 18-year-olds the strongest effect is when the head of household
19It is also quite surprising that the effect of A level is not statistically significant for 
eighteen-year-olds. This contradicts the generally accepted idea that this qualification is a 
mere requirement to go to university and not valued by employers
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has A Level as the highest education attainment.
The socio-economic group of the head of household also has an important effect 
on the child’s decision to continue studying. Being a manual worker reduces 
that probability, whilst being a non-manual worker increases it. However, for 
17- and 18-year-olds, the latter effect is not significant. A reason for this might 
be that when the individual is older his decisions are less influenced by his par­
ents or by the social class they belong to, as long as the family has an economic 
status that enables them to pay for the education.
The other variables proxying for family income have the expected signs. Chil­
dren with single-parents have a lower probability of staying-on in education 
at 16 and 17 years of age. However, this effect is insignificant for 18-year- 
olds. The head of household being unemployed always has a negative effect on 
staying-on rates, although it is only significant for 16-year-olds. Being inactive 
has a positive and significant effect for 17 and 18 year olds. Finally, having 
older siblings always reduces the probability of staying-on in education. This 
reflects the fact that families have to distribute their scarce resources amongst 
their children and the first ones get the bigger share.
Very similar results are obtained when we use the probability of participating 
in education instead of the staying-on rate (see table D.4).
4.5 R obustness o f R esu lts
In this section we have tried to take into account some of the standard econo­
metric problems one encounters when estimating external effects. In particular, 
we worry about the endogeneity of independent variables and the identification 
of the external effect20. The existing literature studying the effects of regional 
labour market variables on education participation in the UK has normally 
not taken this problem into account. However, since we believe it might be a 
very important issue if one wants to study these factors, we will discuss them 
here.
20See Brock and Durlauf (2000) and Dietz (2001) for two excellent surveys about the 
literature dealing with these estimation problems
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The endogeneity of independent variables is a common problem to all studies 
of external and neighborhood effects. The question is whether the area char­
acteristics used to measure these effects are exogenous variables or not with 
respect to the formation of the area. If location was predetermined and fixed 
for all individuals there would not be a problem. However, we know that indi­
viduals are able to choose to a certain extent the area and group they belong 
to. This could generate a sorting process by which individuals with similar 
characteristics live together. This would then be problematic for the estima­
tion of the external effects because the characteristics determining the group 
of interest are the same as the ones determining the problem we are studying, 
generating biased and inconsistent estimators (Greene (1993)).
One possible way of dealing with this problem is to use instruments for the 
potentially endogenous variable. We would require a variable that is correlated 
with the distribution of education but is not correlated with the sorting pro­
cess. This is particularly difficult for our case since this variable would have to 
vary both within regions and over time. Most previous studies in this literature 
which have used instruments where cross-sectional. This allowed them to use 
instruments which vary across areas but not across time, like the demographic 
structure a decade before (Moretti (1998) and Ciccone and Peri (2000)). Some 
other studies have sorted out this problem by constructing instruments such us 
the variation in child labour laws and compulsory attendance across US states 
(Acemoglu and Angrist (2 0 0 0 )), but this is not possible for a country like the 
UK where most of the legislation is nationally based. This leaves us with one 
possible instrument - past values of the variables determining the education 
distribution. However, since the sorting process normally takes a long time, 
persistence is very likely and the endogeneity problem will not be solved by 
this method.
Due to the difficulty of finding a reliable instrument, the relevant question 
that we should answer is how important is the endogeneity due to the sort­
ing process in this particular study. There are some reasons why we believe 
the sorting process might not have an important effect on the estimation of 
external effects. First of all, the areas used in this study, 17 regions, are very 
large and heterogeneous. This would make a perfect sorting process almost 
impossible. Migration of skilled workers will generate a higher concentration of
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qualified individuals in the best regions and therefore their children will have a 
greater probability of remaining in education longer. However, we already con­
trol quite extensively for the characteristics of the child’s family background 
and for whether they have migrated in the last year. In addition, there will 
still be a large number of workers from all types in each region (for example 
because house ownership or housing benefit reduces mobility). Secondly, even 
if the sorting process is important, there is no reason to believe that it has 
been increasing during the sample period or that it has been more acute than 
in the past. Thus, the effect of sorting would mainly be a level effect, most of 
which should be captured by the region and time dummies.
We have undertaken some simple tests to check the potential importance of 
endogeneity. One would expect the effects of the sorting process to be stronger 
in the areas at the extremes of the distribution. That is, in the regions with the 
highest and lowest levels of education. However, when we run the regression 
excluding the regions that consistently have had the highest education level 
(South East including London) and those with the lowest (Metropolitan West 
Midlands and Merseyside) for the whole sample we find that the effect of the 
externality remains similar in magnitude and statistically significant (see table 
D.6 ). These results lead us to conclude that although some endogeneity might 
exist, it does not seem to affect significantly the estimation of the external 
effect of education, or of the other regional variables.
Finally, the other important problem when estimating external effects is the 
one of identification, also named the ’’reflection problem” by Manski (1993). 
This problem arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour 
in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group 
influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group. Manski 
shows that inference on endogenous effects is not possible unless the researcher 
has prior information specifying the composition of reference groups and if the 
variables defining reference groups and those affecting directly the outcomes 
are moderately related in the population. However, he also proved that iden­
tification is eased if the estimated model is non-linear, in particular for the 
binary response model. The reason is that in a non-linear model, the external 
effect changes at a different rate than the direct effect of an individual’s own 
characteristics and therefore both can be independently identified. In addition,
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Brock and Durlauf (2000) showed that this problem is further eased if there is 
within-group heterogeneity. Otherwise, if the neighbourhood is homogenous, 
it is impossible to distinguish between the individual and the group with re­
spect to outcomes. Our study fulfills both of these properties and therefore we 
understand that identification of the external effects should not be a problem 
here.
4.6 Participation  rate in education
So far in this study we have looked at the probability of staying-on in educa­
tion at different ages. However, a large part of the existing literature looks at 
the probability of participating in education. That is, they study how many 
people are in education at a certain age, including those who return to full­
time education after having worked for some time. This issue is only relevant 
for seventeen- and eighteen-year-olds, since in the UK it is illegal to leave edu­
cation before sixteen. One of the practical advantages of this approach is that 
sample sizes are much larger - more than 30,000 individuals - since we include 
everyone at each age. The disadvantage might be that the differences in effects 
between sixteen-year-olds and older children are not so easy to disentangle.
Table D.4 reports the result of estimating a probit for the probability of par­
ticipating in education. The main conclusion is that the regional effects have 
the same sign and significance as with staying-on rates but are larger in mag­
nitude. The only difference is that skilled earnings do not have a significant 
effect on the participation decision of seventeen-year-olds, while the unskilled 
rate of unemployment has a significant effect.
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4.7 Conclusions
This study examines the effect of education externalities on the probability of 
staying-on in education at sixteen, seventeen and eighteen years of age, con­
trolling for many individual and family characteristics. The length of time 
covered and the size of the sample allows a study of the existence of external 
effects from the regional distribution of education.
We find that there are important positive external effects of education. How­
ever, these effects seem to come through different mechanisms at different ages. 
At sixteen and eighteen years of age, the share of the region’s working age pop­
ulation with degree has a positive and significant effect on the probability of 
staying-on in education. At seventeen years of age, the positive external effects 
of education are coming from the high vocational qualifications. This differ­
ence might be due to the structure of the UK academic curriculum.
In addition, we look at the effect of regional labour market variables on the 
probability of staying-on in education. Previous work had identified regional 
effects of unemployment only when interacting it with individual ability and 
not including regional dummies. Here we argue that this is due to the short 
time span covered by their samples. Our analysis shows that the individual 
probability of staying-on in education at all ages is significantly influenced by 
the state of the regional labour market. Young persons of all ages are taking 
into account the opportunity costs and expected gains from education when 
deciding to continue studying or not. They have a greater incentive to leave 
education if the conditions of the region’s unskilled labour market are good 
for them, that is, if the unemployment rate is low and the expected lifetime 
earnings are high. On the contrary, they prefer to continue studying if they 
expect to encounter better conditions in the region’s skilled labour market- 
low skilled unemployment rate and high skilled lifetime earnings. The effect 
of unemployment is significant only for sixteen-year-olds, while the effect of 
earnings is significant at all ages. This reflects the fact that unemployment 
impacts more strongly on low skilled individuals, while earnings become more 
important as they acquire some higher qualifications. The magnitude of these 
effects is quite important, especially due to regional differences.
A ppendix A  
A ppendix for Chapter 1
A .l  Level o f education  in th e Social P lan n er’s 
solution
In equilibrium we have the following levels of employment for the private (qp) 
and social planner solutions (qs P ):
'6 (1
q =  1 1 (a(3)*-2a A*-2" * 2“
S P  (  b  \  *  2a Q . *  f  |r Q \  *_ 2 aq =  ( — 1 a  * - 2*
Re-arranging the expression for the social planer we get the following:
<?*' =  - ----------
Prom this expression it is clear that qsp > qp for all all values of (3.
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Figure A. 1 : Equilibrium of the economy. Case 2a: full employment equilibrium
A .2 A d d itio n a l F igu res o f  ch ap ter 1
A ppendix B 
A ppendix for Chapter 2
B .l  D erivatives o f equilibrium  equations
Equation (2.15):
da*(eq2.15) 
d(q] -  ql ) 
92a* (eq2.15)
d ( q ]  ~  q l  ) 2
'i’ — a
771 a
a 2(PA)*(q] -  q l)*
q/—am *
o?{pA)S(q] -  ql )* ?
< 0;
> 0
since qi > qh.
Equation (2.14):
d{q] ~ ql){eq2.U)
da* ^  - 2 a
F h * ^ !  /(**) (2Blf -  B2f)
[ 7  J— 7-------- :---------- ^  ^
L 1 + f a*  f ( a ) d a
d(q] -  ql){eq2.\A) _  < 0  fo r  a* high
da* > 0  fo r  a* low
where
f(a*)B2,
l  [ r  f ( a)da\
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Bo, — (a*)*~a (  f ( a ) d a  — (  a*~a f ( a )d a  
Jo Jo
dB2,
> 0  ; — - >  0— • _ *
B y  is positive or zero because the average over the interval [a*, 1] (LHS of 
the difference in brackets) is greater than or equal to this expression calculated 
at the lower bound of the interval times the population in the interval (RHS of 
the difference in brackets). A similar argument but using the upper bound of 
the interval explains why B 2l  is also positive or zero. In addition, when there 
is no migration (a* — 1) the derivative is negative ( B y  = 0 and B 2, > 0), while 
when everyone in region g migrates to j, the derivative is positive ( B y  > 0 and 
B 2,  = 0). Then, as migration increases (a* decreases), B y  starts increasing 
and B 2, decreasing, until the derivative becomes positive (see figures 2.3 and 
2.5).
B .2 D erivatives o f equilibrium  equations w ith  
respect to  th e  param eters o f th e econom y
C ost o f  m igra tion , m :
da*(eq2.15) ( ^  -  a \  A2 ^ n . e d(q] -  ql)(eq2.14)
dm y a m J { q ] _ qy)^ > 0 i f * > K '   S S  =  °
M atch in g  effic iency, b:
da*(eq2.15) _  
db
-  ( * * ) * }  > •
In itia l popu la tion  s ize  in  both regions (overa ll popu la tion  2L ) , L:
da*(eq2.15)
dL = 0
d(q] -  ql)(eq2.U)
dL L(ip { (E[af -]) - (£[«;“-]) } < 0
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C o st o f  opening a va ca n cy , c:
da*(eq2.15)
dc
= 0
B argain in g  p o w er  o f  w orkers, (3:
9a*(eg2.15) = /  - £ \  A2
90 \<*0 )  (q] -  $ ) * ?
9(q] -  ql)(eq2.U) -  (/?</, -  a) f ,  H  ^ 90---_ 0(1 — (3)(i> — 2a) \  V ■* ])  - ( E[a° ])  /<0
since we assume V; > 2 a to obtain an stable equilibrium with unemployment 
and j3 = 1 / 2  is an standard assumption in this type of models.
P ro d u c tiv ity  level, A:
da*(eq2.15) = / -^ A  A2 < Q
dA \ a A J  (q] - q ] )  <*
d{q] ~ ql)(eq2.U) $
d(3 (if) — 2  a)A
A ppendix C 
A ppendix for Chapter 3
C .l D efin ition  o f E ducation Variable.
Table C.l: Education Variable
Education level Composition
Higher degree, First degree or other degree, teaching (all levels) 
Nursing, NVQ levels 3-5, HNC, HND, BTEC higher, RSA 
higher diploma, other higher education qualifications below de­
gree
A Level, Scottish 6 th year Certificate, AS Level, SCE higher 
NVQ level 3, GNVQ advanced, RSA advanced diploma, ONC, 
OND, BTEC and SCOTVEC national.
O Level, GCSE grade A-C
NVQ level 2, GNVQ intermediate, RSA diploma, City Sz Guilds 
advanced & craft, BTEC/SCOTVEC general diploma and 
completed apprenticeship 
CSE below grade 1, GCSE below grade C 
NVQ level 1, GNVQ/GSVQ foundation level, 
BTEC/SCOTVEC general certificate, SCOTVEC mod­
ules, RSA other, City Sz Guild other, YT/YTP certificate, 
other vocational/professional qualifications 
No qualifications
Degree or more 
High Vocational
A Level or equivalent 
Middle Vocational
O Level or equivalent 
Low Vocational
Other academic 
Other vocational
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C.2 D efin ition  o f th e  variables used in th e  es­
tim ation .
REGIONAL VARIABLES:
Average education: Average value of education variable (defined above) 
across all individuals of working age by occupational group (4, as defined in 
table 3.1), region and quarter.
s.d. of education: Standard deviation of education variable (defined above) 
across all individuals of working age by occupational group (4), region and 
quarter.
Unemp rate: Unemployment rate across all active individuals by region and 
quarter.
Vacancy rate: Vacancy rate (number of vacancies notified to job centers /  
number of unemployed) by occupational group (4, as defined in table 3.1), 
region and quarter.
Inactivity rate: Inactivity rate across all individuals of working age by region 
and quarter.
Migration ratio: Migration ratio (number of immigrants /  number of emi­
grants) by region and year.
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Sex: 1 male, 0 female.
Age: 16-24, 25-34, 35-49 years of age: 1 age group, 0 otherwise. (50-64 
(59 female) reference category.)
Ethnic origin: 1  white, 0 otherwise.
Married: 1 married, 0 otherwise.
Migrant: 1 if migrated from another region since last year, 0 otherwise. 
Head of Household: 1 head of household, 0 otherwise.
Individual’s Education: Other Voc - Degree: 1 level of highest educa­
tional attainment, 0 otherwise.
Last Job’s Occupational Group: Operator - Manager: 1 occupational 
group in last job, 0  otherwise.
no dep child< 6 : number of dependent children under the age of six living
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in the household.
no dep child< 16: number of dependent children under the age of sixteen 
living in the household.
no working: number of members of the household working at the time of the 
interview.
one person house: household made of one person only, 
two person house: household made of a couple.
Housing benefit: receiving housing benefit during unemployment.
Unemp benefit: receiving unemployment benefit during unemployment. 
Family benefit: receiving financial help from relatives during unemployment.
C.3 C lassification o f regions
Table C.2: Classification of regions
Region Counties
Rest of Northern Region 
South Yorkshire 
West Yorkshire
Cleveland, Cumbria, Durham, Northumberland 
South Yorkshire 
West Yorkshire
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside Humberside, North Yorkshire
Greater Manchester 
Merseyside
West Midlands Metropolitan 
Rest of West Midlands
East Anglia 
Inner London 
Outer London 
Rest of South East
East Midlands
South West
Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamp­
tonshire, Nottinghamshire 
Cambridgeshire, Norfolk, Suffolk 
Inner London 
Outer London
Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, East Sus­
sex, Essex, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Isle of wight, 
Kent, Oxfordshire, Surrey, West sussex 
Avon, Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Som­
erset, Wiltshire 
West midlands Metropolitan
Hereford & Worcester, Shropshire, Staffordshire, War­
wickshire
Greater Manchester 
Merseyside
continued on next page
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Table C.2: continued
Strathclyde 
Rest of Scotland
Rest of North West 
Wales
Cheshire, Lancashire
Clwyd, Dyfed, Gwent, Gwynedd, Mid Glamorgan, 
Powys, South Glamorgan, West Glamorgan 
Strathclyde
Borders, Central, Dumfries Sz galloway, Fife, 
Grampian, Highland, Lothian, Northern Sz western 
isles, Tayside
C.4 E conom etric M ethod  to  correct for stock  
sam pling bias.
The standard econometric model explained in section 3.4 would not be correct 
when we use the full sample of unemployment durations, since it also includes 
unemployment spells that started before the survey period. The problem is 
that these spells are over-represented in the sample, since during that period 
of time other individuals included in the sample experienced shorter spells of 
unemployment, but they were not recorded because they finished before the 
survey started. This is solved by conditioning the log-likelihood function on 
the length of unemployment at the first interview date (see Lancaster and 
Chesher (1983) and Lancaster (1990)). Suppose that an individual i enters 
the survey after ji periods of unemployment, remains unemployed for another 
ki periods, for a total duration U = ji + ki, that can be either censored or 
uncensored. The individual likelihood contribution is therefore
I n ^  =  Ci < lnhi(ji +  kt) +  ^  ln[l -  hj(t)] > +  (1 -  C j) y ]  ln[l -  hj(t)]
and substituting the discrete-time hazard we get the log-likelihood to be esti­
mated using the full sample of unemployment spells:
In Li =  q  {In [ -  exp { -  exp[x^ji +  ki)'/3 +  7 (ji +  ki)]}] -  exp[xi(ji + ki)'p +  7 (j{ +  ki)]}
j i + k i (C.l)
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C.5 A dditional tab les &; figures o f C hapter 3.
Table C.3: Average Education by Region and Occupation 
Group
Manual Services Technicians Man/Prof All
Reg Ave Reg Ave Reg Ave Reg Ave Reg Ave
WM 2.67 WM 3.56 WM 4.25 RYH 6.23 WM 3.95
Mers 2.73 RN 3.74 EM 4.46 WM 6.26 SY 4.11
RN 2.78 SY 3.76 SY 4.53 EAng 6.26 T&W 4.14
T&W 2.78 T&W 3.79 RWM 4.58 Wal 6.28 Mers 4.15
SY 2.80 Mers 3.81 Man 4.78 RWM 6.30 RN 4.19
WY 2.84 Wal 3.82 EAng 4.79 RN 6.31 Wal 4.27
Man 2.91 Man 3.83 RN 4.82 EM 6.34 Man 4.31
Wal 2.93 EM 3.83 T&W 4.82 Mers 6.37 EM 4.33
ILon 2.95 RWM 3.85 WY 4.82 SY 6.38 WY 4.34
RWM 2.99 EAng 3.86 RYH 4.86 Man 6.38 RWM 4.38
EM 3.00 WY 3.88 Wal 4.87 T&W 6.42 RYH 4.40
Strath 3.01 RYH 3.9 Mers 4.91 WY 6.42 EAng 4.40
EAng 3.02 RNW 4.00 RNW 5.01 RNW 6.42 Strath 4.54
RYH 3.05 OLon 4.11 SW 5.01 SW 6.42 RNW 4.56
RNW 3.08 SW 4.13 RSE 5.09 OLon 6.47 SW 4.68
OLon 3.15 RSE 4.14 Strath 5.20 RSE 6.56 OLon 4.74
RSE 3.35 ILon 4.20 OLon 5.25 Strath 6.70 RSE 4.82
SW 3.36 Strath 4.22 Scot 5.38 Scot 6.83 ILon 4.85
Scot 3.48 Scot 4.43 ILon 5.82 ILon 6.93 Scot 4.90
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Table C.4: Average Annual Growth Rate of Average Educa­
tion by Occupation
Manual Services Technicians Man/Prof All
Reg Ave Reg Ave Reg Ave Reg Ave Reg Ave
WM 0.16 Scot 0.74 Strath 1.15 RN 0.54 Scot 0.96
OLon 0.35 OLon 1.57 Scot 1.24 Strath 0.75 OLon 1.34
Scot 0.43 Strath 1.70 Mers 1.27 Scot 0.77 Strath 1.36
ILon 0.44 ILon 1.78 SW 1.36 RSE 0 .8 8 RSE 1.56
EAng 0.71 RSE 1.82 Man 1.39 ILon 0.89 RN 1.58
RSE 0.91 SY 1.82 RYH 1.47 Man 1 .01 RYH 1.60
SW 0.96 SW 1.89 OLon 1.54 WM 1.13 ILon 1.61
RYH 1.07 Man 1.92 WM 1.57 OLon 1.14 SY 1.63
Strath 1 .1 2 RYH 1.96 RSE 1.63 T&W 1.16 WM 1.64
Wal 1.15 EAng 2.04 RNW 1.64 SY 1.18 SW 1.64
EM 1.16 Wal 2.07 RN 1.64 WY 1.23 Man 1.69
RWM 1.37 RN 2 .1 0 SY 1 .8 8 Mers 1.38 RNW 1.80
SY 1.41 Mers 2 .1 1 RWM 2 .0 0 RNW 1.40 EAng 1.81
RNW 1.56 RNW 2 .1 1 T&W 2.05 Wal 1.45 Mers 1.84
WY 1.85 EM 2 .2 1 EAng 2 .1 1 SW 1.48 Wal 1.87
Man 1.90 RWM 2.44 Wal 2.16 RWM 1.53 RWM 1.96
RN 2.03 WM 2.53 ILon 2.17 EM 1.54 EM 2.15
Mers 2.73 T&W 2.58 WY 2.53 EAng 1.56 T&W 2.17
T&W 3.26 WY 2 .6 8 EM 2.56 RYH 1.57 WY 2 .2 0
SD 0.80 SD 0.43 SD 0.42 SD 0.31 SD 0.30
GINI 0.33 GINI 0.11 GINI 0.13 GINI 0.15 GINI 0.09
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Table C.5: Maximum likelihood estimates of re­
employment probabilities by sex and occupation group. 
Individual controls
Variables all
male
high low all
female
high low
In d iv idu a l C h a ra c ter is tic s
Sex
16-24 years of age 0.281*** 0.371*** 0.167 -0.113 -0.147 -0.054
25-34 years of age 0.583*** 0.612*** 0.517*** 0.341*** 0.198 0.461***
35-49 years of age 0.401*** 0.426*** 0.348*** 0.256*** 0.268** 0.192*
White 0.164* 0.322*** 0.035 0.352*** 0.410*** 0.276
Married 0.320*** 0.297*** 0.364*** 0 .0 0 1 -0.118 0.154**
Migrant -0.031 - 0 .0 1 1 -0.047 0.127 0.123 0 .2 0 0
Head of Household 0.143*** 0 .2 1 1 *** 0.025 0.024 -0.039 0.093
In d iv id u a l’s E du cation
Other Voc 0 .2 0 2 *** 0.164 0.232*** 0.065 0.191* 0.025
Other Acad 0.129* -0.063 0.265** -0.084 -0.059 -0.151
Low Voc 0.177*** 0.151** 0 .2 1 0 ** 0.139* 0.193 0.145
0  Level 0 .0 0 2 -0.036 0.060 0.099 0.291*** - 0 .0 0 2
Mid Voc 0.250*** 0.346*** 0.052 -0.183 0.394** -0.569*
A Level 0.074 0.075 0.073 -0.060 0.096 -0.140
High Voc 0.421*** 0.425*** 0.322** 0.143 0.374** -0.073
Degree 0.245*** 0.268*** 0.163 0.099 0 .2 0 1 0.082
L ast J o b ’s O ccupational G roup
Operator 0.727*** 1.080*** 1.037*** 1.526***
Sales 0.710*** 1.094*** 1.039*** 1.526***
Personal 0.744*** 1.134*** 1.095*** 1.572***
Clerical 0 .6 6 8 ** 0.756*
Craft 0.733*** 0.305 1.024*** 0.437
Technical 0 .6 6 6 ** 0.067 0.805* -0.117
Professional 0.634 -0.251 0.449 -0.796*
Manager 0.394 -0.534** 0.307 -0.874**
H ousehold  S tru ctu re
continued on next page
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Table C.5: continued
no dep child < 6 0 .2 1 2 *** 0.230*** 0.195*** -0.068* -0.130** -0.018
no dep child < 16 0.248*** 0.252*** 0.248*** 0.409*** 0.499*** 0.351***
no working 1.025*** 1 .0 2 1 *** 1.046*** 1.186*** 1.246*** 1.198***
one person house 1.657*** 1.663*** 1.637*** 2.129*** 2.248*** 2.067***
two person house 0.959*** 0.898*** 1.043*** 1.322*** 1.404*** 1.275***
B en e fits
Housing benefit -0.404*** -0.287** -0.529*** -0.164 -0.368 -0.023
Unemp benefit 0.355** -0.157*** 0.009 -0.258*** -0.223*** -0.257***
Family credit -0.089* 0.076 0.561** 0.362** 0.179 0.386**
No of Cases 8963 4674 4289 7011 2785 4226
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Region, Time and Occupation dummies and Indus-
try’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
Table C.6 : Maximum likelihood estimates of re-
employment probabilities by age group and occupation
group. Individual controls.
16-34 35-59/64
Variables all high low all high low
Ind iv idua l C haracteristics
Sex 0.005 - 0 .0 1 2 0.008 0.027 -0.009 0.043
16-24 years of age
25-34 years of age 0.223*** 0.150** 0.278***
35-49 years of age 0.258*** 0.284*** 0 .2 1 1 ***
White 0.141 0.209* 0.059 0.505*** 0.553*** 0.440**
Married 0.246*** 0.179** 0.340*** -0.127** - 0 .1 2 1 -0.144
Migrant 0.038 0.019 0.086 0.105 0.187 -0.015
Head of Household 0.243*** 0.372*** 0 .1 1 2 * -0.019 - 0 .0 0 2 -0.054
In d iv id u a l’s E ducation
continued on next page
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Table C.6 : continued
Other Voc 0.141** 0.145 0.182** 0.198*** 0.264** 0.146*
Other Acad -0.003 -0.077 0.046 0.137 0.171 0.162
Low Voc 0.126** 0.116 0.194** 0.164** 0.217** 0.078
0  Level 0.051 0.162* 0.023 0.058 0.067 0.078
Mid Voc 0.069 0.343*** -0.136 0.192 0.396*** -0.423
A Level -0.004 0.109 -0.084 0.153* 0.138 0.251
High Voc 0.274*** 0.424*** 0.044 0.327*** 0.442*** 0.215
Degree 0.232*** 0.330*** 0.173 0.144* 0.194* -0.024
Last J o b ’s Occupational Group
Operator 1.048*** 1.399*** 0.578*** 1.214***
Sales 1.030*** 1.404*** 0.593*** 1.265***
Personal 1.047*** 1.420*** 0.677*** 1.375***
Clerical 0.885*** 0.516
Craft 0.995*** 0.357 0.652*** 0.349
Technical 0.944*** 0 .1 0 1 0.427 -0.250*
Professional 0.754 -0.381 0.385 -0.638*
Manager 0.672 -0.490* 0.067 -0.854**
H ousehold  S tructure
no dep child < 6 0.113*** 0.090 0.114*** -0.077 -0.032 -0.214**
no dep child < 16 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.235*** 0.475*** 0.500*** 0.493***
no working 0.983*** 0.990*** 0.999*** 1.306*** 1.272*** 1.428***
one person house 1.586*** 1.543*** 1.617*** 2 .0 0 1 *** 1.993*** 2.092***
two person house 0.963*** 0.913*** 1 .0 1 1 *** 1.302*** 1.248*** 1.428***
B en e fits
Housing benefit -0.333*** -0.404*** -0.260* -0.305** -0.337* -0.237
Unemp benefit -0.230*** -0.253*** -0.206*** - 0 .0 0 1 -0.065 0.159*
Family credit 0.259* -0.039 0.366** 0.294 0.363* 0.300
No of cases 9495 3865 5630 6479 3594 2885
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Region, Time and Occupation dummies and Indus­
try’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
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Table C.7: Maximum likelihood estimates of re­
employment probabilities by occupation group using all 
the durations in the sample, controlling for entrance to 
sample (10 occupations). Individual controls.
Variables all occup high occup low occup
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
In d iv id u a l C h a ra c teris tics
Sex -0.032 (0 .0 2 2 ) -0.053 (0.034) -0.029 (0.029)
16-24 years of age O.7 7 4 *** (0.040) 0.844** (0.054) 0.681*** (0.059)
25-34 years of age 0.577*** (0.036) 0.638*** (0.048) 0.473*** (0.055)
35-49 years of age 0.487*** (0.032) 0.549*** (0.042) 0.380*** (0.051)
White 0.243*** (0.039) 0.225*** (0.060) 0.266*** (0.052)
Married 0.147*** (0.025) 0.063* (0.034) 0.226*** (0.036)
Migrant 0.203*** (0.065) 0.190** (0.088) 0.226** (0.096)
Head of Household 0.058** (0.025) 0.123*** (0.036) - 0 .0 0 2 (0.035)
In d iv id u a l ’s E ducation
Other Voc 0.136*** (0.034) 0.152*** (0.053) 0.140*** (0.044)
Other Acad 0.049 (0.038) 0.098* (0.060) 0.014 (0.050)
Low Voc 0.192*** (0.028) 0.294*** (0.040) 0 .1 0 1 ** (0.040)
0  Level 0 .2 0 2 *** (0.029) 0.263*** (0.047) 0.178*** (0.036)
Mid Voc 0.331*** (0.054) 0.450*** (0.070) 0.216** (0.089)
A Level 0.253*** (0.041) 0.381*** (0.055) 0 .1 2 0 * (0.065)
High Voc 0.350*** (0.048) 0.447*** (0.060) 0.260*** (0.092)
Degree 0.429*** (0.040) 0.509*** (0.050) 0.322*** (0.078)
L ast J o b ’s O ccupational G roup
Operator 1.277*** (0.046) 1.279*** (0.058)
Sales 1.255*** (0.060) 1.351*** (0.081)
Personal 1 .2 1 1 *** (0.055) 1.297*** (0.073)
Clerical 1.059*** (0.065)
Craft 1.104*** (0.076) -0.083 (0.072)
Technical 0.745*** (0.204) -0.741*** (0.242)
Professional 0.655** (0.295) -0.870*** (0.335)
Manager 0.758*** (0.130) -0.586*** (0.161)
continued on next page
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Table C.7: continued
H ousehold  S tructu re
no dep child < 6 —0.067*** (0.019) - 0 .1 2 2 *** (0.029) -0.017 (0.025)
no dep child <16 0.042*** (0 .0 1 2 ) 0.063*** (0.018) 0.023 (0.017)
no working 0.305*** (0.013) 0.285*** (0.019) 0.325*** (0.018)
one person house 0.107*** (0.040) 0.069 (0.056) 0.105* (0.061)
two person house 0.126*** (0.029) 0.107*** (0.041) 0.149*** (0.044)
B en e fits
Housing benefit -0.488*** (0.047) -0.632*** (0.079) -0.378*** (0.058)
Unemp benefit -0.177*** (0.024) -0.209*** (0.034) -0.142*** (0.035)
Family credit 0.037 (0.092) 0.044 (0.151) 0.042 (0.116)
No cases 40041 18258 21783
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Region, Time and Occupation dummies and Indus­
try’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
Table C.8 : Maximum likelihood estimates of re­
employment probabilities by occupation group dropping 
industrial share. Individual controls.
Variables all occup high occup low occup
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Ind iv idua l C haracteristics
Sex -0.038 (0.033) -0.074 (0.050) -0.035 (0.044)
16-24 years of age 0 .1 1 2 * (0.058) 0.162** (0.083) 0.085 (0.087)
25-34 years of age 0.460*** (0.053) 0.447*** (0.071) 0.486*** (0.078)
35-49 years of age 0.345*** (0.047) 0.389*** (0.061) 0.280*** (0.073)
White 0.229*** (0.086) 0.303*** (0.093) 0.131 (0 .1 1 1 )
Married 0.164*** (0.039) 0 .1 1 0 *** (0.055) 0.239*** (0.053)
Migrant 0.054 (0.069) 0 .0 2 0 (0 .1 0 1 ) 0.085 (0.106)
Head of Household 0.146* (0.031) 0.191*** (0.045) 0 .1 0 2 ** (0.046)
continued on next page
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Table C.8 : continued
In d iv id u a l’s E ducation
Other Voc 0.147*** (0.047) 0.176** (0.080) 0.136** (0.060)
Other Acad 0 .0 2 2 (0.057) -0.060 (0.085) 0.050 (0.073)
Low Voc 0.143*** (0.043) 0.169*** (0.061) 0.149** (0.065)
0  Level 0.033 (0.042) 0.095 (0.069) 0.015 (0.055)
Mid Voc 0.064 (0.103) 0.318*** (0 .1 0 0 ) -0.251 (0.190)
A Level 0.019 (0.068) 0.084 (0.085) -0.025 (0.104)
High Voc 0.287*** (0.071) 0.402*** (0.098) 0 .1 2 0 (0.113)
Degree 0.178*** (0.060) 0.242*** (0.073) 0.116 (0.118)
Last J o b ’s O ccupational Group
Operator 0.949*** (0.117) 1.332*** (0 .2 0 0 )
Sales 0.944*** (0 .1 1 2 ) 1.347*** (0.198)
Personal 0.968*** (0.108) 1.381*** (0.190)
Clerical 0 .8 8 6 *** (0.232)
Craft 0.938*** (0.124) 0.241 (0.179)
Technical 0.929*** (0.253) -0.035 (0.103)
Professional 0.922** (0.394) -0.367 (0.245)
Manager 0.679* (0.390) -0.570** (0.223)
H ousehold  S tructure
no dep child < 6 0.078*** (0.026) 0.335 (0.027) 0.083** (0.034)
no dep child <16 0.312*** (0 .0 2 0 ) 0.052*** (0.041) 0.297*** (0.026)
no working 1.068*** (0.024) 1.066*** (0.032) 1.086*** (0.030)
one person house 1.760*** (0.073) 1.757*** (0.103) 1.747*** (0.094)
two person house 1.085*** (0.045) 1.052*** (0.064) 1.134*** (0.056)
B en e fits
Housing benefit -0.303*** (0.082) -0.325*** (0.124) -0.265** (0 .1 1 1 )
Unemp benefit -0.124*** (0.034) -0.144*** (0.043) -0.079 (0.051)
Family credit 0.304*** (0.114) 0.116 (0.169) 0.385*** (0.146)
No of cases 15974 7459 8515
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level, 
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Region, Time and Occupation dummies and Indus­
try’s share of employment.
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Table C.8: continued
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
Table C.9: Maximum likelihood estimates of re­
employment probabilities by occupation group, more dis­
aggregated. Individual controls.
Variables all occup high occup low occup
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Ind iv idua l C haracteristics
Sex -0.034 (0.034) -0.070 (0.049) -0.026 (0.045)
16-24 years of age 0.115* (0.062) 0.171** (0.085) 0.087 (0.089)
25-34 years of age 0.465*** (0.055) 0.456*** (0.073) 0.486*** (0.081)
35-49 years of age 0.347*** (0.048) 0.398*** (0.064) 0.278*** (0.074)
White 0.234*** (0.078) 0.320*** (0.095) 0.134 (0.103)
Married 0.168*** (0.039) 0.127** (0.054) 0.244*** (0.057)
Migrant 0.054 (0.073) 0.017 (0 .1 0 0 ) 0.088 (0.108)
Head of Household 0.145*** (0.033) 0.186*** (0.045) 0.099** (0.048)
In d iv id u a l’s E ducation
Other Voc 0.144*** (0.049) 0.168** (0.080) 0.133** (0.062)
Other Acad 0.018 (0.055) -0.070 (0.084) 0.051 (0.072)
Low Voc 0.136*** (0.043) 0.153** (0.062) 0.138** (0.062)
0  Level 0.039 (0.043) 0.103 (0.068) 0 .0 1 2 (0.055)
Mid Voc 0.057 (0 .1 1 1 ) 0.319*** (0 .1 0 2 ) -0.266 (0.196)
A Level 0.015 (0.063) 0.074 (0.084) -0.042 (0 .1 0 0 )
High Voc 0.282*** (0.069) 0.389*** (0.093) 0.107 (0.114)
Degree 0.175*** (0.058) 0.238*** (0.074) 0 .1 0 2 (0 .1 1 0 )
Last J o b ’s Occupational G roup
Operator 0.992*** (0.093) 0.999*** (0.113)
Sales 0.911*** (0.104) 1.054*** (0.131)
Personal 0.952*** (0.095) 1.089*** (0.117)
Clerical 0.851*** (0.118)
Craft 0.856*** (0.137) -0.191* (0.098)
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Table C.9: continued
Technical 0.558* (0.333) -1.148*** (0.364)
Professional 0.373 (0.464) -1.630*** (0.525)
Manager 0.738*** (0.248) -0.597** (0.248)
H ousehold  S tru ctu re
no dep child < 6 0.079*** (0.028) 0.336 (0.028) 0.088** (0.038)
no dep child <16 0.312*** (0 .0 2 0 ) 0.049*** (0.041) 0.294*** (0.027)
no working 1.070*** (0.023) 1.073*** (0.032) 1.087*** (0.029)
one person house 1.766*** (0.069) 1.773*** (0.099) 1.751*** (0.095)
two person house 1.090*** (0.043) 1.057*** (0.063) 1.134*** (0.058)
B en efits
Housing benefit -0.304*** (0.078) -0.320*** (0.114) -0.264** (0.106)
Unemp benefit -0.128*** (0.033) -0.143*** (0.043) -0.084* (0.047)
Family credit 0.311*** (0.115) 0.098 (0.171) 0.399*** (0.152)
No of cases 53722 24712 29010
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Region, Time and Occupation dummies and Indus­
try’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
Table C.10: Maximum likelihood estimates of re­
employment probabilities by occupation group control­
ling for Gamma distributed unobserved heterogeneity. 
Individual controls.
Variables
Semiparametric 
all high low all
Weibull
high low
In d iv idu a l C h a ra c ter is tic s
Sex —0.026 -0.074 0 .0 1 1 -0.029 -0.084 0 .0 1 1
16-24 years of age 0.131* 0.188* 0.091 0.135* 0.195* 0.090
25-34 years of age 0.532*** 0.507*** 0.558*** 0.552*** 0.530*** 0.568***
35-49 years of age 0.400*** 0.436*** o CO
 
00
 
♦—
I * * * 0.417*** 0.452*** 0.343***
Notwhite 0.192*** 0.310*** 0 .1 0 0 0.199*** 0.322*** 0.107
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Table C.10: continued
Married 0.179*** 0.133** 0.255*** 0.169*** 0 .1 2 1 * 0.247***
Migrant 0.017 - 0 .0 0 2 0.050 0.006 -0.027 0.054
Head of Household 0.187*** 0.228*** 0.137** 0.194*** 0.238*** 0.143**
In d iv id u a l’s E ducation
Other Voc 0.142*** 0.192** 0.108 0.145** 0.195* 0 .1 1 0
Other Acad 0 .0 0 0 -0.095 0.032 - 0 .0 0 2 -0.096 0.029
Low Voc 0.176** 0.234*** 0.131* 0.186*** 0.252*** 0.133*
0  Level 0.054 0.147* 0.004 0.064 0.155* 0.016
Mid Voc 0 .2 0 1 *** 0.369*** 0.016 0.216** 0.385*** 0.037
A Level 0.027 0.148 -0.075 0.040 0.170 -0.073
High Voc 0.309*** 0.473*** 0.066 0.325*** 0.496*** 0.073
Degree 0.176** 0.271*** 0 .1 0 0 0.183** 0.280*** 0.109
Last J o b ’s Occupational G roup
Operator 1.016*** 1.442*** 1.053*** 1.499***
Sales 1.024*** 1.486*** 1.072*** 1.555***
Personal 1.096*** 1.560*** 1.144*** 1.628***
Clerical 0.937*** 0.966***
Craft 1.017*** 0 .2 2 0 1.057*** 0 .2 1 0
Technical 0.969*** -0.094 1 .0 0 0 *** -0.109
Professional 0.949** -0.437 0.972** -0.465
Manager 0.743* -0.586** 0.749* -0.618**
H ousehold  S tructure
no dep child < 6 0.082** 0.418 0.105** 0.083** 0.441 0.105**
no dep child <16 0.380*** 0.035*** 0.349*** 0.401*** 0.034*** 0.371***
no working 1.335*** 1.319*** 1.354*** 1.409*** 1.398*** 4 2 7 ***
one person house 2.078*** 2.064*** 2.071*** 2.151*** 2.143*** 2.140***
two person house 1.242*** 1.190*** 1.307*** 1.291*** 1.232*** 1.368***
B en efits
Housing benefit -0.324*** -0.329** -0.308** -0.366*** -0.362** -0.360***
Unemp benefit -0.125*** -0.137*** - 0 .1 0 1 ** -0.119*** -0.130*** -0.097*
Family credit 0.321** 0.038 0.473** 0.353** 0.064 0.502**
constant -0.823*** - 0 .8 8 6 *** -0.798*** -12.940*** -17.370*** -5.607
a 0.439*** 0.412*** 0.450*** 0.660*** 0.598*** 0.732***
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Table C.10: continued
Constant 0.439*** 0.412*** 0.450*** -0.550*** 0.598*** 0.732***
Gamma Variance 224.898*** 91.714*** 108.968*** 0.577*** -0.585*** -0.534***
Likelihood ratio 225.92 109.355 157.170
statistic (1 ) vs (2 )
Prob test statis­ 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
t i c a l ^
No of cases 15974 7459 8515 15974 6521 9453
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Individual controls; Region, Time and Occupation 
dummies and Industry’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
Table C .ll: Maximum likelihood estimates of re­
employment probabilities by occupation group dropping 
top &; bottom region in education. Individual controls.
Variables all occup high occup low occup
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
In d iv idu a l C h a ra c ter is tics
Sex -0.068 (0.044) -0.094 (0.073) -0.086* (0.052)
16-24 years of age 0.035 (0.085) 0 .2 1 0 * (0.127) -0.123 (0.113)
25-34 years of age 0.435*** (0.074) 0.471**(0 .1 0 0 ) 0.389*** (0.105)
35-49 years of age 0.402*** (0.065) 0.531*** (0.094) 0.236*** (0.092)
White 0.277** (0.127) 0.517** (0.219) 0.096 (0.127)
Married 0.109* (0.057) 0.059 (0.081) 0.160** (0.076)
Migrant 0.074 (0.093) 0.076 (0.142) 0.082 (0.138)
Head of Household 0.123*** (0.041) 0.178*** (0.064) 0.069 (0.055)
In d iv idu a l fs E du cation
Other Voc 0.170** (0.068) 0.295*** (0.113) 0.105 (0.087)
Other Acad 0.052 (0.077) -0.054 (0.114) 0.115 (0.098)
Low Voc 0.141** (0.059) 0.199** (0.086) 0.133* (0.080)
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Table C .ll: continued
0  Level 0 .0 2 2 (0.058) 0.072 (0.097) 0.042 (0.075)
Mid Voc 0.053 (0 .1 2 1 ) 0.297* (0.153) -0.199 (0.218)
A Level -0.114 (0 .1 0 2 ) -0.037 (0.124) -0.140 (0.163)
High Voc 0.196** (0 .1 0 0 ) 0.390*** (0.137) -0.080 (0.158)
Degree 0.153* (0.084) 0.272** (0 .1 1 1 ) 0.043 (0.142)
Last J o b ’s Occupational Group
Operator 0.708*** (0.185) 1.103*** (0.282)
Sales 0.646*** (0.179) 1.037*** (0.274)
Personal 0.712*** (0.171) 1.106*** (0.267)
Clerical 0.337 (0.389)
Craft 0.589*** (0.194) 0.469 (0.306)
Technical 0.278 (0.412) -0.225* (0.132)
Professional - 0 .2 1 1 (0.685) -1.258*** (0.433)
Manager -0.455 (0.670) -1.358*** (0.397)
H ousehold  S tructure
no dep child < 6 0.091** (0.036) 0.302* (0.042) 0.060 (0.048)
no dep child <16 0.290*** (0.029) 0.104*** (0.056) 0.289*** (0.037)
no working 1.047*** (0.032) 1.026*** (0.044) 1.093*** (0.039)
one person house 1.638*** (0.107) 1.569*** (0.146) 1.716*** (0.138)
two person house 1.047*** (0.065) 0.963*** (0.095) 1.152*** (0.076)
B en e fits
Housing benefit -0.352*** (0.115) -0.333** (0.155) -0.305* (0.158)
Unemp benefit -0.099** (0.045) -0.094 (0.058) -0.083 (0.067)
Family credit 0.377*** (0.142) 0.181 (0.216) 0.490** (0.192)
No of cases 8129 3574 4555
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Individual controls; Region, Time and Occupation 
dummies and Industry’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
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Table C.12: Maximum likelihood estimates of transitions 
to inactivity. Individual controls
Variables all occup high occup low occup
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
In d iv idu a l C h a ra c ter is tics
Sex -0.455*** (0.047) -0.602*** (0.085) -0.382*** (0.059)
16-24 years of age -0.286*** (0.073) -0.362*** (0.128) -0.252** (0 .1 0 2 )
25-34 years of age -0.503*** (0.073) -0.476*** (0 .1 1 1 ) -0.474*** (0 .1 0 1 )
35-49 years of age -0.367*** (0.067) -0.495*** (0.104) -0.243** (0.097)
White -0.070 (0.069) 0.019 (0.132) -0.113 (0.093)
Married 0.180*** (0.054) 0.267*** (0.092) 0.118* (0.070)
Migrant -0.106 (0.141) - 0 .2 1 1 (0.240) -0.088 (0.181)
Head of Household -0.050 (0.051) 0.038 (0.078) -0.097 (0.067)
In d iv id u a l ’s E du cation
Other Voc -0.009 (0.075) 0.158 (0.136) -0.108 (0.093)
Other Acad 0.070 (0.081) 0.333** (0.161) -0.008 (0.094)
Low Voc 0.070 (0.075) 0.083 (0.123) 0.096 (0.098)
0  Level 0.165*** (0.061) 0.251** (0.123) 0.119* (0.070)
Mid Voc - 0 .0 0 2 (0.147) 0.190 (0 .2 2 0 ) -0.204 (0.213)
A Level 0.243*** (0.085) 0.034 (0.154) 0.399*** (0.106)
High Voc 0.167 (0 .1 2 0 ) 0.157 (0.184) 0.246 (0.165)
Degree - 0 .1 0 0 (0.103) -0.003 (0.150) -0.302* (0.177)
L ast J o b ’s O ccupational G roup
Operator -0.335** (0.141) -0.192 (0.206)
Sales -0.270* (0.138) -0.156 (0.208)
Personal -0.233* (0.133) -0.094 (0.196)
Clerical -0.162 (0.308)
Craft -0.235 (0.144) -0.177 (0.316)
Technical 0.217 (0.337) 0.465*** (0.176)
Professional 0.475 (0.537) 0.833* (0.434)
Manager 0.676 (0.521) 0.985*** (0.382)
H ousehold  S tru ctu re
no dep child < 6 0.113*** (0.039) -0.072 (0.050) 0.135*** (0.051)
continued on next page
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Table C.12: continued
no dep child <16 —0.045* (0.027) 0.087 (0.062) - 0 .0 2 2 (0.034)
no working -0.351*** (0.029) -0.577*** (0.044) -0.234 (0.035)
one person house -0.322*** (0.085) -0.615*** (0.141) -0.132 (0 .1 1 1 )
two person house -0.193*** (0.060) -0.325*** (0.098) - 0 .1 2 0 (0.079)
B en efits
Housing benefit - 0 .1 1 2 (0.107) -0.247 (0.195) -0.072 (0.131)
Unemp benefit -0.656*** (0.051) -0.513*** (0.081)
#**i—ltOo1 (0.065)
Family credit 0.307* (0.178) 0.686** (0.290) 0.133 (0.223)
No cases 15974 7459 8515
NOTES: a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Individual controls; Region, Time and Occupation 
dummies and Industry’s share of employment.
c) The robust standard errors are clustered by region, occupation and time period. This allows for 
correlation of errors between individuals in the same cluster.
A ppendix D  
A ppendix for Chapter 4
D .l  D efin ition  o f th e  variables used in th e  es­
tim ation .
R EG IO N A L VARIABLES:
Regional E ducation  E xternalities: Share O ther Voc - Share D egree:
Share of working age population with highest educational attainment for all 
levels of education, as defined on section C.l, by region and year.
U nem p Unskilled: Unemployment rate across all active individuals with 
qualifications of O level or less by region and year.
U nem p Semiskill: Unemployment rate across all active individuals with 
middle vocational qualifications or A level by region and year.
U nem p Semiskill: Unemployment rate across all active individuals with 
higher vocational qualifications, degree or more by region and year.
Earnings Unskilled: Average level of present discounted value of perma­
nent earnings across all active individuals with qualifications below middle 
vocational by region and year.
E arnings Skilled: Average level of present discounted value of permanent 
earnings across all active individuals with qualifications of A level or more by 
region and year.
The present discounted value (PDV) of permanent earnings is calculated like 
in Rice (1999). We use data on earnings by 5 age groups (20-29, 30-39, 40-49,
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50-59, 60-64) and 2  skill groups (skilled and unskilled) 1 from the NES. Then, 
for each skill group we obtain the PDV of permanent earnings in the following 
way:
6
. . W j  *  CLQGjPDV of permanent earnmgs group l =  > — -
j =i ft
where w3 is the average weekly earnings for members of occupation i in age 
group j , age3 is the age range of the age group j  in weeks and (33 is the dis­
count factor applied based on an annual discount rate of 0.05% (e.g. P 2 0 -2 9  =  
(1 +  0.05)9, where the power is calculated from the age of 16 to the middle 
year of the age group).
Pup/teach  primary: number of pupils per teacher in primary education by 
region and year.
P up/teach secondary: number of pupils per teacher in secondary education 
by region and year.
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Individual Ability: Other Voc to  > High Voc: 1 level of highest educa­
tional attainment at the moment of the interview, 0  otherwise.
Migrant: 1 if migrated from another region since last year, 0 otherwise.
Sex: 1 male, 0 female.
Ethnic origin: 1 notwhite, 0 otherwise.
Head of Household’s education: Other Voc - degree: 1 level of highest 
educational attainment of the head of household, 0  otherwise.
Head of Household’s Socio-economic group: Manual Unskilled - 
Non-manual Skilled: 1 socio-economic group of the head of household, 0 
otherwise.
1The skill groups are based on the SOC and KOS occupations classifications. In particu­
lar, we use the classification proposed by Elias (1995) and recently used in Bell, Nickell and
Quintini (2000), but aggregated to have two skill groups: Level 2: Managers and adminis­
trators, Professional occupations, Office Managers and managers/proprietors in agriculture
and services, Associate professional and technical occupations, Craft and relations occupa­
tions, Buyers, brokers, sales reps (SOC minor groups: 10, 11, 12, 15, 1920-27, 29 13, 14,
16, 1730-3950-59). Level 1: Clerical, secretarial occupations, Personal and protective ser­
vice occupations, Sales occupations (except buyers, brokers, sales reps), Plant and machine 
operatives, Other occupations in agriculture forestry, fishing, Other elementary occupations
(SOC minor groups: 40-46, 4960-67, 6972,73, 7980-8990, 91-95, 99)
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Head of household’s labour force status: unemployed: 1 head of house­
hold unemployed, 0  otherwise.
Head of household’s labour force status: employed: 1 head of household 
employed, 0  otherwise.
single parent: 1 head of household single parent, 0 otherwise, 
youngsibl: number of younger siblings living in the household, 
oldsibl: number of older siblings living in the household.
D .2 A dditional tab les & figures o f C hapter 4.
Table D .l:  Education attainment of stayers and leavers by 
age
school leavers school stayers everyone
16 yrs  Y ly r s  18 yrs 16 yrs  Y ly rs  18 yrs 16 yrs  Y ly r s  18y r s
S h a r e  o f  U K ’s  w o r k in g  age p o p u la t io n
No qual 30.6 13.5 3.5 9.5 3.5 3.5 19.2 16.2 3.5
Other voc 2.0 1.9 1.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.8 1.1
Other acad 20.8 8.7 3.0 6.7 2.9 1.7 13.2 11.3 2.2
Low voc 2.4 8.5 10.5 0.9 3.8 4.0 1.6 6.1 6.4
O level 42.2 51.3 24.2 78.8 77.3 25.6 61.9 55.9 25.1
Mid voc 4.4 9.0 1.6 5.1 2.2 6.5
A level 45.2 57.7 53.2
More 2.1 11.6 3.0 3.7 10.3 1.4 2.9 6.4 2.0
Total 46.0 23.3 36.3 54.0 76.7 63.7 100.0 100.0 100.0
Vocational 7.7 18.5 24.7 2.1 6.7 11.8 4.3 12.6 16.5
Academic 92.3 81.5 75.3 97.9 93.3 88.2 95.7 87.4 83.5
No qual 30.6 13.5 3.5 9.5 3.5 3.5 19.2 16.2 3.5
Any qual 69.4 86.5 96.5 90.5 96.5 96.5 80.8 83.8 96.5
<  0  level 55.7 32.6 18.5 17.6 10.8 10.2 35.1 35.5 13.3
0  level 42.2 51.3 24.2 78.8 77.3 25.6 61.9 55.9 25.1
>  0  level 2.1 16.1 57.3 3.7 11.9 64.2 2.9 8.7 61.7
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Table D.2: Region’s ranking by education. Top 5 regions
No qual Other Voc Other Acad Low Voc 0  Level
region 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99
GrLon 3 3 10 17 3 2 1 1 14 2
RSE 1 1 13 6 12 7 6 3 16 17
EAng 6 6 17 15 8 15 4 4 10 16
Scot 7 4 1 13 1 1 16 5 6 1
SW 2 2 9 4 7 12 8 10 17 14
Mid Voc A Level High Voc Degree Average edu
region 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99
GrLon 1 1 16 15 7 3 17 17 16 16
RSE 15 6 15 16 15 13 16 16 17 17
EAng 5 2 13 4 5 6 12 15 12 11
Scot 16 4 17 17 14 17 14 13 15 15
SW 9 7 14 14 17 16 13 14 14 14
Table D.3: Region’s ranking by education. Bottom 5 regions
No qual Other Voc Other Acad Low Voc O Level
region 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99
SY 16 14 2 8 10 17 7 14 2 9
RN 13 12 8 3 15 14 13 16 8 8
WMid 17 16 6 16 11 10 2 2 3 4
Mersey 10 17 11 1 16 6 5 6 13 5
T&W 11 13 15 9 17 13 15 17 4 3
Mid Voc A Level High Voc Degree Average edu
region 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99 83 99
SY 4 5 5 2 13 2 4 5 2 4
RN 13 17 2 1 8 7 3 4 5 5
WMid 7 11 4 5 1 1 1 3 1 1
Mersey 2 12 9 8 6 9 5 2 6 2
T&W 8 14 3 11 2 10 2 1 3 3
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Table D.4: Probit estimation of the individual’s probability 
of participating in education
Variables 16year olds 17year olds 18year olds
Coef Mg V Coef Mg V Coef Mg V
Regional Education Externalities
Share Other Voc —0.205*** -0 .0 9 3 -0.243*** -0 .1 5 4 -0 .0 6 5 -0 .0 7 2
Share Other Acad 0.024 0.011 0.113** 0.071 -0 .0 7 3 -0 .0 8 1
Share Low Voc 0.041 0.019 0.113 0.072 -0 .0 1 3 -0 .0 1 4
Share 0  Level 0.065 0.030 0.335** 0.212 0.144 0.158
Share Mid Voc 0.051. 0.023 0.019 0.012 -0 .0 3 0 -0 .0 3 3
Share A Level -0 .1 4 1 -0 .0 6 4 -0 .0 7 5 -0 .0 4 8 0.199* 0.219
Share High Voc -0 .0 7 1 -0 .0 3 2 0.227** 0.144 -0 .0 4 3 -0 .0 4 7
Share Degree 0.353*** 0.160 0.111 0.070 0.417*** 0.458
Regional Labour M arkets
Unemp Unskilled 0.156* 0.071 0.173** 0.110 0.144 0.158
Unemp Semiskill 0.078*** 0.035 0.035 0.022 -0 .0 4 5 -0 .0 4 9
Unemp Skilled -0.082*** -0 .0 3 7 -0 .0 2 5 -0 .0 1 6 -0 .0 3 6 -0 .0 4 0
Earnings Unskilled - 2 .011*** -0 .9 1 1 0.051 0.033 -1.245** -1 .3 6 8
Earnings Skilled 0.347 0.157 0.584 0.370 1.652*** 1.816
Region’s Education Quality
P up/teach primary -0.822** -0 .3 7 2 -0 .1 7 1 -0 .1 0 8 -0 .8 9 3 -0 .9 8 1
Pup/teach 2ndary 0.817* 0.270 - 0.200 -0 .0 7 7 0.111 0.040
Individual Ability
Other Voc -0.192*** -0 .0 6 7 0.123 0.046 0.099 0.036
Other Acad - 0.022 -0 .0 0 7 0.038 0.014 -0.140** -0 .0 4 9
Low Voc 0.007 0.002 0.543*** 0.185 0.230*** 0.087
0  Level 0.872*** 0.332 1.305*** 0.456 0.751*** 0.213
Mid Voc 0.783*** 0.247 0.797*** 0.309
A Level 1.633*** 0.554
High Voc 0.838*** 0.325
>  0  Level 0.956*** 0.212
>  Mid Voc 1.769*** 0.372
>  High Voc 1.517*** 0.530
Individual Characteristics
migrant -0 .083* -0 .0 2 8 -0.130** 0.065 0.133*** 0.049
continued on next page
APPENDIX D. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4 179
Table D.4: continued
sex 0 .212*** 0.065 0.173*** --0.051 -0 .0 2 3 -0.008
notwhite 0.739*** 0.182 0.693*** 0.225 0.821*** 0.319
Head o f Household ’s Education
Other Voc 0.080*** 0.026 0 .102*** 0.039 0.187*** 0.070
Other Acad -0 .0 9 0 -0.031 -0 .0 6 6 -0.026 -0.230** --0.078
Low Voc 0.129*** 0.041 0.091*** 0.034 0.104*** 0.038
O Level 0.305*** 0.109 0.356*** 0.141 0.199*** 0.068
Mid Voc 0.311*** 0.111 0.307*** 0.121 0.227*** 0.078
A Level 0.606*** 0.159 0.544*** 0.186 0.638*** 0.248
High Voc 0.447*** 0.125 0.442*** 0.155 0.378*** 0.145
Degree 0.937*** 0.209 0.890*** 0.270 0.509*** 0.198
Head o f Household ’s Socio-economic Group
Man Unsk -0.197*** - -0.069 -0.189*** --0.074 -0.145** -0.051
Man Semisk -0.152*** - -0.053 -0.234*** - -0.092 —0.144*** -0.050
Man Skilled -0.114*** - -0.036 - 0 .221*** - -0.082 -0.137*** - -0.051
Non-man Unsk 0.039 0.013 -0 .0 8 3 -0.032 0.075 0.027
Non-man Semisk 0.126*** 0.040 0.048 0.018 0.000 0.000
Non-man Skilled - 0 .122*** - -0.042 -0.161** -0.063 -0 .0 1 4 -0.005
Head o f Household ’s Labour Force Status
unemployed -0.163*** - -0.056 -0.107*** - -0.042 -0 .1 0 9 -0.039
inactive 0.200 0.062 0.090 0.034 0.039*** 0.014
Household Structure
single parent -0.039*** - -0.013 0.036*** 0.014 0.189 0.071
youngsibl - 0.002 -0.001 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.001
oldsibl -0.105*** - 0.035 -0.105*** - -0.040 -0.109*** - -0.039
Constant 17.686** -5 .2 3 8 -2 .6 9 2
Prob (staying) 0.73 0.61 0.33
Log Likelihood -1 9084 -1 6 8 3 0 -1 1 8 9 3
X2 10499 16258 11120
Pseudo R2 0.218 0.2761 0.296
No Observations 35359 34173 30537
N O T E S
a )  * * *  d e n o t e s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  1 %  l e v e l ,  * *  a t  t h e  5 %  l e v e l  a n d  *  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l .
b )  O t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n :  I n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r o l s ;  R e g i o n  a n d  y e a r  
d u m m i e s  a n d  I n d u s t r y ’s  s h a r e  o f  e m p l o y m e n t .
continued on next page
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Table D.4: continued
b )  S t a n d a r d  e r r o r s  a r e  c l u s t e r e d  b y  r e g i o n  a n d  y e a r .  T h i s  a l l o w s  f o r  c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  
e r r o r s  b e t w e e n  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  t h e  s a m e  c l u s t e r .
Table D.5: Probit estim ation of the individual’s probability 
of staying on & participating in education not controlling for 
ability
Variables 16year olds 17year olds 18year olds
stay /  part stay part stay part
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t ie s
Share Other Voc —0.233*** -0.142* - 0 .220*** -0 .1 5 6 -0 .1 3 1
Share Other Acad 0.034 0.254*** 0.119** - 0.021 -0 .0 8 6
Share Low Voc -0 .0 1 8 0.367* 0.025 -0 .0 7 8 - 0.001
Share O Level 0.367** 0.643*** 0.557*** 0.498 0.305
Share Mid Voc 0.057 0.000 -0 .0 5 3 -0 .0 3 8 -0 .0 2 7
Share A Level -0 .169* -0.109 -0 .0 5 6 -0 .0 1 4 0.328***
Share High Voc -0 .0 5 7 0.273** 0.242** 0.031 -0 .0 7 8
Share Degree 0.401*** -0.110 0.072 0.606*** 0.378**
R e g io n a l L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp Unskilled 0.191** 0.151 0.241*** 0.056 0.143
Unemp Semiskill 0.070** 0.018 0.032 -0 .0 0 8 - 0.021
Unemp Skilled -0.080*** -0.010 -0 .0 2 4 0.024 - 0.012
Earnings Unskilled -1.895*** -0.269 0.002 -1.681*** -1.240***
Earnings Skilled 0.619 0.939* 0.384 2.047*** 1.825***
R e g io n ’s  E d u c a t io n Q u a lity
Pup/teach  primary -0.804* -0.264 -0 .4 2 5 -0 .2 2 3 -0 .6 5 4
Pup/teach  2ndary 0.932** 0.682 0.394 0.008 -0 .2 9 1
I n d iv id u a l  C h a r a c te r is t ic s
migrant -0.174*** -0.318*** -0.251*** 0.022 0.136***
sex 0.264*** 0.066*** 0.238*** -0.130*** 0.064***
notwhite 0.697*** 0.349*** 0.661*** 0.517*** 0.747***
H e a d  o f  H o u s e h o ld ’s  E d u c a t io n
Other Voc 0.113*** 0.133*** 0.147*** 0.152*** 0.229***
continued on next page
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Table D.5: continued
Other Acad - 0.021 -0.209** 0.007 - 0.220 -0.214**
Low Voc 0 214*** 0.119*** 0.193*** 0.076* 0.184***
0  Level 0.458*** 0.304*** 0.519*** 0.166*** 0.399***
Mid Voc 0.462*** 0.174*** 0.461*** 0.247*** 0.460***
A Level 0.768*** 0.480** 0.799*** 0.635*** 1.037***
High Voc 0.601*** 0.404*** 0.623*** 0.308*** 0.621***
Degree 1.130*** 0.740*** 1.145*** 0.432*** 0.938***
Head o f Household ’s Socio-economic Group
Man Unsk -0.206*** -0 .0 9 9 -0.236*** -0 .1 0 8 -0.240***
Man Semisk -0.132*** -0.124** -0.229*** -0 .1 0 5 -0.213***
Man Skilled -0.075** -0.083* -0.178*** -0 .0 4 7 -0.157***
Non-man Unsk 0.087 -0 .0 8 9 -0 .0 5 7 0.000 0.013
Non-man Semisk 0.217*** 0.119** 0.156*** 0.005 0.063
Non-man Skilled -0.185*** -0.161*** -0.230*** 0.026 -0 .0 7 1
Head o f Household ’s Labour Force Status
unemployed -0.233*** - 0 .102** - 0 .220*** -0 .0 6 4 -0.161***
inactive 0.297*** 0.138 0.216* 0.044*** 0.129***
Household Structure
single parent -0.098*** -0.023*** -0.052*** 0.133 0.151***
youngsibl -0.023*** 0.000 -0.017** -0 .0 0 4 -0 .0 1 4
oldsibl -0.133*** -0 .0 9 4 -0.155*** -0.103*** -0 .1 6 7
Constant 13.769* -4 .5 7 0 -2 .7 4 5 -0 .3 6 5 -3 .3 7 4
Prob(staying) 0.731 0.799 0.555 0.734 0.444
Log Likelihood -2 0 5 9 4 -9 2 4 1 -1 9 2 4 9 -7 4 7 0 -1 3 8 5 7
x2 8898 3790 13304 2814 9284
Pseudo R2 0.156 0.090 0.172 0.088 0.180
No Observations 35359 18688 34173 12187 30537
N O T E S
a )  * * *  d e n o t e s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  1 %  l e v e l ,  * *  a t  t h e  5 %  l e v e l  a n d  *  a t  t h e  1 0 %  l e v e l .
b )  O t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n :  I n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r o l s ;  R e g i o n  a n d  y e a r  
d u m m i e s  a n d  I n d u s t r y ’s  s h a r e  o f  e m p l o y m e n t .
b )  S t a n d a r d  e r r o r s  a r e  c l u s t e r e d  b y  r e g i o n  a n d  y e a r .  T h i s  a l l o w s  f o r  c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  
e r r o r s  b e t w e e n  i n d i v i d u a l s  in  t h e  s a m e  c l u s t e r .
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Table D.6: Probit estim ation of the individual’s probability 
of staying on & participating in education dropping top & 
bottom  regions
Variables 16year olds 17year olds 18year olds
stay /  part stay part stay part
R e g io n a l E d u c a t io n  E x te r n a l i t ie s
Share Other Voc —0.252*** -0 .0 5 6 -0.175** -0 .1 8 5 -0 .0 6 7
Share Other Acad 0.015 0.269*** 0.100* -0 .0 7 7 -0.132**
Share Low Voc 0.017 0.494** 0.232 0.069 0.028
Share 0  Level 0.161 0.564** 0.162** 0.545* 0.202*
Share Mid Voc 0.001 0.071 0.346 -0 .1 3 9 0.236*
Share A Level 0.029 -0 .1 7 5 0.035 -0 .0 0 6 -0 .1 2 7
Share High Voc -0 .1 1 9 0.421** -0 .1 1 6 0.214 0.239
Share Degree 0.022** -0 .0 6 3 0.143 0.408** 0.018*
R e g io n a l L a b o u r  M a r k e ts
Unemp Unskilled 0.351 0.138 0.015 0.144 0.267
Unemp Semiskill 0.147*** -0 .0 2 0 0.091 0.022 -0 .0 2 8
Unemp Skilled 0.089*** 0.051 0.034 0.045 -0 .0 3 6
Earnings Unskilled -0.125*** -0 .0 4 4 -0 .0 3 0 -0.057*** -0.069***
Earnings Skilled -3.201** 0.044** -0.038** 0.061*** -2.559***
R e g io n ’s E d u c a t io n  Q u a lity
Pup/teach primary 1.671 1.111 1.301 1.094 2.157
P up/teach 2ndary -0 .5 6 2 1.735 -0 .2 2 3 3.457 -0 .3 6 2
Log Likelihood -1 3 2 6 3 -5 3 3 5 -1 0 5 5 9 -4 1 6 6 -7 0 5 4
x2 5659 3248 11628 2247 10265
Pseudo R 2 0.148 0.134 0.275 0.116 0.312
No Observations 22467 11259 21683 7067 19034
NOTES
a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Individual controls; Region and year
dummies and Industry’s share of employment.
b) Standard errors are clustered by region and year. This allows for correlation of
errors between individuals in the same cluster.
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Table D.7: Probit estim ation of the individual’s probability 
of staying on in education, interacting ability with labour 
market variables.
Variables 16 year olds 17 year olds 18 year olds
Coef Coef Coef
R E G I O N A L  L A B O U R  M A R K E T  V A R I A B L E S :  
I n d iv id u a l  w ith  lo w  a b il i ty  ( le s s  th a n  O leve l)
Unemp Unskilled 0.090 0.178 0.029
Unemp Semiskill 0.082* 0.087 0.027
Unemp Skilled -0 .0 6 1  0.141 -0 .0 9 8
Earnings Unskilled —2.335*** —0.957 —3.817
Earnings Skilled 0.713 0.354 3.446**
I n d iv id u a l  w ith  h ig h  a b il i ty  (m o r e  th a n  O leve l)
Unemp Unskilled 0.181** 0.090** 0.118
Unemp Semiskill 0.074** 0.004 —0.013
Unemp Skilled -0.092*** -0 .071* 0.018
Earnings Unskilled -1.731** 1.808 -1.115***
Earnings Skilled 0.054 0.812* 1.515***
NOTES
a) *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.
b) Other variables included in the estimation: Regional & Individual controls; Region 
and year dummies and Industry’s share of employment.
b) Standard errors are clustered by region and year. This allows for correlation of 
errors between individuals in the same cluster.
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